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 The National Telecommunications and Information Administration have 
convened a series of meetings to create a voluntary code of conduct for the commercial 
use of facial recognition technology.  This research asks and answers three questions 
related to the creation of the voluntary code of conduct: 1) How is the regulatory regime 
of FRT emerging in the U.S.? 2) What are the roles of the various stakeholders in shaping 
the commercial regulation of FRT? 3) How does FRT challenge our current conceptions 
of privacy?  Data has been gathered to answer these questions using participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews.  The data was analyzed via mediated 
discourse analysis.  Findings of the research include: the highly sensitive nature of the 
biometric data that facial recognition technology collects, the data’s ability to be linked 
across multiple databases, the surreptitious way the data can be collected, the potential 
chilling effect the technology can have on the First Amendment, and the various threats 
the technology poses to privacy.   
 











 Privacy is currently at the center of a major U.S. controversy.  On February 12, 
2014, Kentucky Republican Senator Rand Paul filed a class action lawsuit against 
President Barack Obama, Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency 
(NSA), James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and James Comey, Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Paul contended that the warrantless and 
suspicionless data collection of American citizens, which had been performed by the 
government, was illegal under the Fourth Amendment (Fuller, 2014).  Paul’s concerns 
reflect a wide-spread public feeling of uneasiness with the government’s access to private 
online data.  According to the Pew Research Internet Project, 68% of Internet users 
believe the privacy laws do not provide enough protection and 50% are worried about the 
amount of their personal information available online (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang, and 
Madden, 2013).  Other citizens cite laws such as the Patriot Act to argue that the 
collection of users’ private data is necessary for the security of the country.  Facial 
Recognition Technology (FRT), a relatively new form of data collection technology 
possesses the powerful ability to link data about individuals, further invading personal 
privacy and threatening the general anonymity, the ability to be anonymous in public a 
majority of the time that Americans currently enjoy.   
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 The ability to scan an individual’s face and recognize it, which is within the 
capacity of FRT, further exacerbates the public debate on Internet privacy.  Joseph Atick 
(2011), a pioneering scientist of modern FRT, defined facial recognition as a computer’s 
ability to recognize faces in photos and appropriately identify separate individuals.  FRT 
is the essential hardware to record or scan an image, as well as the software to process the 
algorithms required for recognition or verification.  In the following work, FRT is used as 
a blanket term to include the hardware and software necessary for face recognition, 
identification, and verification.  The International Biometrics & Identification 
Association (IBIA) draws a distinction between photographs, which it does not view as 
biometric identifiers, the ability to uniquely identify a person by a distinguishing 
biological feature, and a faceprint, the digital code extracted from a photograph, that can 
be matched against other databases (Atick, 2011; Rouse, 2008).  Faceprints can be 
thought of similarly to fingerprints, as both are unique individual identifiers.    
 There are three stages in the application of FRT, beginning with face detection.  
Face detection can be accomplished using memoryless systems, which do not “extract, 
store or utilize faceprints; they simply detect the presence of a human face” (Atick, 2011, 
p.1).  Although unnerving in its own right, the current privacy controversy concerns the 
systems that store such information, rather than simply acknowledge it. The other two 
stages in FRT application include facial recognition identification and facial recognition 
verification.  Identification is the process of comparing a singular faceprint to a database 
of multiple faceprints to determine who the individual is.  Verification, on the other hand, 
provides process reliability by ensuring that a person is who he says he is.   
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 Recently, the commercial use of FRT has gained popularity.  Internet companies 
like Facebook and Google have made noticeable use of the technology through 
“tagging”1 and Google Glass2 respectively.  Many retailers are adopting the technology to 
combat shoplifters.  Most notably, FRT was deployed during the 2001 Super Bowl to 
search individuals against a mug shot database in an effort to identify wanted criminals 
(McCullagh, 2001). 
 This dissertation explores the evolution of the regulatory regime of FRT.  First, 
the focus is the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
multistakeholder (MSH) process for the development of a regulatory regime for FRT; this 
is a unique process which involves stakeholders who previously participated in an earlier 
MSH process convened by the NTIA.  This process began February 6, 2014 and 
continues as of this writing (June 2015).  The meetings were primarily followed via the 
webcast posted on the NTIA website.  In all ten meetings have been recorded.  Issues 
discussed in the meetings include but are not limited to: notice, transparency, reverse 
engineering of data, First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights, and surveillance.    
 Through the discourse analysis of video transcripts and interviews conducted for 
the study, as well as tracking the development of the regulatory regime for FRT, this 
researcher demonstrates how the stakeholders view the concept of privacy and the 
various methods they have constructed to regulate FRT.  Interviews have been conducted 
with members from each stakeholder group: academics, government officials, business 
members, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  A discussion on the merits and 
                                                          
1 Refers to a feature on Facebook where an individual can assign a name to an individual in a photograph.   
2 Eyewear that allows an individual to Google search and perform other tasks on objects in their range of 
sight.  
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the deficits of creating a voluntary code of conduct to regulate this technology has been 
provided.  This dissertation demonstrates that the flexibility of a code of conduct allows 
for continued innovation of the technology.  Alternatively, the voluntary nature of the 
code of conduct provides little protection to consumers if companies do not agree to sign 
on.  This dissertation illustrates the positions of various stakeholder groups and their 
advocacy goals for outcomes to the voluntary code of conduct.  The primary focus of the 
process is to protect United States consumers and their privacy; however, many of the 
businesses represented in the process are international in nature.  References to 
international standards or laws are done for the sake of business entities involved in the 
process but the primary focus remains on the United States consumer.  
 Several assumptions have been made while conducting this research.  The first 
assumption made is the adoption of the liberal notion of privacy.  As Anita Allen (1998) 
notes: “The liberal conception of privacy is the idea that government ought to respect and 
protect interests in physical, informational, and proprietary privacy” (p. 723).  The liberal 
notion of privacy is similar to liberal notions of property; privacy is associated with 
things we own such as our home, body, and affects (Allen, 1998).  This notion of privacy 
is primarily concerned with inaccessibility to either our person or our information.  Also, 
this notion places a premium on individual choice and autonomy over our lives.  This 
view of privacy has been challenged by business interests represented in the 
multistakeholder process. 
 Another assumption of this research is the primacy of business or economic 
interests over the liberal notion of privacy and democracy.  During the course of 
observing the meetings, business and economic interests have trumped the privacy of 
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individuals.  It is clear that corporate power has trumped that of the individual and 
appears to challenge a few pillars of American democracy namely the First and Fourth 
Amendments.   
 Finally, privacy is a concept without strict agreement as to its definition or scope, 
nor is there uniform appreciation for privacy amongst the public.  Privacy varies in 
importance to individuals subjectively and in the context of a given situation.  As such, it 
is very difficult for the academic community to make statements and conceive of privacy 
as a static definition.  Therefore, the academic community has provided narrow 
conceptions of privacy including: physical, informational, or cognitive; and dealt with 
specific facets of privacy.  The dissertation demonstrates how FRT blurs the distinctions 
the academic community has previously made.  As such, I propose that privacy needs to 
be reconceptualized.  Privacy scholars should conceive of privacy as interference.  The 
interference concept accounts for privacy’s subjective and contextual nature while, more 
importantly, not adding an additional definition of privacy, which is common in academic 
literature.  This work aims to explain why this conception works and why it will be 
beneficial to privacy scholars.   
 Several research questions have been asked and answered by this dissertation.  
The first question the dissertation answers is: How is the regulatory regime for FRT 
emerging in the U.S.?  This regime is being developed via a unique MSH format to 
protect consumer privacy.  The second question addressed by the dissertation is: What are 
the roles of the various stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?  In 
other words, what consumer safeguards are being implemented to protect privacy from 
the challenges posed by FRT.  Finally, this project addresses the question of: How does 
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FRT challenge our current conceptions of privacy?  The project has concluded that 
privacy must be re-conceived because of the capabilities of FRT. 
 This dissertation employs multiple research methods to answer the above stated 
questions.  Data has been collected by conducting interviews with participants involved 
in this process as well as through participant observation.  Discourse analysis has been 
conducted on the data to determine which texts have contributed to the development of a 
code of conduct for FRT.  Multiple research methods have been employed to enhance the 
reliability of the findings. 
 This dissertation contributes new knowledge to the fields of new media, privacy, 
and the regulation of communication technology.  FRT is a new medium through which 
communication can be conducted, as such it poses new challenges as well as benefits to 
the way humans communicate.  It is argued in this dissertation that FRT poses new and 
unique challenges to current conceptions of privacy; as such, new understandings of 
privacy are needed in light of the development of FRT.  Finally, this project contributes 
to current understandings of the regulation of communication technology.  This project 
argues that there is a field of technology regulation despite the term scantly appearing in 
the academic literature.   
 There are limitations to all research projects and this dissertation is no exception.  
Limitations include: 
 The debate and creation of a voluntary code of conduct are incomplete.  The 
original timeline for the process was to begin in February and end in June with 
a scheduled re-convening of the group in September, this timeline was 
adopted by this dissertation.   
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 The novelty of this technology is another limiting factor of this dissertation.  
There is scarce theoretical literature available about the technology.   
 Not all stakeholders who were reached agreed to provide an interview.  
Important stakeholder voices are missing from this dissertation.   
 Novelty of the evolving regulatory regime for FRT being created via a MSH 
process. 
1.1. Chapter Descriptions 
 Chapter two contains a detailed case description of the evolving regulatory regime 
for FRT.  The meetings arose out of trade complications with the European Union (EU) 
and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) (2012).  The case is discussed in 
reference to relevant documents and previous processes convened dealing with FRT.  
While the NTIA MSH meetings represent the first regulatory regime for FRT there were 
other “best practices3” issued previously by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  A 
description of the venue, participants, and proceedings of the meetings is also presented. 
 The third chapter is a description of how FRT actually works.  FRT has multiple 
uses and different modalities.  The chapter discusses the differences between recognition, 
authentication, and identification.  There are several different ways to conduct a facial 
scan, each with their own merits and deficits.  These various scanning methods are 
discussed, including how they are used to identify or authenticate an image.  Also, in this 
chapter, a discussion of accuracy rates, thresholds and their uses, as well as hybrid uses of 
the technology are provided.   
                                                          
3 The FTC has issued a staff report containing best practices for the commercial use of FRT. 
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 Chapter four discusses the theoretical underpinnings of this research.  The 
dissertation employs the social constructivist paradigm and shows how this case study fits 
under it.  This research relies on three primary theoretical concepts: privacy, regulation of 
technology, and multistakeholder collaboration.  Presented in the chapter are the 
historical, legal, theoretical, and varied conceptualizations of privacy.  This chapter 
shows that the regulation of technology is a field of study, though the term is not used in 
the academic literature.  Also presented are the historical approaches to the regulation of 
communication technologies as well as contemporary theories of technology.  Finally, a 
discussion on the history and merits of the multistakeholder approach to creating 
regulation is provided.  The discussion focuses on the advantages of collaboration as it 
relates to the case as well as regulating the technology.   
 The fifth chapter is best described as a research methods chapter.  In this chapter a 
discussion of the case study design, its rationale for being chosen, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the design are provided.  This dissertation employs multiple methods for 
collecting data including participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and 
discourse analysis.  Strengths of these data collection methods as well as the benefit of 
using multiple data collection methods to triangulate results are discussed as well.   
 Chapter six is a discussion and comparison of the U.S. and EU data protection 
laws, specifically focusing upon their differences.  In many ways, this analysis is 
necessary because of tensions between the U.S. and the EU, primarily in terms of each 
country’s stance on data protection.  Edward Snowden’s revelations concerning the NSA 
spying scandal strained U.S. EU commerce relations due to Safe Harbor violations.  Lack 
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of data protection on the part of the U.S. needs to be understood in order to comprehend 
why the CPBR was created and what its goal is.   
 Chapter seven contains analysis of the first research question of the dissertation 
(Please see section 5.5. for a more detailed review of the research questions): How is the 
regulatory regime for facial recognition technology emerging in the U.S.?  This MSH 
process was preceded by an earlier process regarding mobile application transparency.  
The mobile application transparency process was concerned with the notice that users 
receive about their data and privacy protections when downloading and using a mobile 
application or “app.”  This carryover of stakeholders is a unique situation as most 
stakeholders are new to each process.  Furthermore, the previous process was largely 
described as unpleasant and unproductive.  Next, a discussion of how the voluntary code 
of conduct is emerging for FRT is provided.  Participants in the current MSH process 
have adopted new communicative strategies and alternative decision making methods to 
achieve positive outcomes.  The strengths and weaknesses of these new decision making 
methods are discussed as well.  A discussion is also provided on stakeholder 
relationships, participant influence on the MSH process, as well as representation in the 
meetings.     
 Chapter eight primarily concerns how the technology itself is regulated, which is 
an ongoing process.  Here the research question: “What are the roles of the various 
stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?” is answered.  A discussion is 
provided on data security, as it was the initial matter discussed during the MSH meetings 
after the group had learned about the technology.  Further detail is provided about the 
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sensitivity of the data collected, best practices for securing said data, and the different 
privacy implications attached to each modality of FRT.   
 In chapter nine the central question of this research is answered, which is how 
privacy should be reconceptualized because of this technology.  Initially, data on how 
stakeholders conceive of privacy are presented.  Understanding how stakeholders 
conceive of privacy is important in determining the development of a voluntary code of 
conduct for FRT.  Next, the many conceptions of privacy are briefly discussed as well as 
how FRT blurs the distinctions privacy scholars have previously made.  An argument is 
provided for the merits conceptualizing privacy as interference without creating 
additional definitions of privacy, which would only serve to further cloud the waters of 
academic study.   
 Chapter ten acts as the final chapter of this dissertation, where a summary of the 
major findings from this research, limitations to the research, and areas for future inquiry 
are all presented. The MSH process for FRT is ongoing, and, as such, conclusions are 
limited as to what language will be contained in the code of conduct as well as the 
consumer protections to privacy may provide.  An argument for further research 








UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXTUAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE FACIAL 
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY MEETINGS 
 
 In the United States, facial recognition technology has been under development 
for decades4, funded primarily through government agencies.  One of the first times FRT 
entered the public debate was the December 2011 Federal Trade Commission workshop 
on FRT.  The workshop brought together diverse participants to discuss a variety of 
issues surrounding the increasingly likely commercial use of FRT.  The FTC in October 
of 2012 issued a staff report entitled Facing Facts: Best Practices for Common Uses of 
Facial Recognition Technologies.  The best practices included privacy consideration, the 








Figure 1.  Timeline for facial recognition technology entering the public debate 
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 The National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) The 
NTIA multistakeholder meetings for facial recognition technology began with the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) in, February of, 2012).  The White House 
intended the CPBR to protect consumer’s privacy by describing broad privacy protecting 
principles that consumers should expect from companies that handle personal 
information.  The CPBR is  
[P]art of a comprehensive blueprint to protect individual privacy rights 
and give users more control over how their information is handled. This 
initiative seeks to protect all Americans from having their information 
misused by giving users new legal and technical tools to safeguard their 
privacy.  (White House, 2014) 
 The CPBR tasks the Department of Commerce’s NTIA with convening a series of 
multistakeholder (MSH) meetings, including Internet companies, consumer advocates, 
trade associations, businesses, and governments on a variety of privacy issues (including 
the use of facial recognition technologies).  The goal of the MSH meetings is to create 
enforceable codes of conduct that comply with the CPBR and that can be enforced by the 
FTC.  The Obama Administration has also pledged to work with Congress to enact 
comprehensive privacy legislation. 5 
                                                          
5 The current 2013-2014 113th Congress is on track to be the least productive Congress ever, passing just 
142 bills as of July (Murray, 2014).  According to the Pew Research Center, have just a 28% favorable 
view of Congress, 69% disapprove (Pew Research Center, 2014).  Additionally, just 44% of the American 
public approve of the President according to Pew Research Center (Tyson, 2014).  The administration has 
pledged to work with Congress to pass the privacy principles in the CPBR but has also urged advocates and 
the private sector to work together to implement the principles outlined in the CPBR.  Given the current 
political realities, it seems unlikely that the President and Congress will enact these privacy protections 
legislatively.   Codes of conduct represent an alternative way forward toward the goal of protecting 
consumer privacy by developing voluntary codes of conduct that comply with the privacy principles and 
can be enforced by the FTC.   
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 The Obama Administration directed the NTIA Privacy MSH Process: FRT to 
produce codes of conduct.  This MSH framework allows interested parties to participate 
and work within their areas of expertise.  As it is explained by the White House, 
“Multistakeholder processes can provide scalable, flexible means of developing codes of 
conduct that simplify companies’ compliance obligations” (White House, 2012, p. 2).  To 
a certain extent, business is dependent on consumer trust and confidence.  It is anticipated 
that businesses, that chose to adopt a voluntary code of conduct, will enjoy an extra level 
of consumer trust.  Adoption and compliance with a code of conduct, once created, could 
provide businesses with a competitive advantage (Bowie & Jamal, 2006, p. 339).   
 Another National Telecommunications and Information Administration driven 
process was held prior to the current one on FRT, in July of 2012, concerning Mobile 
Application (app) Transparency.  Some stakeholders from the current FRT process 
described the mobile app process as frustrating, as some stakeholders were deliberately 
disruptive rather than working towards an agreeable end, disruptive stakeholders likely 
had the goal of avoiding the creation of new regulation.  Not all of the stakeholders from 
the FRT process were involved in the mobile app process, but those who were may have 
approached the current situation with a skeptical view.  Prior experience with a MSH 
process allowed the NTIA to conduct a more coherent debate of the FRT uses, 
stakeholders expressed opinions that the FRT process proceeded with less confrontation, 
which they largely attributed to the moderator, John Verdi, who skillfully facilitated the 
debate.6   
                                                          
6 John Verdi was a former advocate at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) before being hired 
at the NTIA.  Verdi sees his role in the process as a facilitator, nothing more or less.  He was very specific 
about his role as facilitator, so as to not influence the process but to simply facilitate it.  Some stakeholders 
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 The following key principles of the CPBR provide important context for the 
group’s interaction and the code of conduct created (White House, 2012)  Individual 
control, or consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data companies 
collect from them and how they use it.  Transparency is the right consumers have to 
easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices.  
Respect for context concerns consumers having a right to expect that companies will 
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in 
which consumers provide the data.  Security is a right consumers have to secure and 
responsible handling of their personal data.  Access and accuracy is a right to access and 
correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity 
of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate.  
Collection concerns consumers having a right to reasonable limits on the personal data 
that companies collect and retain.  Finally, accountability is a principle where personal 
data is handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to 
the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Whitehouse, 2012).   
 These privacy principles were based on the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology’s (NIST) Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), originally included in 
the Privacy Act of 1974 (NSTIC, 2014).  The above principles were specifically designed 
with generalizability in mind in order to promote flexibility in company implementation.  
The Obama Administration hopes that the flexibility of the general principles in the 
CPBR will lead to innovation that creates better consumer and business outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
have had a previous relationship with Verdi and others have not.  Stakeholders have not articulated a 
negative opinion of John or his facilitation of this process.   
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2.1. Key Parameters of the Facial Recognition Debate Case 
 The MSH meetings on FRT that the NTIA convenes, facilitates the stakeholder 
debate on how to protect consumer privacy from the commercial use of the technology.  
The NTIA is an executive branch agency that primarily advises the President on matters 
of information and telecommunications policy.  One of the chief concerns of the NTIA is 
enhancing access to broadband Internet; however, the NTIA also focuses on copyright, 
online privacy, online security, and the Internet economy.  The NTIA handles domestic 
and international telecommunications activities. 
 The NTIA MSH meetings concerning FRT began February 6, 2014.  These 
meetings were announced on the NTIA website in advance to encourage interested 
parties to join the mailing list for the process.  Each of the meetings were scheduled once 
a month from February to December of 2014, with each meeting lasting, four hours.  This 
dissertation was designed to follow the stated timeline and is one of the reasons this 
research ends ahead of the completion of a code of conduct for FRT.  The meetings were 
open to the public (a notification was published on the NTIA website December 3, 2013 
announcing the upcoming meetings) and convened at the boardroom of American 
Institute of Architects in Washington D.C.; they were also made available via a webcast 
on the NTIA website, providing interested parties the opportunity to dial in to the 
conference call.  One business interviewee (whose anonymity has been protected) has 
described the process as “radically transparent.”  A timeline for the 2014 meetings is as 










Figure 2.  Timeline of 2014 multistakeholder meetings. 
 
2.1.1. Venue 
 The desks in the boardroom are arranged in a two tiered horseshoe shape.  The 
room is capable of seating around 70 individuals.  The seats are all provided with 
microphones so that stakeholders can be heard in both the room and on the webcast (See 
Figure 3.) 
 The stakeholder collaboration is facilitated by a projector located in the center of 
the room so that the participants can see and work on documents collaboratively.  Three 
cameras in the room ensure observation via the webcast and allow individuals to see the 
documents, as well as the speakers.   
Figure 3.  Display of American Institute of Architects Boardroom, NTIA MSH Venue 





Figure 3.  Display of American Institute of Architects Boardroom, NTIA MSH Venue. 
Adapted from “American Institute of Architects’ Website” (American Institute of 
Architects, 2014) 
 
2.1.2. Participant Groups 
 Representatives from four broad groups of stakeholders were present at the 
meetings: academics, government, business, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  The following provides more details on the representatives:  Academics from 
varied institutions have made presentations, some institutions represented include but are 
not limited to: Rutgers University, Carnegie Mellon University, and UCLA.  Government 
representatives include the NTIA, the FTC, some elected official representatives, and the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner’s Office of Ontario.  Business representatives 
include but are not limited to International Biometrics and Identification Association 





others7.  The last major stakeholder group is NGO participants that are comprised of 
advocacy groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Center for 
Digital Democracy (CDD), Common Sense Media, Consumer Federation of America, 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Center for Democracy and Technology 
(CDT), and others.8  The following is a brief description of the stakeholders who attained 
high visibility through participation.  These descriptions are included to provide the 
reader an idea of the advocacy goals of the most vocal participants involved in the 
process.   
 The American Civil Liberties Union was one of the most vocal participants 
throughout the process.9  Throughout this MSH process the ACLU was 
concerned about protecting the privacy rights of individuals.   
 Common Sense Media, an advocacy group, was primarily concerned with 
FRT being used to take pictures of or sell products to children.  In later 
meetings, the group also urged the other stakeholders to include the term 
“facial profiling” into the definitions list.10 
                                                          
7   Private sector participants were harder to track because not all of them have been vocal participants 
  
8  It is not always clear who is monitoring the meetings as stakeholders can call in to the meetings or follow 
along on the webcast without identifying themselves or their respective organizations.  Stakeholders may 
have various motivations for monitoring the meetings and not participating.   
  
9 According to the ACLU’s website, “The ACLU is our nation’s guardian of liberty, working daily in 
courts, legislatures and communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties that the 
Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee everyone in this country” (ACLU, 2014).   
 
10  According to the Common Sense Media website, “Common Sense is dedicated to helping kids thrive in 
a world of media and technology.  We empower parents, teachers, and policymakers by providing unbiased 
information, trusted advice, and innovative tools to help them harness the power of media and technology 
as a positive force in all kids’ lives” (Common Sense Media, 2014).   
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 Consumer Federation of America is a non-profit organization protecting 
consumer rights, was often in opposition to the interests of commercial 
companies11.   
 The Center for Digital Democracy (CDD)12  advocated for increased learning 
and education during the meetings when other members of the group felt they 
had sufficient facts.   CDD protested and challenged the validity of the MSH 
process.   
 The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)13  provided technical 
expertise and occasionally voiced their opinion on matters they are invested 
in, most notably data encryption and the definition of encryption as it relates 
to FRT.   
 NetChoice was also actively involved in the process.14  The organization has 
been involved in helping draft the definitions that the group will work with 
and use on the code of conduct.   
 The International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA) has also been an 
active participant in the NTIA MSH meetings on FRT.15    
                                                          
11 “The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is an association of non-profit consumer organizations that 
was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and education.  
Today, nearly 300 of these groups participate in the federation and govern it through their representatives 
on the organization’s Board of Directors” (Consumer Federation of America, 2014).    
12 “CDD has been at the forefront of research, public education, and advocacy on protecting consumers in 
the digital age. It has helped foster widespread debate, educating a spectrum of stakeholders, and creating a 
legacy of government and self-regulatory safeguards across a variety of Internet and digital media 
platforms” (Center for Digital Democracy, 2014). 
13 “CDT is a champion of global online civil liberties and human rights, driving policy outcomes that keep 
the Internet open, innovative, and free” (Center for Democracy and Technology, 2014). 
14 “NetChoice is a trade association of eCommerce businesses and online consumers all of whom share the 
goal of promoting convenience, choice, and commerce on the net” (NetChoice, 2014). 
15 “The International Biometrics & Identification Association (IBIA) is a trade association founded in 
September 1998 in Washington, DC that promotes the effective and appropriate use of technology to 
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 Motorola, represented by an attorney in the FTR proceedings, is a leading 
mobile device manufacturer.  It remains unclear to this researcher exactly 
what Motorola was advocating for during the meetings but the organization 
led the risks/harms committee by way of use cases to provide actual FRT use 
examples.  The group worked alongside the Definitions Committee but has an 
important role in determining what some of the ultimate uses of FRT may be 
via the code of conduct.  Motorola also represented a potential key 
stakeholder as some technologists have already shown that facial recognition 
(FR) is possible using mobile devices and off the shelf software.    
2.1.3. Meeting Phases 
 The FRT MSH collaborative process progressed in phases from February to 
December 2014.  The researcher observed the following three major phases in the MSH 
process based on stakeholder interaction and the agenda set by the moderator. 
1. February-April: was the information collection stage marked by expert 
presentations and stakeholder debates.  This provided stakeholders with a 
baseline of knowledge on several different areas.  With the possible exception 
of certain technologists, stakeholders were learning about how the technology 
works, how different companies use the technology, and what the technology 
may be able to do in the future.  Initially, the Microsoft representative was a 
vocal contributor at the meetings.  She gave a brief presentation about how 
their Xbox Connect technology worked, which provides a large consumer use 
of FRT and technologies similar to FRT.  The first four meetings were reliant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
determine identity and enhance security, privacy, productivity, and convenience for individuals, 
organizations, and governments” (International Biometrics and Industry Association, 2014a). 
 
21 
on presentations from companies, technologists, and advocates for more fact 
finding.  The initial stage of the process started with consensus building, 
where stakeholders developed a common understanding of terminology, 
technology capabilities, and agreement about the scope of the process.  This 
consensus building continued throughout the process and was prominently 
seen again at the end when the codes of conduct were drafted and a consensus 
was reached in terms of appropriate actions to include in the code.   
 A major source of contention in the initial meetings, and a lingering point of 
frustration, was the scope of the code of conduct.  With the National Security 
Agency (NSA) revelations from Edward Snowden, the stakeholders at the 
meeting were increasingly concerned about government’s use of the 
technology, specifically related to surveillance, personal privacy, and freedom 
of speech.   
2. May-July: In the case collection stage the stakeholders were utilizing their 
knowledge about the technology to identify potential risks/harms.  The 
participants were also looking at examples of best practices, previous debate, 
and the technology being deployed in the physical environment to create a 
code of conduct.  In the second stage, the actual work on a code of conduct 
began.  Committees were formed to create a common language (definitions 
committee) and to discuss applications (risks/harms committee).  This led the 
participants to consider which uses of the technology they were uncomfortable 
with, and opinions often varied.  Discussing cases of the application of the 
FRT led the group to compile a list of use cases that became the Risks/harms 
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Committee.  These use cases challenged the participants to create solutions or 
guidelines to the use of the technology in specific situations.  Terminology 
quickly became a problem for the group which often led to 
misunderstandings.  
 The definitions committee focused on creating a common language that the 
stakeholders could use to avoid terminology confusion.  For example, 
stakeholders were confused about what a “user” of FRT was.  Did a user 
describe the person operating FRT or the person the technology was being 
applied to?   Terminology issues such as these were identified and corrected 
by the Definitions Committee.   
3. November-December: The drafting stage was marked by stakeholders coming 
together to decide on a final code of conduct.  In this stage the capacity 
building potential of the MSH process is demonstrated as the stakeholders 
used their “accumulated social, intellectual, and political capital” to make 
decisions (Antonova, 2011, p. 433).   At this final stage the participants who 
drafted the code of conduct expressed two varying positions. The privacy 
protection advocates argued for a more limited scope for the use of FRT, 
which was contrary to the industry advocates’ perspective.  Industry advocates 
suggested a wider scope of FRT uses.  Where the code applies to the scope, 
use, and varied capabilities of the technology remain to be seen.  The final 
stage proceeded based on topics of consensus within the group.  The first issue 
that received broad consensus from the stakeholders was security.  Agreement 
was achieved that FR data should receive strong protection in order to make 
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the data as secure as possible.  Recent data breaches occurring at Target and 
Home Depot were discussed during the meetings and encouraged stakeholders 
to treat data security seriously.  It was believed that stakeholders coming to 
consensus on “low hanging fruit” items, such as security, provided the group 
with momentum and good will so that more contentious items could be agreed 




   
 















FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
 Facial recognition technology applies algorithms to process photos of an 
individual.  This evaluation can recognize the presence of a face, authenticate an 
individual for access to a privilege, or identify an unknown individual.  Facial recognition 
technology collects unique biometric data that cannot be changed or replaced if exploited.   
3.1. Biometric Data 
 Biometric data are based on personal unique biological traits such as finger prints.  
The term biometrics is now commonly used to describe the technology that allows for the 
collection and examination of biometric data.  Biometric data are increasingly being used 
by consumers, and commercial, as well as government, uses abound (Wood, 2014).  
Biometrics offer the possibility of making daily transactions and interactions safer, as it is 
hard to copy or fake DNA or similar biological traits.   Apple iPhone users, for instance, 
can now use their fingerprint to unlock the device or use a scan of their face.  This 
eliminates the worry of stolen or compromised passwords which ultimately leads to 
unwanted access of protected data.  It also facilitates convenience of use by eliminating 
the need to remember multiple passwords; instead a device can be accessed by simply 
presenting one’s face or scanning one’s finger.   
 Despite the common belief that biometrics enhance security and provide 
convenience to the user, some experts have expressed concerns: an individual’s biometric 
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data are very difficult, if not impossible, to change.  Should biometric data be 
compromised, there is no way to change the data, as one would if their password was 
compromised.  For these reasons, biometric forms of authentication are often a secondary 
form of authentication, or, if used as a primary form, are typically coupled with another 
secondary form of authentication, like a pin number or smart card (Atick, 2014).    
 FRT is one mode of obtaining biometric information about a person.  Other 
methods include iris scans, hand telemetry, fingerprints, and DNA.  Facial recognition 
technology is unusual because it does not require the consent of the person whose picture 
is being taken; photography is a First Amendment protected activity (Schauer, 1981).  Iris 
scans and hand telemetry devices would require the individual to consciously interact 
with the system.  The faceprint, the biometric information created from an image, can be 
taken surreptitiously from a distance or even at night if using infrared FRT (Kong, Heo, 
Abidi, Paid, & Abidi, 2005).  This technology mimics a human skill, recognizing faces.  
In contrast, humans cannot identify someone based on a casual observation of their 
fingerprint or the size of their hand.  The other major difference is the scalability of the 
technology; FRT can scan and store potentially endless numbers of images, while 
humans are capable of remembering up to 10,000 faces, according to some estimates 
(Radford, 2004).   
 Facial recognition technology is applied to an image or a series of images of a 
person.  The images often reveal additional information about the person besides 
allowing the technician to extract a face template.  Many digital cameras capture what is 
called Extended File Information (EXIF).  EXIF data contains information about the 
camera that took the photo, such as file name, size, date, camera make, camera model, 
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resolution, flash usage, focal length, and Jpeg process (Alvarez, 2004, p. 2).  Apple’s 
iPhone is also capable of embedding precise geo-coordinates with photos and videos 
taken with the device (Friedland & Sommer, 2010, p. 1).  Also unique to FR is its ability 
to easily fix a person in place and time.  The fact that more information can be collected 
about an individual from their faceprint, which can be gleaned from a photo, raises 
concerns about privacy expectations, particularly who is collecting the information.     
3.2. Modalities of Facial Recognition 
 Facial recognition technology usually operates in a predictable manner, however, 
not all systems perform identification.  The initial process is face detection.  The system 
must first look through the image or video to determine whether or not there is the 
presence of a human face.  Applications for face detection may include face counting to 
determine traffic in a store.  During this process there is no additional information 
collected about the person and no comparisons are made about the individual.   
 Face detection is not completely innocuous, however, because the system or 
operator may be capable of making other determinations about the individual.  The 
system may be able to recognize race, gender, and even an individual’s age range.  
Operators may be able to draw conclusions about the wealth or relative health of an 
individual based on other factors present in the picture, such as clothing or medical 
devices.    
 Another cause for concern about face detection is whether the system is capable 
of recognizing the same face.  During this process, the system may collect face data and 
store it for a period of time without identifying it.  Imagine someone who is an alcoholic 
and frequents the local liquor store.  The system may not know who the individual is, or 
 
27 
anything about the individual, but it may be able to determine that the same individual 
visits the store on a daily basis.  This example seems innocuous unless their face is 
identified and enrolled in a separate system that can be linked to the liquor store.  From 
there, the individual could be dropped from his/her health insurance or even denied an 
organ transplant.  The rise of “big data,”16 including vast consumer dossiers full of 
transactional, demographic, and financial data could be more easily linked thanks to FRT.   
 After a face has been detected, the system may or may not be capable of 
performing a more detailed analysis.  The next step is authentication, sometimes used 
interchangeably with verification.  During the authentication stage the (FR) system is 
trying to determine if the person who is presenting himself as John Doe is in fact John 
Doe.  Payroll systems commonly deploy this type of technology.  Employees often 
present their faces as a way to clock into and out of work.  During the authentication 
process, the system compares the face and identity that is presented with a stored 
(enrolled) identified image in a database.  The system extracts the face template from the 
individual in front of it and compares it with the identified template stored in the system.     
 During this process there are two types of errors that could occur.  A type I error 
is the acceptance of a false positive.  The FR system matches the individual to a stored 
identity incorrectly.  In other words, the system believes that there is a match when in fact 
there is no match.  The systems can be altered according to a threshold rate, which 
equates to how willing the operator is to experience false positives.  Therefore, if a 
system has a false accept rate of .1 for every 1000, then there will be one false positive 
                                                          
16 The ability of society to harness information in novel ways to produce useful insights or goods and 
services of significant value” and “…things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one, 
to extract new insights or create new forms of value (Press, 2014 par. 10).   
 
28 
identification per 10,000 individuals that attempt access.  The rate corresponds with the 
size of the database.  For every 100,000 there will be 10 false positives, for 1,000,000 
there will be 100 and so on (Vaillant, 2014)  
 A type II error refers to a false reject; this occurs when an individual with correct 
credentials is present and the system mistakenly fails to allow the individual access.  An 
example of this would be if an ATM machine failed to allow an individual access to their 
bank account.   
 These two types of errors impact the end user in completely different ways.  
When a type II error occurs, as with the ATM example, an authorized user is denied 
access to a system or privilege to which they should have access.  Continuing the ATM 
example, the user becomes annoyed that they do not have access to their account, and 
may have to employ another authentication method, including entering a pin number or 
physically visiting the bank to present the appropriate credentials, in order to access their 
money.  However, if a type I error is made, then an unauthorized user will gain access to 
another individual’s bank account, which could lead to fraud or theft.  This is why the 
threshold false accept rate of the system becomes critically important.   
 The threshold rate can be raised or lowered depending on the needs of the system.   
For critical access applications, such as a bank account, the threshold can be very high, 
which will lower, or maintain, the false accept rate.  However, the two errors have an 
inverse relationship.  As the threshold is raised, the false accept rate stays low but the 
false reject rate increases.  In banking matters, most customers are willing to accept a 
higher false reject rate and deal with the annoyance rather than have an unauthorized 
individual gain access to personal bank accounts.  Of course, the bank can collect more 
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images of the individual or higher quality images to improve both the accuracy of the 
system and the experience of the customer.  In other applications where less sensitive 
access is on the line, the threshold can be lowered (Vaillant, 2014).   
 Experts suggest that the most difficult process to complete is that of identification.  
This is where the FR system performs a one to many match.  Here the system tries to find 
the identity of an unknown individual by extracting their faceprint and comparing it with 
a database of templates.  This type of application is common in law enforcement 
communities trying to match criminals to identified mug shots.  In these systems, the 
threshold false reject is usually lowered.  Law enforcement is willing to accept more false 
positives in order to find the criminal.  Often a system will return multiple images that an 
analyst will then review in order to determine a match.  Mug shots follow a standard 
format in terms of face orientation, distance, and lighting in order to increase the 
likelihood of finding a match.   
3.3. History and Development 
 Facial recognition technology can be traced back to the 1880s when Alphonse 
Bertillion, a police officer working in Paris, became concerned with identifying 
criminals.  Bertillion decided to record body images of criminals and took their mug 
shots under controlled lighting.  Standardized images and mug shots thus became 
standard practice in police work until there were too many images to search effectively.  
Despite FRT’s criminological beginnings, the technology is not associated as strongly 
with criminality as is fingerprinting.  Eventually, innovations in computing technology 
led researchers to try to teach computers to read faces (Morozov, 2012), thus began the 
work of modern FRT.   
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 Some of the earliest digital work on facial recognition began in the 1960s.  After 
spending several years working on pattern recognition, Woody Bledsoe, along with 
Helen Chan and Charles Bisson, began developing a way for computers to recognize 
faces.  However, much of this early work was not published, though, “Because the 
funding was provided by an unnamed intelligence agency that did not allow much 
publicity” (Ballantyne, Boyer, & Hines, 1996, p. 10).  The project originally involved 
matching a photograph of an individual to a data set containing many images, essentially 
matching a photograph from a book of mug shots.  The results were expressed as a ratio 
between the number of images the program felt were matches to the original number of 
images selected.  However, the technology faced many challenges, namely the rotation 
and tilt of the head (face), lighting, angle, facial expression, and aging (Ballantyne, et al., 
1996).   
 The technology employed by Bledsoe located several coordinates on the face used 
to perform accurate facial measurements.  These measurements include the inside and 
outside corners of the eyes, the location of the pupils, the width between the eyes and 
pupils, and the point of widow’s peak (hairline).  The technology also accounted for the 
various angles and rotations of the images by “normalizing” these measurements.  In all 
20 distances were recorded and the technology was capable of processing 40 pictures per 
hour.  The research was advanced by Peter Hart at the Stanford Research Institute, where 
the computer consistently outperformed human recognition on a database of 2000 
images, marking one of the first successful uses of the technology (Ballantyne, et al., 
1996).   
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 In the 1970’s, scientists were unable to make major progress in the development 
of FRT for several reasons.  The quality of the images was not high enough for the 
systems to perform more accurate recognition.  More sophisticated algorithms were also 
needed to process the images.  Finally, computing power was either insufficient or too 
expensive (Morozov, 2012).   
 The 1980’s saw the formation of a new industry.  Academia and corporations 
came together to work on “automated person identification,” which would later become 
the biometrics industry.  In 1992, the research division of the NSA convened a meeting of 
a biometrics group.  Intelligence and defense agencies, which funded most of the FRT 
projects, allowed the technology to progress significantly (Morozov, 2012).   
 The use of FRT garnered much public attention in 2001 when it was utilized to 
compare Super Bowl attendees against a mugshot database (McCullagh, 2001).  Cameras 
were fixed at the turnstiles to surveil fans as they entered the venue, which resulted in the 
most public and most highly criticized use of FRT’s capabilities (ACLU, 2003).   
Accuracy has now greatly improved as well.  One industry test showed that the 2006 
algorithms were ten times more accurate than those available in 2002 and more than a 
hundred times more accurate than those in 1995 (Morozov, 2012) and yet FRT 
technology is still evolving.  FRT systems are now capable of skin texture analysis, 
where a segment of skin is converted to mathematical segments of space.  Infrared scans 
which are capable of performance in the dark, are also often utilized and can detect vein 
structure under the face, another biometric identifier (Kong et al., 2005; Morozov, 2012).  
Face “hallucination” is another developing technique for FR where computers guess what 
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a low resolution face may look like from a large collection of high resolution faces (Liu, 
Shum, & Freeman, 2007).   
3.4. Techniques for the Acquisition of Face Data 
Facial recognition techniques can be broadly categorized into three areas based on 
the acquisition of face data: intensity (color) images, video sequences, and 3D 
information or infrared imagery (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).  A discussion follows on how 
each of these techniques work.   
3.4.1. Intensity Images 
 Face recognition derived from intensity images fall into two main categories: 
feature-based and holistic.  Feature-based approaches identify, extract, and measure 
features of the face, including, but not limited to, the eyes, mouth, nose and other fixed 
markings.  These markings are then used to create a geometric relationship where, 
statistical pattern recognition techniques can match faces (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).  
However, it is unfair to say the system functions automatically “In general, current 
algorithms for automatic feature extraction do not provide a high degree of accuracy and 
require considerable computational capacity” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p. 43).  This is to 
say that the process is not automatic; technicians are often needed to locate the 
geographic areas (widow’s peak, chin, pupil spacing, etc.) that allow FR to work.   
 Another features-based approach is Elastic Bunch Graph Matching.  This 
technique creates a graph from hand selected fiducial points on the face.  Fiducial points 
are reference points on the face; for example, the pupils of the eyes are considered 
fiducial points.  Each fiducial point then becomes part of a complete graph.  The distance 
from the points are measured to create a series of graphs called a face bunch graph.    
 
33 
Graphs for new faces can be compared to the original and matches are made by 
determining the highest similarity value between graphs (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).   
 Features-based approaches offer several advantages.  Since the features are 
extracted before matching an image, they are resistant to inaccuracy created by position 
changes of the face.  These approaches offer relatively compact representations of the 
face, which aid in the matching process and can be performed with relative speed.  
However, automation of feature detection has proven difficult and requires greater time 
for data gathering.  Individuals employing these techniques make arbitrary decisions on 
facial features.  If the selected features cannot be discriminated from, matching will prove 
difficult (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).  Therefore, the chosen features are important to the 
matching process as some features offer greater accuracy than others.  Other methods 
focus on the entirety of the face and not simply facial features.       
 Holistic methods, based on the entire image of the face also fall into two main 
subcategories: statistical and artificial intelligence (AI).  The simplest statistical approach 
draws data from a two dimensional representation of the color values of a face.  A direct 
comparison can then be made between the original face and other faces.  This technique 
has been shown to work, but its usability is rather limited by alterations in lighting, pose, 
and expression.  Remedies to these shortcomings include infrared images and 3D images 
(Hiremath & Hiremath, 2013).   
 Unlike statistical methods, AI uses intensity images to conduct FR.  AI is a 
complex way of conducting FR, “AI approaches utilize tools such as neural networks and 
machine learning techniques to recognize faces” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p. 48).  Neural 
networks mimic the way the human brain works.  In the brain, there are interconnected 
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neurons to allow for thought processing.  Neurons, which comprise neural networks, 
respond to input signals and allow the machine to “think” (Russell, 1991).  A popular 
example of an AI application is Facebook’s AI system “Deep Face.”  Deep Face uses AI 
technology known as deep learning to match faces.  It is just slightly less accurate than 
humans, it correctly matches faces 97.25% of the time. whereas humans are 97.53% 
accurate (O’Toole, 2014).   
3.4.2. Video Sequences 
 FRT is popularly used for security purposes, often applied to security video 
recordings.  Video sequences are examined by the technology in stages, “A video-based 
face recognition system typically consists of three modules: one for detecting the face; a 
second one for tracking it; and a third one for recognizing it” (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009, p. 
51).  To offer security, FRT needs to be able to recognize faces in real time and identify 
them.  Frames are selected from the video that offer the best chance of performing a 
match and then a recognition technique is applied to the intensity image.  Methods for FR 
in video sequences vary from Difference of Gaussian filtering, “an illumination pre-
treatment,” to skin color modeling (Wang, Li, Wang, Jiang, Jiang, & Zhao, 2012, p. 429).  
Other methods employ using images, where the face has moved 180˚, allowing the 
system to see the front and both sides of the face.  One method involves analyzing video 
and 3D information for accuracy (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).   
 Video sequences are more difficult to match compared to static images as they 
often suffer from low quality, the presence of multiple faces, and background information 
that hinders the process.  However, the abundance of data in video sequences allows the 
option of discarding less desirable images.  Video sequences also offer the advantage of 
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viewing the face from multiple angles, which can eliminate other accuracy detriments, 
such as facial expressions and lighting.   
3.4.3. 3D and Infrared 
 Most of the research on FR has been focused on 2D matching.  However, as the 
technology progresses increased attention will continue to focus on alternative matching 
methods, such as, 3D information and infrared imagery. The 3D technique allows for the 
recording of complex data, including the curvature of the face, jaw line, and cheek 
profile.  These techniques are also not easily confused by lighting and orientation 
variances, compared to the 2D techniques.  However, the complexity of the data causes a 
significant increase in computing expenditures.  Currently, 3D techniques employ the use 
of lasers, structured light systems, stereo vision systems, and reverse rendering (Jafri & 
Arabnia, 2009).     
 Infrared imaging offers yet another method for FR.  Infrared techniques reveal 
vein and tissue structures of the face, which are unique to each individual.  Infrared 
techniques are limited in use due to the high cost of thermal sensors, lack of data sets, 
sensitivity to ambient temperature conditions, and the disruption glass causes when 
collecting information (eyeglasses can occlude data) (Jafri & Arabnia, 2009).  
Nevertheless, infrared techniques allow for the collection of data in dark places, making 
it a unique option for FR.   
3.5. Facial Recognition Technology Uses 
 Current uses of FRT can be broadly categorized into three sections: government, 
commercial, and private.  These categories are often not distinct.  For example, the 
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government can contract with commercial vendors of FRT, and, in turn, the commercial 
entities may use the data they gather for their own economic interests.   
 The original area of interest in the FRT was law enforcement.  In September of 
2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that its FR system was fully 
operational.  The system would allow law enforcement agencies, including probation and 
parole officers, to cross-reference photos from criminal databases.  It would also allow 
continuous updates on reported criminal history for individuals in trust positions, such as 
school teachers (Volz, 2014).   
 In March 2014, the city of Seattle voted to allow the police department to use 
FRT to identify suspects caught on camera (Wagstaff, 2014).  Police had reported they 
were already doing the process manually, but that FRT would speed it up significantly.  
The project was funded by a grant from the Department of Homeland Security.  The 
measure was originally opposed by the city council until certain provisions were added, 
including allowing only trained officers to use the FR software, as well as limiting the use 
of the software to still images and individuals suspected of criminal activity (Wagstaff, 
2014).   
 Government uses tend to revolve around security and identity.  Evgeny Morozov 
(2012) described a situation in 2010 where Navy SEALs used FRT from satellite photos 
to identify a suspected terrorist.  The New York Times reported that the NSA is 
collecting millions of photos that can be examined by FRT.  This technology is also 
deployed in airports to verify passports and heightened assurance of positive 
identification on government IDs.      
 
37 
 It appears that some commercial entities may have an edge on the government in 
terms of accuracy.  Russell Brandom (2014) reported that Facebook’s DeepFace system 
is better than the FBI’s new Next Generation Identification system boasting 97% 
accuracy rate compared to the FBI’s 85% accuracy, respectively. The FBI’s FR database 
has caused some controversy because the database will include biometric identification of 
persons who are not suspected of criminal mischief (Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, 2014).   
 A popular private sector use of FRT includes social networking sites, particularly 
Facebook and Google+ which are leading developers of FRT.  Facebook has spent 
considerable time and effort developing its FRT with the latest announcement of their 
DeepFace technology.  The DeepFace technology is almost as accurate in identifying 
faces as humans are (O’Toole, 2014), and is coupled with the largest photo library in the 
world, thanks to Facebook users (Grandoni, 2014).  Similar to Facebook’s tagging 
feature, where Facebook asks if you would like to attach your friend’s names to pictures 
on your profile, Google+ has a “Find My Face” feature that suggests names in photos.  
Unlike Facebook, Google+ has users opt-in to use the controversial feature, providing 
users with the opportunity to consent (Kincaid, 2011).   
 Payroll systems that employ FRT allow employers to eliminate possible employee 
fraud on time cards.  If an employee claims that they worked for eight and a half hours 
and they should be paid for the time they put in, and liability on the employer’s behalf is 
eliminated as well.  This also prevents fellow co-workers from clocking in a late friend at 
work, which can cost businesses thousands in lost revenue through decreased production 
(Brackeen, 2014).   
 
38 
 Although commercial and government uses of FRT are still in their infancy, 
experts perceive potential government uses for fraud prevention of social programs, 
assistance in locating missing children, passport verification, and the prevention of 
driver’s license duplication.  Commercial applications range from social networking, 
payroll systems, cruise ship photos, eye tracking, emotion research, facial response to 
stimuli, image searches, and government sponsored vendor services.   
3.6. Public Debate 
 The public debate surrounding FRT is one that continues to shift.  Given the 
technology’s history, especially that significant funding was provided by intelligence and 
defense organizations, much of its earliest implementations were created for law 
enforcement use (Ballantyne, Boyer, & Hines, 1996; McCullagh, 2001).  Members of the 
public, who seek police intervention to maintain law and order, grant such agencies a 
certain amount of discretion in performing those roles, thus are unlikely to question the 
need for this new surveillance technology (Gates, 2011).  These views are supported by a 
more communitarian view of privacy advocated by Amitai Etzioni (1999).  Etzioni’s 
views require individuals to relinquish some of their privacy in order to maintain public 
safety and order.  However, there are members of society who are more skeptical of the 
role of police and question their need for such technologies.  The Snowden revelations 
have in part supported the latter’s argument.  Daniel Solove (2011) argued that a false 
dichotomy exists between privacy and security, and that both can be achieved properly 
utilizing technology.  For further discussion on contemporary views of privacy please see 
section 4.2.   
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 Retail use is another instance where FRT has garnered much attention in the 
public sphere.  Advertisers and retailers are eager to use the technology to better serve 
their customers, as they say, and quickly point them in the direction of products and 
services they are likely to buy.  Groups like Common Sense Media and Center for Digital 
Democracy are concerned, though, about the technology being used to “steer” customers 
to particular products/services or even discriminate based on race, gender, or age.  
Providing disparate opportunities to customers via FRT is a legitimate concern. 
 Helen Nissenbaum (2009) argued for privacy in context.  Privacy protections and 
affordances should be based on the context in which they arise.  There are some 
indications that this may be the way that FRT is treated.  For instance, people may enjoy 
the convenience of FRT’s use at airports to speed lines, limit intrusive searches, and 
increase security.  These are likely seen as legitimate uses of the technology.  FRT 
systems located outside of children’s stores, bathrooms, or surreptitiously surveilling 
people from mall kiosks are generally viewed as inappropriate uses of the technology at 
the meetings.  Furthermore, privacy is a fluid concept and a subjective value.  Providing 
individuals with a choice or the ability to consent to being subject to FRT is being 
discussed as an appropriate way to deploy the technology.  However, even with the 
flexibility of choice and transparency, (two principles outlined in the CPBR) (Please see 
p. 11 for full list of principles), there are participants who worry about “bad actors” who 
would not consent to FRT in an effort to avoid detection and potentially aid in their 









 For this project, the theoretical construct relied on the concepts of privacy, 
communication technology regulation, and the multistakeholder collaborative process.  
The academic community has not reached consensus on the theoretical or legal 
conception of privacy as it has been interpreted as a legal concept in a variety of different 
contexts.  The framers of the U.S. constitution recognized the need for privacy as a 
necessary condition for freedom.  Although technological advances in communication 
have played a substantial role in improving the public’s lives as well as the democratic 
process, these advances have also enhanced the government’s and commercial 
organizations’ ability to intrude on one’s privacy.  Diverse theoretical and legal 
interpretations of privacy focus on the dialectic between the right to privacy and the 
enhanced technological power of surveillance.  The theories of privacy presented here are 
meant to serve as a “purposive sample” to cover the central arguments in the field of 
privacy (Randolph, 2009, p.4).   
 Similarly, the presentation of theories on regulation and the multistakeholder 
format is not meant to be exhaustive.  The theories presented were selected based on their 
importance to their respective fields, as well as their relevance to this research project.  
Furthermore, the “regulation of technology” is not a phrase used often in the academic 
literature, but, as will be shown, such a field exists nonetheless.  Privacy is not a new 
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concept, so it is important to track the way that scholarship and thinking on the subject 
has evolved.  Presented initially are some historical conceptions of privacy.   
4.1. Historical Conceptions of Privacy 
 As early as the mid-19th century, John Stuart Mill conceived of privacy as a 
necessary condition for freedom.  For Mill (1988), “[I]n the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign” (p. 69).  Mill believed actions that do not affect society 
or other individuals should be permitted to the individual, based on his or her own liberty.  
Mill also found “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (p. 68).  Of course, 
surveillance was already a problem in Mill’s time.  In fact, surveillance was an issue 
before Mill.  During the early years of the U.S. postal system, letters would often be 
delivered in bulk via ship, to a central location where they sat for extended periods of 
time.  To keep information private some individuals employed wax seals.  In 1753 
Benjamin Franklin, Postmaster General, required postal workers to swear an oath not to 
open mail (Regan, 1995).  In sum, two conceptions of privacy, the need for seclusion and 
the need to keep information private, were recognized at this early time.  The 
categorization of physical privacy and information privacy are still used in scholarship 
today.   
 In the late 19th century, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were the first legal 
scholars to argue about the right of privacy in the context of mass media and photo 
cameras (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). For them, privacy was “the right to be let alone.”  
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Warren and Brandeis penned The Right to Privacy in 1890, during a time when the 
technologies of the day, cameras and the press, enabled others to encroach on one’s 
privacy.  The response occurred after Warren read a society page piece about the lavish 
party he threw for his daughter after her wedding in the Boston Saturday Evening Gazette 
(Rosen, 2000).  Thus, decisive steps were made to broaden the notion of privacy by 
considering the private agents abilities to conduct surveillance over private individuals; in 
doing so, privacy was codified as a legal concept and constituted ‘intrusion of privacy’ as 
a separate tort or private law.  
 In many ways, Warren and Brandeis created the foundation of FRT as a challenge 
to privacy.  They were concerned about cameras operated by private agents intruding on 
others’ privacy, much like the capabilities of FRT.  Now the NTIA meetings on FRT are 
a continuation of the discussion started by Warren and Brandeis in the late 19th century.  
Other scholars would continue to develop privacy as an academic concept.   
 Alan Westin (1968) maintained that the origins of privacy go well beyond the 
19th century, back to man’s animal origins.  Westin challenged Mill’s conception of 
privacy as absolute, writing “[T]he individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since 
participation in society is an equally powerful desire” (pg. 7).  One must carefully 
consider the balance between the individual’s right to privacy and the collective good.  
Individuals have a vested interest to keep parts of their lives private, and, in many cases, 
making certain beliefs, attitudes, or preferences known would be deemed offensive or 
inappropriate.  However, the collective good of society often compels individuals to 
reveal personal information for the safety and benefit of the whole, as seen in the sex 
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offender registry, vaccination compliance, and jury duty.  The balance is not easy to 
strike.   
 Government also has an impact on privacy norms (see section 4.3. for further 
discussion on organizations’ need for privacy).  For example, totalitarian governments 
protect their own privacy and surveil their constituents closely.  Conversely, democratic 
forms of government are surveilled by groups and individuals while constituent privacy is 
highly regarded.  Indeed, high importance is placed on privacy as the voter casts his/her 
ballot.  The government requires some information from individuals and groups to 
function effectively, but the balance depends on social norms and values.  For Westin 
(1968), most American claims to privacy stem from their fierce love of independence and 
high value on individuality.  Mill (1988) supported this notion in On Liberty. 
 For Westin (1968), privacy was not primarily viewed in terms of surveillance, but 
he certainly was not unaware of surveillance practices.  He described surveillance as 
necessary for social control.  He further wrote that surveillance was necessary to protect 
society.  However, surveillance can invade privacy with negative consequences.  In fact, 
just a few short years after Westin’s book Privacy and Freedom was published, Richard 
Nixon resigned the presidency following the Watergate scandal.  The Democratic 
National Committee headquarters break-in ultimately started an investigation by 
authorities.  The authorities soon found that Nixon had placed wiretaps on the 
Democratic offices in an attempt to gain insight into their political strategies (Mellinger, 
2011).     
 FRT poses new challenges to privacy that previously did not exist. The 
technology can be applied to images retroactively.  Many individuals have had their 
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pictures taken by newspapers, for yearbooks, and other events, the technology can 
potentially identify individuals found in these dated images.  Individuals post numerous 
photos of themselves to social media where End User License Agreements (EULAs) 
dictate what happens to user’s content and how long data can be retained.  Individuals 
may have their images captured without their knowledge and used for purposes to which 
they did not consent.  FRT has the potential to magnify the potential privacy harms faced 
in each of these scenarios.     
 The French philosopher Michel Foucault provided one of the most insightful 
notions on privacy and surveillance when he discussed Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon 
(Foucault, 1995).  The Panopticon is a prison design where one guard in a central tower 
would have the ability to watch every single prisoner.  At the same time, the prisoners 
would not be able to see the guard to know if he was actually present or if present who he 
was monitoring.  Foucault (1995) stated, “Visibility is a trap” (p. 200).  The individual is 
seen but cannot observe who is watching him.  Foucault stated that this makes the 
individual “the object of information, never a subject in communication” (p. 200).  
Furthermore, this asymmetric power imbalance is particularly effective in maintaining 
social norms.  When individuals cannot observe those who are observing them, they must 
assume they are being watched and conduct themselves according to the norms.  The 
invisibility of the watcher gives him power, “This invisibility is a guarantee of order” 
(Foucault 1995, p. 200).  “Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the 
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power” (Foucault 1995, p.201).  The principle difference, however, is that 
citizens are not prisoners.  Nevertheless, “[Jeremy] Bentham was surprised that panoptic 
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institutions could be so light: there were no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy 
locks” (Foucault 1995, p. 202). In many cases, the presence of cameras seems innocuous, 
and may make people feel safe, such as in banks and schools.  However, if these cameras 
can all be accessed by the National Security Agency, and there are those who believe this 
to be the case, the panoptic power would be unnerving.  Government surveillance is but 
one form of privacy invasion.   
 Private agents are a separate source of surveillance and a challenge to privacy.  
When in public, there is normally no expectation to privacy; there is also no immediate 
assumption that one’s image will be recorded either.  FRT has the ability to turn the 
assumption of relative anonymity around.  As a result, citizens are beginning to take 
action to protect their relative anonymity in public.17  Such behavior is an expression of 
internally motivated resistance. 
 Foucault wrote that the Panopticon assures the functioning of power.  Individuals 
behave differently when they know they are being observed.  In a world where cameras 
are everywhere, one must ask how this will change individual behavior.  It appears that 
the number of cameras currently available and the limitations of FRT have already 
changed how people act.  Indeed, organizations like Justice Caps provide consumers with 
hats that project infrared light to interfere with the camera and scuttle face recognizing 
software (Chibba, 2014).  Currently, the technology is somewhat limited for real time use 
but future actions taken by individuals to protect their faces may be more drastic than 
wearing ball caps.   
                                                          
17 Please see section 4.8 for further discussion on protecting relative anonymity from FRT.   
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 In summary, the surveillance power that FRT could impose may have material 
effects on societal norms.  Many aspects of privacy historically conceived are still 
relevant to life in society today.  Scholarship has continued to develop theories of 
privacy, these are presented next.   
4.2. Contemporary Conceptions of Privacy 
 Amitai Etzioni, former senior advisor to the Carter White House (1999), voiced a 
communitarian notion of privacy.  He noted, as did Daniel Solove (2011), that privacy 
does not have to be traded for other values or interests.  For Etzioni, privacy should be 
balanced against the good of society.  Etzioni stated that privacy interests should be 
considered when there is a clear and documented threat to privacy, not just a hypothetical 
fear.  Many privacy advocates fear the government and its power of surveillance, but 
Etzioni noted that privacy enhancing forms of technology, such as encrypted 
communications, also allow criminals to operate with less fear of prying eyes.  This 
reasoning holds that the value placed on privacy in American society is inefficient for the 
government and some businesses because it allows negative actions, including criminals 
to operate, illegal immigrants to persist, and parents to not pay child support.  One must 
consider the costs and benefits privacy provides, and Etzioni contended that privacy must 
not be placed on such a high pedestal; there must be compromise, especially in the 
application of FRT. 
 FRT will have to be analyzed in such a light.  At the NTIA meetings members are 
concerned about the threats FRT poses to privacy.  FRT poses significant challenges to 
privacy.  However, FRT also presents the possibility of providing more secure 
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authentication methods.  In the future, individuals will have to balance the potential costs 
and benefits of the technology when attempting to regulate its usage.     
 Privacy has recently been balanced against national security in light of recent 
terror attacks, beginning with the 9/11 attacks (terrorists flew planes into the World Trade 
Center Towers killing thousands) and continuing with the Boston Marathon bombings 
(2013) of more recent memory.  The technology almost allowed the capture of Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev before the bombings took place; the technology was simply not advanced 
enough at the time.  Tsarnaev was spotted on several security cameras, but the images 
were not of sufficient quality to allow the application of FRT.   
 Etzioni’s (1999) position on privacy is difficult for many who believe in 
individualism.  Communitarians worry about excessive individualism, a value that has 
high regard in the U.S.  However, Etzioni wrote his book before the NSA was tracking 
citizens, before the IRS targeted specific individuals and groups, and well before the 
government mandated national health coverage for all Americans all of which reveal 
private and personal information to the government.  Under the Affordable Care Act, 
U.S. citizens are required to sign up for health coverage or be fined by the IRS.  David 
Lyon (1994) noted the power of the IRS writing, “In the USA the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) is the largest civilian collector of personal data” (p.91). Signing up for this 
coverage includes divulging one’s name, location, income, and a host of other personal 
information.  Solove (2011) rejects an all or nothing privacy surveillance dichotomy and 
a variety of actions, technologies, and policy changes support his view.  In the process of 
signing up for these services individuals must show some identification credential, such 
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as a driver’s license or passport.  Individuals are compelled to have their image captured 
and utilized by the government and subsequently other private organizations.   
 Laurence Lessig (2006) challenged how people typically view their Fourth 
Amendment rights in terms of privacy.  Lessig wrote, “Technology enables perpetual and 
cheap monitoring of behavior” (p. 200).  Lessig specifically noted the privacy 
implications of FRT, describing it as the least intrusive and fastest growing biometric 
technology.  Lessig is more concerned with the fact that on the Internet it is hard to know 
what constitutes an overly burdensome search, as stated in the Fourth Amendment.  It is 
possible for one’s emails and computer to be viewed without one’s knowledge, which is 
almost certainly a breach of privacy.  However, is the search of one’s computer 
burdensome if the individual is unaware the search occurred?  Government institutions, 
as well as private institutions, store personal data, which sometimes includes images.  
Deciding whether or not a search is considered burdensome could have a profound 
impact on FRT regulation.     
 For Helen Nissenbaum (2009) privacy should be interpreted in the context in 
which it is examined.  For example, if a person enters the hospital because of an ailment, 
information may be collected about the patient including weight, blood pressure, pre-
existing conditions, and heart rate; information considered to be very personal.  It may be 
critical in this setting for the information to be collected, but in other circumstances 
inappropriate or annoying in the case of higher insurance premiums.  Nissenbaum argued 
that privacy is not about restricting the flow of information but rather ensuring it flows 
appropriately based on the context of the situation.  Another point that Nissenbaum 
makes is that there is information about individuals and information associated with 
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individuals.  It is entirely possible for incorrect conclusions to be reached about a person 
based on information associated with his or her person.  It does not take an elaborate 
imagination to conclude that images of individuals could be associated with information 
that may or may not be true about them.     
If a right to privacy is a right to context appropriate flows [many forms of 
notice are based on context], and not to secrecy or to control over 
information about oneself, there is no paradox in caring deeply about 
privacy and, at the same time, eagerly sharing information as long as the 
sharing and withholding conform with the principled conditions prescribed 
by governing contextual norms.  (Nissenbaum 2009, p. 187)   
It is unclear how these governing contextual norms are created or what happens when 
there is unauthorized or malicious use of data.  Unfortunately, there are no clear 
precedents set for the unauthorized or malicious use of data, as well as no definite legal 
recourse or policies outlining the considerations, legal or penal.  For example, it is still 
unclear if the NSA reading private citizen’s emails constitutes a search under the 4th 
Amendment.  These kinds of policy, legal, and penal considerations all provide context 
which is central to Nissenbaum’s argument.  Without these considerations, individuals 
interested in protecting their privacy have a difficult time making informed decisions.   
 Nissenbaum’s argument for contextualizing privacy is predicated on individual 
choice, which may not always be available.  Not only can government institutions like the 
IRS compel citizens to reveal information, private organizations can as well.  Websites 
like Google and Facebook are notorious for surveilling their users.  Many individuals are 
simply unaware their data are being used and some simply do not care.  In situations like 
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these the context matters very little because users do not have a choice in how their data 
are used.  Many websites end user license agreements (EULAs)18 are asymmetrical, 
granting all the negotiating power to the organization.  Despite the appealing notion of 
appropriate flows of information, there are many instances in which the user has no 
control over how his or her information is used.  In such cases, it is left to the 
organization’s self-regulatory policies, primarily the code of conduct, to contextualize the 
provider/consumer relationship in the absence of government regulation or law.  
Individuals are often presented with an all or nothing proposition and the costs of not 
participating or utilizing a service are seen as higher than the private information they are 
forced to reveal.   
 Daniel Solove (2011) reminded individuals that privacy is not just about keeping 
information secret and that it is rarely an all or nothing decision.  Solove examined the 
argument many privacy advocates hear, “I have nothing to hide.”  Privacy is not just 
about keeping bad information secret.  Surveillance and intrusion on privacy can have an 
impact on free speech, free association, and other First Amendment protections that are a 
cornerstone of American democracy.  Furthermore, traditional refuges of protection, like 
the Fourth Amendment, will not protect Google searches and personal information from 
the government and corporations.  Solove also argued that the aggregation of seemingly 
innocent data in small amounts when compiled can create a detailed portrait of an 
individual.  This is the same concern Nissenbaum (2009) articulated when she 
distinguished information collected about a person and information associated with a 
                                                          
18 Agreement entered into between the user and the software provider. 
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person.  Multiple captured images of an individual could potentially reveal a great deal of 
information.   
 Aggregating user data is easier thanks to the Assumption of Risk Doctrine, a legal 
tort defense.  It holds that when a person tells another person a secret they no longer have 
an expectation that the secret will remain private (Solove, 2011).  Pertaining to the 
Internet, the doctrine does not protect the billing and shipping information provided to 
businesses like Amazon under the Fourth Amendment.  Additionally, all the information 
Amazon retains concerning past purchases and purchasing preferences is not protected 
either.  Images shared via Facebook could end up in the hands of a third party where the 
expectation of privacy disappears as well.   
 Solove (2011) used the metaphor of an envelope to discuss Fourth Amendment 
protections.  The envelope is the material that is protected under the Fourth Amendment 
from search and seizure.  The information on the envelope is in plain view and therefore 
there is no expectation to privacy, so it is not protected under the Fourth Amendment.  
However, the information on the envelope is often just as valuable, as it says who the 
letter is from and where they would like it to be delivered.  On the Internet, the envelope 
is the URL address.  The problem is that the URL address, the address protocol for the 
Internet, contains a lot of information that would otherwise be held in the content of the 
envelope, e.g. http//www.google.com/what-is-the-formula-for-figuring-the-area-of-a-
circle?  Using this innocuous example, it is not only easy to see who is sending the 
message and where they are sending it, but what the content of the message is as well.  In 
this case Marshall McLuhan (1994) seemed to be absolutely correct that the medium is 
the message (Lessig, 2006).   
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 Lessig (2006) and Solove (2011) alerted the reader to privacy threats on the 
Internet in terms of the Fourth Amendment in their seminal works.  Given the age of the 
Amendment, it is clear it needs to be updated, or there needs to be a new interpretation of 
it, to reflect current privacy problems.  “Burdensome” searches are context dependent on 
the Internet.  “Reasonable expectations to privacy” also must be viewed in a different 
light.  If citizens are concerned about their privacy, and the NSA scandal suggests they 
should be, constantly worrying about what one searches or says on the Internet has First 
Amendment implications, a “chilling effect” or self-censorship similar to Foucault’s 
panopticon effect.  As Senator Samuel Ervin explained, “When people fear surveillance, 
whether it exists or not, when they grow afraid to speak their minds and hearts freely to 
their government or to anyone else, then we shall cease to be a free society” (as cited in 
Neier, 1975, p. 12).  From the above discussion, it becomes clear that in many instances, 
American citizens may start considering privacy as a First Amendment issue.  
Furthermore, Lessig and Solove appear to have been ahead of their time.  Their 
challenges to the Fourth Amendment, about what constitutes a burdensome search, have 
been substantiated in a class action lawsuit, as stated in the introduction, filed by Senator 
Rand Paul against the President, NSA, and FBI for collecting metadata about U.S. 
citizens.  A delayed ruling by Judge Richard Leon in the court case Klayman v. Obama, 
ruled the collection of metadata likely unconstitutional.  However, the ruling was delayed 
so the government could file an appeal (Robertson, 2013).  The outcome of Paul’s legal 
action or the ruling in Klayman v. Obama could have profound implications on 
surveillance and privacy depending on the wording of the decision.   
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 Privacy is a fundamental human right according to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Necessary and Proportionate, 2014).  The declaration identifies principles 
determining appropriate times for government to invade an individual’s privacy.  Of 
central concern are the concepts of legality, legitimate aim, necessity, adequacy, 
proportionality, competent judicial authority, due process, user notification, transparency, 
public oversight, integrity of communication systems, safeguards for international 
cooperation, and safeguards against illegitimate access (Necessary and Proportionate, 
2014).19  Legality is concerned with the legal authority that exists for a government entity 
to invade one’s privacy and the legal restrictions regarding doing so.  Legitimate aim 
specifies that communications can only be surveilled by certain state actors to achieve a 
legitimate aim.  Necessity is the principle of gathering only the information that is 
necessary for the government to build their case.  Adequacy instructs state actors to use 
an adequate surveillance level to achieve its goals.  Proportionality is a check on fairness; 
the government presumably possesses a far greater ability to invade citizens’ privacy than 
citizens have on investigating the affairs of the government.  Competent judicial 
authority implies that impartial judicial authority must be obtained before surveilling 
communications.  Due process ensures a fair, impartial, and public hearing to the 
individual on issues of any human right.  User notification states that individuals should 
be notified about the decision to surveil their communications with exceptions only in 
exigent circumstances.  Transparency is a concept that involves the government notifying 
citizens about when they invade citizens privacy, the extent to which they do so, and the 
tools they have available to them to do so.  Public oversight ensures legitimacy and 
                                                          
19 Please see Appendix A for a table detailing the principles further.   
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transparency.  Integrity of communications systems ensures that the state cannot compel 
software or hardware providers to build in surveillance capacities in their products.  
Safeguards for international cooperation suggest that in cases where state laws may 
intersect with national laws, those with higher individual protections are used.  Finally, 
safeguards against illegitimate access suggest that the state legislates against illegal 
public or private communication surveillance (Necessary and Proportionate, 2014).  
Notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights considers privacy in terms of 
interference which is the position further developed in this dissertation (see section 9.4.), 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference [emphasis added] with his [sic] 
privacy…” (Hurley, 2015, p.72).  These ideals are included in privacy considerations in 
the international community.    
4.3. Private Organizations’ Need for Privacy 
 Individuals are not the only party concerned when discussing privacy.  Companies 
must carefully guard proprietary information that they feel give them a competitive edge.  
There are many examples of elaborate security measures enacted to keep company 
recipes, like Coca Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), private.  KFC famously kept 
their fried chicken recipe in a lock box handcuffed to a security consultant as it was 
moved to a newer more high-tech safe (Schreiner, 2009).   This is related to companies 
utilizing FRT, like Facebook.  Facebook would not talk to National Public Radio about 
its security measures, citing that, “social media companies rarely talk about their internal 
systems” (Kaste, 2013).  The paradox is that companies like Facebook go to great lengths 
in order to capture their users’ personal information, but keep their own proprietary 
information safeguarded.  Fuchs (2011) stated “The use of targeted advertising and 
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economic surveillance is legally guaranteed by Facebook’s privacy policy” (p. 149). 
Browser cookies, information about pages visited on the Internet, are collected from users 
by Facebook to sell to advertisers.  Users have the ability to opt-out of the cookie 
tracking feature, but only by viewing the lengthy privacy policy and clicking a link to a 
separate webpage.  A court case like Facebook Inc. v. Power Ventures Inc. illustrates the 
lengths organizations will go to in order to protect their own information, Facebook sued 
their third party advertiser for violating the company’s privacy policy.  Companies 
developing FRT carefully guard their proprietary systems.  Certain FRT methods and 
algorithms work better than others, thus companies developing FRT have a vested 
interest in keeping these methods private.  These various methods provide regulators with 
additional challenges ensuring that all methods and uses of FRT are equally regulated.   
 James Coleman (1982) described the increasingly heavy influence that 
corporations have when legal considerations are discussed.  The law considers 
corporations to be “natural persons,” the modern corporation, through limited liability, is 
treated as an “individual.”  Nonetheless, the individuals who run the corporations are 
protected from being personally held responsible for the corporation’s liabilities.  
Coleman described the rapid growth of corporations, as compared to natural persons, and 
made the case that corporations have skewed the power wielded over natural persons in 
their favor.  For instance, individuals can sue Facebook over privacy violations, but 
cannot hold Mark Zuckerberg personally responsible for them, nor damage him 
financially for any violations.  Given the valuation of fines the company pays, Facebook, 
a company valued in the billions, is ostensibly paying a speeding ticket for its violations.  
Most corporations have vast resources compared to the individual person.  Indeed, most 
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corporations are structured around CEO’s or executive boards, made up of natural 
persons who are in charge of the corporation, who cannot be held liable for their actions 
on behalf of the corporation.  This skewing of power leads to what Coleman called, and 
titled his book, The Asymmetric Society.  Regulating companies in a meaningful way may 
prove challenging as regulations are often predicated on legal definitions which are hazy, 
at best, in the realm of privacy.   
4.4. Legal Conceptions of Privacy 
 As it was already introduced, the first legal conception of the right to privacy was 
provided by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890 for the Harvard Law Review 
(Belmas and Overbeck, 2012).  Through court decision in legal cases, two important 
privacy concepts have emerged that most U.S. states recognize either by statute or 
judicial decision.  These concepts include that the media may publish newsworthy stories 
on individuals without their blessing, but a person’s name or likeness may not be used for 
commercial purposes, usually advertising without their express consent (Belmas & 
Overbeck, 2012).   
 Most legal cases regarding invasion of privacy are tort actions or civil lawsuits.  
Courts have identified four distinct privacy torts, including those concerning the 
publication of embarrassing private facts, physical and technological intrusion, false 
light, and commercialization (Terilli & Splichal, 2011).  Genelle Belmas and Wayne 
Overbeck (2012) noted that ten states have not recognized the “false light” tort of privacy 
invasion.   
 There are several landmark court cases regarding privacy, but one of the most 
foundational cases is Katz v. United States (1967).  The ruling in this case considers a 
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“reasonable expectation to privacy” (Belmas & Overbeck, 2012).  Some scholars have 
found the ruling in Katz troubling as it is tautological; once a court rules there is an 
expectation to privacy it is used regardless of whether it existed prior to the ruling 
(Etzioni, 1999).  Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) is credited with establishing a 
constitutional right to privacy ruling that forbidding contraceptives violated marital 
privacy.  Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) ruled that contraception could be distributed to 
unmarried couples, widening the scope of privacy.  The ruling provided equal protection 
to both married and unmarried couples and protected the privacy of unmarried couples.  
Roe v. Wade (1973) granted women personal choice on abortion, an action previously 
controlled by the state.  The NAACP v. Alabama (1958) ruled that certain organizations 
do not have to turn over their membership rolls to the state (Terilli & Splichal, 2011).  
The court ruled in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, (1989) that public record information can be shielded from disclosure because it 
exists in a computer database.  There seems to be varied opinions on privacy that 
continue to change based on the most recent rulings.      
 Despite many of these cases expanding the right to privacy the case that is most 
central to FRT is Katz v. United States (1967).  The Katz ruling states that one must have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in order for the actions to be considered private.  A 
reasonable expectation exists if a person actually expects privacy and if society as a 
whole views that expectation as legitimate.  In Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. 
(1997) the court held that it is implausible for an employee to expect privacy, while 
toiling in a workplace’s open and undifferentiated work area (Hatcher, 2001).  
Additionally, the court noted that employers have a right to efficiently operate their 
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business.  To facilitate this efficient operation employers have the right to monitor 
occurrences that happen in plain view.  The court also explained that since employers can 
hire supervisors to monitor work, the business can also use unconcealed video cameras to 
achieve the same purpose as long as they are not equipped with microphones (Hatcher, 
2001).  Similarly, in United States v. Vazquez (2011), the court ruled that women 
videotaped entering an abortion clinic had no legitimate expectation to privacy as there 
were persons consistently exercising their First Amendment rights on a regular basis, as 
well as the tapings occurring in broad daylight in the open (Hatcher, 2001).  Even more 
controversial the C’Debaca v. Commonwealth (1999) case where a man’s conviction for 
using a camera to film under a woman’s skirt was reversed, stating she had no 
expectation of privacy while standing in public fairgrounds (Hatcher, 2001).  Similarly in 
Thompson v. Johnson Community College (1997), the court held that employees had a 
legitimate expectation to privacy in individual locker areas but not in the surrounding 
locker area.  In short, the reasonable expectation to privacy is controversial and without 
clear consensus (Hatcher, 2001).   
 In light of the Thompson ruling, FRT then has to reconcile with the plain view 
principle.  According to Mark Tunick (2009), the plain view principle is defined as 
follows: 
Plain view principle: (1) If information about ourselves (including the  fact 
that we are engaged in an activity or present in a certain location) is in 
plain view or earshot of anyone engaged in legitimate means of 
observation, we cannot reasonably expect privacy in that information; 
(2)otherwise we can.  (p. 599) 
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This principle usually applies to police officers; they are allowed to seize contraband or 
pertinent evidence that is found in plain sight during an investigation.  The plain view 
principle seems to clearly indicate that individual lives, despite any relative anonymity 
they may currently enjoy, may be legally monitored in the future with the rise of Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV)20 and FRT.  According to Maxine Frith (2004) the average 
Briton is caught on camera an average of 300 times a day.  It is true that Great Britain has 
a more comprehensive CCTV system than the U.S. but there are an increasing number of 
cameras in the U.S.      
 Early scholars of privacy were primarily concerned with invasion of personal 
privacy by individuals.  In addition to individuals intruding on personal privacy, now one 
must be concerned with surveillance by both the government and corporations.  In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the erosion of privacy rights is now primarily 
occurring in the name of security.  Increased government surveillance is usually couched 
in the need to keep citizens safe.  Corporations also have a vested interest in surveilling 
those who have been identified as shoplifters.  Other intentions of corporate surveillance 
include using the information to provide customers with more effective advertisements.   
4.5. Information Privacy 
 There have been many ways that privacy has been conceived.  One of the most 
useful categorizations of privacy has been proffered by Smith, Dinev, & Xu. (2011), 
making the distinction between informational and physical categorizations of privacy.  
                                                          
20 “Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a system where the circuit in which the video is transmitted is 
closed and all the elements (camera, display monitors, recording devices) are directly connected. This is 
unlike broadcast television where any receiver that is correctly tuned can pick up and display or store the 
signal. Such specialized systems are not subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC)” (Brickhouse Security, 2015, par. 1) 
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Historically, privacy was largely thought of in terms of the physical, “access to an 
individual and/or the individual’s surroundings and private space” (Smith et al., 2011, p. 
990).  With the ever increasing amount of data being collected about individuals, 
information privacy became a specific conception of privacy subsumed under the general 
thought of privacy.  Information privacy is concerned with information that can identify a 
person, also known as personally identifiable information (PII).    
 Yet information privacy is much broader than information that directly identifies 
someone.  During the NTIA FRT meetings, Alessandro Acquisti, professor at Carnegie 
Mellon University, showed his latest unpublished proof of concept experiment.  During 
the experiment he had students on campus to ask if they would like to have their picture 
taken and fill out a three page privacy survey.  Using the captured image, Acquisti was 
able to use FRT to find the student’s Facebook profile, predict the first five numbers of 
their social security number, and even find their Match.com dating profile, where 
pseudonyms are typically used (Acquisti, 2014).  Acquisti’s experiment utilizes face 
information, which is tied to an identity that is unknown, and uses the face information to 
identify the individual.  Other information, such as spending habits, routines, places of 
work, may also be combined to invade personal privacy and potentially result in a 
positive identification.   
 With an increased importance placed on informational privacy, and the rise of e-
commerce, privacy has also been conceptualized as a commodity.  Zizi Papacharissi 
(2010) contended that people tend to trade privacy for access to services such as online 
social networks.    
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Slowly, privacy defined as the right to be left alone attains the 
characteristics of a luxury commodity, in that a) it becomes a good 
inaccessible to most b) it is disproportionately costly to the average 
individual’s ability to acquire and retain it, and c) it becomes associated 
with social benefits inversely, in that the social cost of not forsaking parts 
of one’s privacy in exchange for information good and services (e–mail 
account free–of–charge, online social networking) places one at a social 
disadvantage.  (Papacharissi, 2010, par. 6) 
From a business standpoint, consumers are constantly offered benefits, coupons, reward 
cards, and discounts in exchange for personal information.  There are also perceived 
benefits to having more “friends” on social networks as users trade their information and 
privacy to the networks.   
 Perhaps the most troubling conception of privacy, and one currently coming to 
fruition, is a cognate based conception of privacy (Smith et al., 2011, p. 993).  In a world 
where privacy seems to be under constant attack, the mind may be considered the last 
tomb for complete privacy; after all, credible telepathic individuals are hard to come by.  
Facial expressions, whether knowingly displayed or not, can be captured by FRT and 
reveal some likely thoughts.  If the technology is applied to a video sequence, it can even 
capture “micro-expressions” which deception experts are only able to spot with limited 
accuracy in real time (Meyer, 2010).  Infrared FRT can also measure the temperature of 
one’s face, which may signal an increased level of interest or even deception.  In fact, 
high-definition thermal imaging is being developed to quickly and accurately identify 
deception.  One study showed deceptive individuals were correctly identified 75% of the 
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time and those being truthful were correctly categorized 90% of the time (Pavlidis, 
Eberhardt, & Levine, 2002).  This technique was shown to be comparable to polygraph 
tests, but do not require skilled operators and can be conducted with greater speed.  While 
current uses may primarily be concerned with deception, future uses may reveal other 
aspects of human cognition.   
 A popular component of information privacy is privacy conceptualized as control 
over one’s information.  Control is a popular way of conceptualizing information privacy 
because it allows privacy to be “operationalized”.  For instance, regulators can create 
rules for control such as who is authorized to review information, under what 
circumstances they are allowed to review information and how sensitive data should be 
protected.  The Edward Snowden revelations have made clear that security agencies are 
able to learn eclectic bits of information about individuals without their consent, 
eliminating their ability to control the information.  Data breaches at prominent retailers 
like Target and Home Depot also illustrate why “control” is not a sufficient way to 
conceptualize privacy.   
 Conversely, suppose an individual could have total control over his or her 
information, there is still no guarantee of privacy.  The government mandates that one 
wear clothing while out in public, ensuring some physical privacy.  However, there are 
plenty of people on the Internet who choose to share operations of themselves, record and 
display child birth, pose nude for art, or engage in pornography for money.  Securing 
control through established rules does not guarantee privacy (Allen, 1999, p. 867).   
 Despite data breaches and individuals who voluntarily relinquish their privacy, 
the conceptualization of privacy as control still does not satisfy.  Even when assuming 
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individuals are privacy protective and adequate security to prevent data breaches exists, 
there are a host of activities in which individuals are compelled to reveal private 
information.  A good example is the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  The ACA requires all 
U.S. citizens to have health insurance, a noble goal.  However, because of this individuals 
are now mandated to reveal personal information in the form of medical history including 
mental health issues, sexually transmitted diseases, and prior medical procedures or face 
financial penalty.  Beyond this, for an individual to qualify for federal subsidies, they 
must reveal financial data just as they would when they pay taxes.  The government has a 
power to compel private information from the individual, as well as to compel the 
individual to remain private by mandating clothes be worn in public, dictating what is 
and is not private in search and seizures, and enacting non-disclosure agreements.  The 
ability to compel private information from an individual is sometimes necessitated for 
public safety, but as Solove (2011) so eloquently explained that reason is used far too 
often.  
4.6. What Privacy Is Not 
 Privacy is often conflated with other terms such as anonymity, secrecy, and 
confidentiality (Smith et al., 2011, p. 995).  These terms are related to privacy in that they 
often help us be “left alone.”  While these terms are related to privacy they are distinct 
from privacy.   
 Anonymity is often conflated with privacy but is a distinct idea.  As Weicher 
(2006) notes, “Anonymity allows the individual to have a voice without having a name” 
(p.1).  Smith et al. (2011) note, “Anonymity is the ability to conceal a person’s 
identity…” (p. 996).  Additionally, one can be completely anonymous or pseudonymous.  
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Anonymity or pseudonymity exist when a person limits the ways that he or she can be 
identified; this may help individuals exercise control over their privacy (Smith et al., 
2011, p. 996).  Anonymity, according to the Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation standard,21 is a requirement to ensure privacy along with 
pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability (Yanes, 2014, p.1).  Anonymity is 
strictly concerned with a person’s identity; but the ability to control one’s identity is 
necessary to control one’s privacy.     
 Secrecy is also confused with privacy at times.  Secrecy involves concealing 
information that is likely viewed negatively by the excluded audience (Smith et al., 2011, 
p. 996).  The revelation of secrets can cause a change in the interpretation of an identity 
by others; secrecy affords opportunities to control how others view an individual.  
“[P]rivacy, by contrast, protects behavior which is either morally neutral or valued by 
society” (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996).   
 Finally, confidentiality is also mistakenly thought of as privacy, however, privacy 
implies that the individual holds sole discretion on when to release personal information.  
Confidentiality involves the release of private information, shared with a third party, 
under controlled circumstances (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996).  Therapists and insurance 
providers often specify what the terms are for the release of confidential information, or 
what was once private information, before being shared with a third party.  Individuals 
entrusting biometric and other sensitive data to third parties may want to check on the 
security of data storage before releasing it.  Data breaches wreck the controlled release of 
information that confidentiality specifies.  Security ensures that data is not manipulated 
                                                          
21 Common Criteria is an organization that certifies information technology products for security, 
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness (Common Criteria, 2015).   
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or that other parties can use an individual’s data for authentication purposes (Smith et al., 
2011, p. 996). 
4.7. Discussion on Privacy 
   Privacy lacks a coherent and accepted definition and has been conceptualized in 
many different ways, all with certain merits.  Privacy suffers from numerous conceptions 
because of the complex relationships between an individual and other entities as well as 
varied ideological perspectives exacerbated by varied technologies and their ability to 
monitor, record, and manipulate data.  The established social and legal norms allow for a 
variety of personal privacy preferences to be accommodated.  Any discussion of privacy 
is predicated on how it is initially conceived and valued.  For these reasons, individuals 
may want to think of privacy not as a subjective value with varying levels, or the 
differences between physical or informational privacy but instead focus on interference.  
No matter the conception of privacy, individuals, for the most part, know when they are 
interfered with and are free to decide how they would like to handle the interference.  By 
thinking about interference, there exists a concept that allows for the varied conceptions 
of privacy and the subjective reactions of individuals being interfered with.   
 Interference sounds similar to the legal concept of invasion of privacy.  There are 
certain parallels to the concepts.  The basic difference is that invasion of privacy is a legal 
tort.  There are legal guidelines that define when an individual’s privacy has been 
invaded.  Depending on the individual, there are exceptions for public figures and 
celebrities, and the nature of the interference because legal remedies can be pursued.  
Interference, however, is a broader concept because a host of privacy annoyances occur 
during daily life that are not illegal.  Invasion of privacy only deals with illegal acts, 
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while interference acknowledges a perceived threat to privacy and allows the law/people 
to deal with it at the individual level.  The concept again allows for subjective valuations, 
or perceived threats to privacy.   
 Since there are varied conceptions of privacy and because privacy is dependent 
upon the individual’s need or use of it, focusing on privacy in terms of interference can 
unite the many conceptions of privacy and also allow for its subjective nature.  If one 
speaks of physical privacy, or the intrusion upon one’s person or private space such as a 
bedroom, the individual is allowed to determine what level of interference they are 
willing to tolerate.   
 If one conceives of privacy as a natural human right, interference still works as a 
concept.  If we concede that there are natural rights, those rights have to be defended and 
fought for.  Decisions that intrude upon an individual’s privacy, whether a natural right or 
one outlined legally, are still subject to interference.  Tribes of people without formal 
laws may still have privacy expectations subject to interference.  Similarly, in the U.S. 
there are a number of troubling cases where the court found there was no “expectation of 
privacy”, most notably including the taking of pictures in locker rooms, as in the case of 
Thompson v. Johnson Community College.   
 When we view privacy as a commodity that can be exchanged for benefits, 
interference is present as well.  Online, users are subject to a variety of advertisements, 
tracking cookies, and other forms of privacy intruding tools.  Some users may be willing 
to let the interference convince them that trading some privacy for a benefit is fine, while 
others will view the interference as too intrusive and decline the offer or avoid online 
commerce altogether.  The same goes for brick and mortar retail stores.  For example, 
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Home Depot may solicit shoppers with a rewards card in exchange for a user’s private 
information; some users will undoubtedly perceive the benefits of the rewards card as an 
advantageous exchange.  Privacy centric individuals may be so adverse to interference 
that they only pay with cash, surrendering very little if any of their privacy.  Both 
individuals, those who value privacy and those who have less value for privacy, may be 
caught on a security camera which will reveal any of a number of details about the 
individuals.   
 No matter how we conceive privacy there will always be interference or unwanted 
intrusions on our privacy.  Thinking of interference allows all conceptions of privacy to 
be discussed in terms of a common idea.  Furthermore, privacy seen in terms of 
interference allows for the subjective nature of privacy as well.  All persons will be 
subject to interference in regards to their privacy, but how they act after that interference 
will vary.    
4.8. Modes of Resistance to Facial Recognition Technology 
 An individual’s face is an inherently public part of one’s identity.  Face is how we 
recognize, remember, judge, and make a host of other evaluations about individuals.  To 
a certain extent, humans enjoy the recognition that their faces provide; it is how we are 
immediately comfortable engaging with friends and family, how we remember business 
associates, and how we recall individuals as helpful and friendly or harmful and rude.  
Society also has the expectation that we will keep our faces public.  After all, it would be 
suspicious, unacceptable, and unlawful, to conduct one’s banking business while wearing 
a ski mask.  Since citizens have few options but to keep their face public, this section 
describes a way citizens can protect their face or resist FRT.      
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 There are companies like Justicecaps.com that have conjured up interesting ways 
for privacy centric individuals to protect their privacy.  Their product is a baseball cap 
with built-in infrared lights on the brim.  Humans cannot see infrared light so most 
individuals perceive the cap as a normal baseball hat.  However, infrared light effectively 
“blinds” cameras, distorting the individual’s face to the point of opaqueness to the 
camera.  One limitation to the product, however, is it only works at night (Charlie, 2014).  
Currently facial hair, hats, and eye glasses can confuse the technology but these obstacles 
appear to be surmountable as FRT continues to develop.   
4.9. Communication Technology Regulation Studies 
 Communication technology regulation can be tracked all the way back to the 
telegraph and we find attempts at regulation of communication technologies today, 
specifically FRT.  The first piece of legislation concerning the telegraph was passed in 
1845, and it imposed a fine on those who might damage the telegraph poles and wires 
along public roads (Nonnenmacher, 2001, p. 21).  In a sense, this regulation had the 
effect of promoting and protecting the growth of the new technology.  As with most 
technologies, there are several ways to implement regulation, in this case rival patents 
were issued, most likely to protect the competitive advantages of rival companies.     
 As the telegraph continued to spread across the country, new legislation was 
required by smaller companies.  Smaller companies demanded that their messages be 
transmitted in a “timely fashion” on larger company lines.  This in turn revealed 
information about the messages and senders so that disclosure protections were required 
as well (Nonnenmacher, 2001, p. 22).   
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 The next major communication technological breakthrough was the telephone.  
This was the first communication network that was designed to be accessed by the entire 
population (John, 2008, p. 507).  The two dominant providers of early telephone services 
were Western Union (nationwide) and American Bell (regional).  Western Union 
remained mostly unregulated until the New Deal thanks to political lobbying and 
consumer demands being substantially met, so there was minimal outcry from the public 
concerning regulation (John, 2008, p. 509).  Inventors still enjoyed patent protections for 
their inventions making it harder for outsiders to enter the market.  The patents 
commanded large sums of money and could be sold.  Local municipalities began 
ownership of some telephone networks to prevent fraud and promote innovation.   
 While the U.S. was figuring out how best to regulate its own communication 
industries, the international community gathered for a similar purpose.  The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) was created in 1934.  The formation of the ITU led to 
international regulation consistency, such as the International Frequency List for 
broadcasting.  A central consideration of the ITU was the large number of developing 
countries involved.  Developing countries outnumbered developed countries and started 
to gain traction for assistance by the ITU with technical expertise and funding (Codding, 
1994, p. 505).  The ITU ensures that telecommunications around the world follow a 
standardized format and have partnered with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
ensure compliance and fairness with laws and regulations.  As the oldest international 
organization, the ITU is an important historical and current regulator, one that has a 
majority of developing countries as members.  As technology progressed so did 
regulation.   
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 The next major communication technology development was the radio.  The radio 
has a limited band of frequencies that can be used for transmission.  As such this is a 
scarce resource that could either enjoy private property rights or regulation by the 
government.  The following information comes from R.H. Coase’s (1959) The Federal 
Communications Commission.  In 1910, the Navy sent a letter to the Senate describing 
the relative chaos of radio frequencies in the air.  Despite bickering in the house and 
senate licenses were issued by the Secretary of Commerce for radio use outlining certain 
legal obligations such as wave length.  Several other proposals included giving radio 
authority to the Post Office and the Navy.  By the early 1920’s broadcast stations began 
to proliferate.  After Secretary of Commerce Hoover refused to accept a license renewal 
because it interfered with other stations, Intercity Radio Company filed suit.  After more 
suits were filed by various broadcasting companies, the Federal Radio Commission was 
established and the ‘ether’ (of air) was deemed property of the people of the United 
States.  This required that offensive content could not be broadcast and that advertisers 
must be announced by name.  The commission, however, did not have the authority to 
regulate government radio stations.  In 1934 the commission’s powers were transferred to 
the Federal Communications Commission which was also responsible for telegraph and 
telephone businesses (Coase, 1959, p. 7).   
 A more contemporary example of communication technology regulation is the 
Internet.  The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is governed by the International 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  There are other 
communicative bodies, such as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).  These 
international groups are representative of the connected world.  Globalization among 
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international bodies has forced national governments to regulate these matters.  ICANN 
does not “run” the Internet, but rather provides technical expertise (Fuller, 2001, par. 11).  
While ICANN is not intended to run the Internet, it is “dedicated... to coordinate policy 
through private-sector, bottom-up, consensus-based means” (Fuller, 2001, par. 12).   
 Bottom up regulation created through consensus is a stark departure from the old 
top down legislative means previously employed by the government.  This departure is 
likely due to the global nature of communicative technologies, the complexity of the 
technologies, and the rapid pace at which these technologies are innovated.  Instead of 
legislation, governments have been content to allow multistakeholder processes to 
convene in certain circumstances, often where great technical expertise is needed.  
Technologies, such as FRT, require such expertise and corporations involved in utilizing 
the technology are often international in nature.   
4.9.1. Theories of Regulation 
 Regulation is generally thought of in terms of restricting or preventing some 
action.  Regulation can also allow certain behaviors or action to begin but in a more 
structured way.  There are different views of regulation some more narrow and others 
broader in context.  Regulation can be seen as focused control or a set of specific 
commands that must be obeyed.  Regulation has also been viewed as state influence on 
social or organizational behavior.  Finally, regulation can be seen as any form of social or 
economic influence (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 3).   
 The seminal question to ask regarding regulation is: “Is regulation needed?”  
There may be a variety of situations in which regulation is needed or desired.  One reason 
to regulate may be lack of information available to the consumer.  Situations arise when 
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there is very little reward for providing consumers with information, and, Internet based 
businesses are notorious for having hard to find, jargon filled, and non-negotiable privacy 
policies and end user license agreements.  In fact, unequal bargaining power is another 
reason regulation may be needed (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 20).22    
 Another situation that may call for regulation is when services or opportunities to 
individuals are offered without consistency.  Perhaps the most famous regulatory example 
to encourage fairness and consistency of opportunities would be Affirmative Action 
policies.  Concerns have arisen that FRT could be used in a manner called facial profiling 
to offer certain opportunities to one race or gender in a discriminatory fashion.   
 Regulation need not always be viewed as hampering an activity, but permitting 
activities as well.  For example, the need for regulation can be seen as good for the public 
in instances of security.  FRT has been deployed at airports to enhance security and allow 
for accurate identification, subsequently allowing passengers to more conveniently 
navigate airport security.  Regulation is often created because it is in the public’s best 
interest.     
 Regulation occurs due to market failures, specifically concerning examples 
previously mentioned.  However, regulation can also fail and create odd externalities in 
the market.  Affirmative Action policies were created to enforce fair hiring practices for 
minorities.  Currently, there are some in the minority community who feel that the laws 
hold back minorities, while others view them as a crutch that leads to stigmatization 
                                                          
22 FRT was famously deployed at the 2001 Super Bowl without notice to the fans in attendance 
(McCullagh, 2001).  Concerns have been expressed that deployment of FRT without notice or consent may 




(Navarette, 2014).  Choosing when regulation is needed is a consideration that requires 
careful evaluation.   
 As shown, regulation should be chosen when there are market failures, but 
regulation can also have negative effects as well.  Creating regulation that produces 
maximum benefit and minimal problems is the optimal goal.  Then again, what 
constitutes “good” regulation?  Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (2012) have created the 
following five questions to determine if regulation is worthy of support.  Is the action or 
regime supported by legislative authority?  Is there an appropriate scheme of 
accountability?  Are procedures fair, accessible, and open?  Is the regulator acting with 
sufficient expertise? Is the action or regime efficient? (p. 27).  Regulation authorized by 
the government is often seen as legitimate.  However, regulation can be broadly worded 
with a good deal of latitude in how the regulation is actually implemented.  This results in 
a need for an accountable group implementing the regulation.  Regulation needs to treat 
individuals fairly and allow for their participation.  Expertise is often a central part of 
creating regulation.  Often technologies are complicated, and the various ways they 
impact the market need to be considered.  Finally, a lack of bureaucracy and red tape 
leading to increased efficiency is desirable. 
 At this point regulatory regime needs to be defined as it is a central theme to this 
dissertation.  David Levi-Faur (2011) writes that regulatory regimes encompass the actors 
making decisions as well as the norms and mechanisms used to make regulatory 
decisions.  Levi-Faur (2011) also notes “an increasingly popular concept in the study of 
regulation and regulatory reform, which probably attests to the emergence and 
consolidation of systemic rulemaking to govern different issues, arenas, and sectors” (p. 
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20).  Regulatory regimes are the norms and rules for making decisions as various 
interests converge around a specific issue or group of issues.   
 How does regulation arise?  There are many reasons and models for the 
development of regulation, but one explanation most closely follows the MSH meetings 
on FRT.  The ‘Power of Ideas’ explanation closely resembles the MSH meeting format.  
This explanation places primary importance on conversation and deliberation (Baldwin, 
Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p. 49).  “This ‘argumentative turn’ follows Habermas and points to 
the importance of interpretative communities that are supposed to deliberate and come to 
a shared understanding regarding the regulatory issues and processes” (Baldwin, et al., 
2012, p. 51).  During conversations and deliberation knowledge is gained by the 
participants and the learning that takes place is a tangible outcome of the process.   
 There are various strategies that regulators can pursue in order to ensure that the 
regulation is enforced.  Some strategies are punitive, incentive based, market based, or 
pursued by other means.  The enforcement of the voluntary code of conduct will be done 
under the Section 5 authority of the FTC to enforce against unfair or deceptive practices.  
This most closely resembles the command and control strategy where standards are 
enforced by threat of criminal sanctions, something the FTC can pursue.  Command and 
Control strategies are seen as forceful by the public because they are backed by the power 
of the state.  This, in turn, provides additional confidence to the public that the regulation 
will be enforced aggressively (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 107).  Unfortunately, not all 
members of the public will be able to agree that the regulation is in their best interest.    
Additionally, “Command methods may also lack force when court sanctioning is weak 
and the rules, as a result, fail to pose a credible deterrent” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 110).   
 
75 
4.9.2. Soft Versus Hard Regulation   
The result of the MSH process is a voluntary code of conduct that organizations can 
agree to abide by and will be enforced by the FTC.    This code of conduct can be seen as 
a form of ‘soft’ regulation. Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson (2001) noted that codes of 
conduct can be viewed as soft regulation but there is little agreement on what defines soft 
regulation or what ‘hard’ regulation is, for that matter.  Sisson and Marginson (2001, p. 
4) provide useful comparisons between soft and hard regulation.  They note that soft 
regulation is concerned with general principles where as hard regulation deals with 
obligations.  Additionally, soft regulation deals with obligations it tends to prescribe 
limited provisions, whereas hard regulation sets standard provisions. Finally, soft 
regulation may continue to be negotiated when hard regulation is seen as finished.  As 
stated previously, many of the companies involved with FRT are international in nature.  
Soft regulation, because it is often less rigid than hard regulation, is seen by the 
participants as a productive way to standardize the technology.  Additionally, hard 
regulation has a one size fits all nature that may not apply to the various uses of FRT, 
such as validation, identification, and demographic uses.   
4.9.3. Regulation of Technology 
 Technology and regulation are often represented as antithetical (Wiener, 2004).  
Regulation can be seen as unnecessary bureaucratic requirements that slow the 
development of technology and stifle innovation.  In fact, this view is witnessed in the 
multistakeholder meetings facilitated by the NTIA.  The goal of the meetings is to 
develop a voluntary code of conduct as a mode of self-regulation instead of allowing the 
development of governmental regulation of FRT.   
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 A growing body of academic literature has been exploring the false dichotomy 
that exists between technology and regulation.  Jonathan Wiener (2004) explored 
concepts of technology and regulation noting that technology symbolizes progress and 
capitalism while regulation symbolizes bureaucracy and growth prohibition.  
Nevertheless, the regulation of technology does not have to be seen as inhibiting 
development or innovation.  Some forms of regulation can actually promote the growth 
and innovation of technology.  For instance, it has been proposed, but not yet regulated, 
that FRT be more effective at lower pixel rates thus increasing the accuracy of the 
technology.     
 In attempting to explain what justifies the developing regulatory regimes for new 
technologies some authors point to the fact that those technologies are so ubiquitous and 
essential that using the technology becomes compulsory.  Jennifer Chandler (2012) wrote 
that competition between individuals and organizations drives the adoption and 
enhancement of technology.  These individuals or organizations become dependent on 
the technology because the costs of discontinuation are too high.  The multitude of users 
establishes a need for a system of rules which prevents or punishes users through 
negative social consequences, while also rewarding them which leads to positive social 
benefits (Chandler, 2012).  According to Jennifer Chandler (2007), courts also play a role 
in regulating technology through the establishment of property rights or rights to 
damages, which shape the regulatory landscape.  Individuals, through tort claims, can 
bring legal action against those who invade property rights. Technologies can be 
impacted by the courts when they award damages in cases.   
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 Leo Marx (1994) found that technology is easier to view in a positive light 
because the consequences of new technologies often escape us.  Marx (1994) wrote of the 
public pessimism surrounding technology only after disasters such as Chernobyl, the 
Vietnam War, and various oil spills.  Some individuals already hold this pessimistic 
position on FRT because of its invasive nature.  Balancing the concerns of those who are 
pessimistic about FRT with those who are excited about its potential will be necessary to 
ensure responsible regulation that allows for innovation while protecting citizens. 
4.10. Discussion on the Application of Regulation Theories 
 Chandler (2012) discussed ubiquitous and obligatory technologies, and FRT has 
the potential to become one.  Online identity theft has become an issue of international 
importance in the last decade, and FRT, as well as other biometric identifiers for 
authentication, are offered as a possible way to slow the rate of, or prevent altogether, 
identity theft.  If this is the case, then future societies will depend on FRT to authenticate 
bank transactions, rather than rely on simple pin numbers.  Pin numbers will be seen as a 
weak form of authentication and a dangerous way of performing critical transactions.  
Consequently, how the enormous amount of FRT data is going to be gathered, stored, and 
used, specifically by whom, becomes an issue of great social importance.  The public 
debate, as contained by the multistakeholder (MSH) meetings convened by the NTIA, is 
directed toward developing the foundations of a regulatory regime for FRT, and this 
debate will contribute to the case study for the current research.   
 As photos become stored for authentication and security purposes issues of 
property rights are likely to arise.  A recent example of these disputes is the so called 
“Cute Convict.”  According to Gabe Gutierrez and Scott Stump (2014), Megan Simmons, 
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who was arrested for DUI, is suing InstantCheckmate.com over the public use of her mug 
shot without her permission.  The ruling will have legal implications over the use of 
photos and may have implications for FRT over the scanning of public photos.  For 
instance, if the court agrees with Ms. Simmons, ruling that she has a property right to her 
photo, then other organizations may have to change their practices as a result.  
Conversely, they may rule that the photo was public and the company had a right to use 
it, which could make other companies more aggressive in searching the Internet for 
photos.   
4.11. Multistakeholder Collaborative Process 
 Before presenting the multistakeholder format a brief history of organizational 
studies is necessary to provide context to the process.  One of the first writings on 
organizational studies comes from Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations where he 
described the division of labor (Hatch, 2006, p. 27).  Following this work is Karl Marx 
who wrote of labor and capital.  Capital theorists began with theories of labor only later 
to focus on management.  For example, Ėmile Durkheim was concerned about the 
specialization of labor while Max Weber focused on the origins of managerial authority 
(Hatch, 2006, p. 30).   
 Scientific management was born from the work of Frederick Taylor.  Taylor 
studied the most efficient way to accomplish a task.  Taylor’s scientific approach to labor 
worked to achieve maximum profit for organizations (as cited in Hatch, 2006, p. 32).  
Moving beyond such singular pursuits theorists started writing about systems theories 
and challenging the single best way to organize labor.  For example, in Total Quality 
Management (TQM) the worker was seen as the person most knowledgeable on how to 
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improve an operation or an aspect of the operation.  This singular input could have 
positive material consequences for a business’s output, “Quality is not improved by after-
the-fact inspection but by control over the production process as it happens” (Sashkin, 
1993, p. 11).  Soon organizations and the tasks they are charged with were recognized for 
their increasingly complex demands and organization.  In turn, complex demands and the 
interaction of multiple interested entities led to the rise and increased popularity of the 
MSH format for solving such issues (Hintz & Milan, 2014).   
 The NTIA has been tasked with regulating a complex and nascent technology in 
FRT.  In many ways the MSH model is the practice of participatory democracy, “Their 
power [practice of participatory democracy] derives from respect for their processes the 
openness, the flexibility, and the ability for all voices that can credibly articulate their 
positions to be heard and the quality of their outputs, which are intended to represent 
broad stakeholder consensus” (Waz and Weizer 2012, p. 336).  Similarly, David Held 
(2006) described deliberative democracy as those who, “Champion…informed debate, 
[and] the public use of reason” (Held, 2006, p. 232).  The NTIA meetings have involved 
informed debate and reasoning to pursue participant goals.  Held (2006) continued,  
The major contention of deliberative democrats is to bid farewell to any 
notion of fixed preferences and to replace them with a learning process in 
and through which people come to terms with the range of issues they 
need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political 
judgment.  (p. 233)   
The voluntary codes of conduct created at the NTIA are, in part, the result of a firm’s 
general resistance to “excessive government laws and regulations,” (Kolk, Tulder, & 
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Welters, 1999, p. 152).  These voluntary codes are a “soft” form of regulation rather than 
the top down command and control style regulation that could be enacted by Congress or 
other governing bodies.  Soft regulation has been employed to achieve a balance between 
consumer protection and the need to innovate the technology.   
 The multistakeholder process is the format the White House (2012) has required 
the NTIA meetings to follow.  This format allows for non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which possess a better understanding of the complex technology to meet and 
garner greater legitimacy concerning the chosen policy (Antonova, 2011).  Furthermore, 
“[T]he open and inclusive stakeholder process leads to accumulation of intellectual 
capital, development of relational infrastructure. ” (Antonova, 2011, p. 426).  This also 
leads to shared consciousness among stakeholders.   
 The MSH process is a collaborative one.  Collaboration “is a process through 
which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their 
differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is 
possible” (Gray, 1989, p. 5).  The goal of collaborating is to gather stakeholders together 
in order to gain a more complete and detailed understanding of the problem.  
Stakeholders bring unique knowledge, experience, and views to the process which adds 
to the formulation of the problem, as well as the solution. 
 When diverse stakeholders decide on the problem and how it is going to be 
solved, there will most likely be conflict.  Collaboration can help resolve conflict: 
“Collaboration transforms adversarial interaction into a mutual search for information 
and for solutions that allow all those participating to insure that their interests are 
represented” (Gray, 1989, p. 7).  Conflict does more than just ensure that stakeholders’ 
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interests are represented; in fact, conflict often leads to unforeseen opportunities:  
“differences are often the source of immense creative potential.  Learning to harness that 
potential is what collaboration is all about” (Gray, 1989, p. 11).  Oftentimes, parties are 
only willing to collaborate if they can envision a positive outcome as the result.  Remove 
the possibility of a positive outcome and parties may decide to withdraw or to do their 
best to disrupt the process.   
 Barbara Gray (1989), who is a prominent author on the theory of collaboration, 
defined the criteria for problems that are best solved by collaboration: 
 The problems are ill defined, or there is disagreement about how they should 
be defined. 
 Several stakeholders have a vested interest in the problems and are 
interdependent. 
 These stakeholders are not necessarily identified a priori or organized in any 
systematic way. 
 There may be a disparity of power and/or resources for dealing with the 
problems among the stakeholders. 
 Stakeholders may have different levels of expertise and different access to 
information about the problems. 
 The problems are often characterized by technical complexity and scientific 
uncertainty. 
 Differing perspectives on the problems often lead to adversarial relationships 
among the stakeholders. 
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 Incremental or unilateral efforts to deal with the problems typically produce 
less than satisfactory solutions. 
 Existing processes for addressing the problems have proved insufficient and 
may even exacerbate them (p. 10) 
The problems identified on Gray’s list are consistent with the problems surrounding the 
regulation of FRT.  The technology is nascent, and there is often disagreement 
concerning the technology’s capabilities and limitations.  Also, many vendors, 
technologists, academics, and advocates have a vested interest in the technology.   
 Gray (1989) noted that collaboration usually proceeds in three phases.  The first 
phase is “problem setting.”  This phase is marked by identifying a common 
understanding of the problem, a willingness to collaborate, identification of legitimate 
stakeholders, the role of the convener, and identification of resources (Gray, 1989, p. 57).  
The second phase is “direction setting.”  In direction setting, rules for stakeholders are 
set, an agenda is created, subgroups may be created, information is found, options are 
explored, and an agreement is reached (Gray, 1989, p. 57).  The third phase is 
“implementation.”  This phase is marked by dealing with constituencies, building 
external support, and ensuring compliance of the agreement (Gray, 1989, p. 57).  Each 
phase faces specific challenges that have to be met and collaboration can increase the 
success rate with which those challenges are met.   
 Collaboration is one of the central focuses of the MSH process, but how do 
rulemaking standards measure up to other processes?  Would the rules have higher 
standards if they were developed under a different process?  The stated outcome of the 
NTIA for this process is to create voluntary codes of conduct (rules) for commercial uses 
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of FRT.  Fransen & Kolk (2007), suggested that the rules created at multi-stakeholder 
processes are more demanding (rigorous and elaborate) than those drawn up by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and those of business associations (p.3).  This 
indicates that even though the codes of conduct, created by the NTIA, are voluntary, they 
still have a good chance of setting high standards for consumer privacy.   
 Even though the expectations may be high, research also suggests cautious 
optimism as voluntary codes are sometimes adopted by only a few organizations (Kolk, 
et al., 1999, p.144).  In fact, the last NTIA directed multi-stakeholder process, for mobile 
app transparency (2012), resulted in very limited adoption.  Complicating matters, 
“Specificity and compliance mechanisms are seen as the crucial elements which 
determine the likelihood of compliance” (Kolk, et al., 1999, p. 147).  This suggests that if 
codes are too strict or prescriptive in nature they may not be adopted by companies. 
 One must also be mindful of stakeholder motivations for creating a code of 
conduct.  Ostensibly, this process has the goal of protecting consumer privacy.  Kolk et 
al., (1999) noted that firms involved in the process may have ulterior motives, such as 
influencing regulators or customers (p. 151).  The content of the voluntary codes of 
conduct determine whether companies will adopt them, how companies are regulated, 
whether consumers believe they are legitimate, and the level of consumer privacy 
protection they provide.   Businesses typically try to avoid regulation; codes of conduct 
may be created to prevent mandatory regulation (Kolk et al., 1999, p. 152).  Codes that 
are specific in nature allow them to be more easily measured.  This clarity also 
encourages compliance by businesses.   
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4.11.1. Multistakeholder Processes and Shared Power 
 Bringing together diverse stakeholders who have a willingness to collaborate on 
issues has many benefits as explained above.  One should not assume that all 
stakeholders possess the same amount of power to influence the process.  Nigel Roome 
and Frank Wijen (2006) contended “that influence is the equivalent of power, as power 
that is not exercised is insignificant, and influence is a materialization of power” (p. 3).  
Ian Mitroff (1983) described stakeholder properties, such as resources, special knowledge 
or skills, relationships with other stakeholders, and the purpose or beliefs that the 
stakeholder has, as impactful on the stakeholder’s power in the process (p. 36).  With 
regard to the MSH process on FRT, specialized knowledge and skill are critical factors 
when considering stakeholder influence.  As stated earlier, this technology is in its early 
stages of development and its capabilities are still uncertain, making regulating the 
technology challenging.   
 Each stakeholder exercises a certain amount of power in a limited capacity.  
Given the nature of MSH processes, a consensus must eventually be reached or the 
process will fall apart.  For productive outcomes to be achieved stakeholders will have to 
collaborate and negotiate until there is agreement.  If stakeholders are unwilling to reach 
consensus they may do their best to undermine the process, since they are still legitimate 
stakeholders until they choose to no longer participate.  Depending on the stakeholder 
and their source(s) of power, not participating can impact the process in significant ways.   
 The MSH process is open, inviting diverse groups with diverse ideas that lead to 
stimulating conversations; however, that can also make the process lengthy.  The more a 
stakeholder participates and speaks up during the process the more they can potentially 
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impact it.  Even though all stakeholders have been encouraged to participate by the 
moderator, there are different forms of participation, including nonparticipation.  
Nonparticipation may invite suspicion from other participants.  Another way that 
stakeholders exercise influence is by the “power of the pen.”  Stakeholders have been 
asked to join groups whose issues are most meaningful to them; they are then asked to 
produce draft language about the issue to be discussed with the entire group of 
stakeholders.  Most of what is decided by the large group is dependent upon the smaller 
group’s draft language. 
4.11.2. MultiStakeholder Outcomes 
 Some outcomes of the MSH process, such as codes of conduct, are tangible and 
easy to recognize.  Other outcomes from the process are intangible and hard to estimate 
and appreciate, including the knowledge acquired by stakeholders through the learning 
process (Antonova, 2011).  Tangible and intangible outcomes are important to both the 
process and stakeholders as they move to other MSH meetings or revisit the original.   
4.11.3. Learning 
 The learning that takes place at the forum is a facilitative part of the process and 
also an outcome of the MSH process.  The learning process is affected by several factors, 
including “organizational antecedents, market positioning, technology, access to 
stakeholder networks, sensitivity to multiple perspectives, and ability to facilitate inputs 
from different internal and external stakeholders” (Roome & Wijen, 2006, p.6).  The 




 James March (1991) described two forms of organizational learning: exploration 
and exploitive.  Exploration learning seeks to find new information which may include 
experimentation.  Exploration is also described as “double loop” (Roome & Wijen, 2006, 
p. 7).  Double loop learning “…provid[es] feedback and more effective decision making” 
(Argyris, 1976, p. 363).   Exploitive learning, on the other hand, seeks to take advantage 
of known information and may include increasing efficiency or enhancing execution of 
something (March, 1991, p. 71).  Unlike exploration, exploitive learning is described as a 
“single loop” or an action created as a result of a known theory (Argyris, 1976, p. 363).   
 Due to the emerging nature of FRT, most of the learning taking place at the forum 
is exploration.  The stakeholders are discovering ways to protect consumers while also 
providing business entities the ability to continue innovating.  This type of learning also 
provides the flexibility that regulators need to balance consumer privacy with business 
interests.   
 Learning occurs in three stages acquisition, sharing, and storage (Roome & 
Wijen, 2006, p.8).  In the explored FRT process, but especially at the beginning, various 
technical experts were brought in so stakeholders could be exposed to different sources of 
expertise and create shared meaning for later discussions.  This acquisition was marked 
by experts reporting on various experiments to demonstrate the technology’s capabilities, 
accuracy, and uses.   
 Sharing information has been an ongoing process, and without a clear delineation 
at the forum.  Stakeholders share information to solve larger problems (Roome & Wijen, 
2006, p.8).  As the process continues, stakeholders have been counted on for their various 
expertise; for example, lawyers have been drawn upon for legal advice, biometrics 
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experts have been consulted, and regulators have been brought in to discuss the scope of 
the code of conduct.  Information storage is used for shared meaning and later problem 
solving; one form of information storage may include documents created based on 
consensus.     
 As previously discussed not all information is shared.  Corporations may want to 
protect a competitive advantage and thus be reluctant to share information, or have new 
uses of the technology that they do not want to discuss.  Others may be reluctant to 
discuss information as they feel it may be of advantage to them during the process.     
 The learning process is not limited to technical knowledge.  Stakeholders may 
learn new social skills, enabling them to participate more effectively at the MSH forum 
(Turcotte & Pasquero, 2011, p. 457).  Stakeholders learn where their views may be most 
appreciated, as well as where their organization and others stand on an issue.  This social 
aspect of the learning process should not be discounted because it can enhance 
cooperation and produce tangible outcomes and partnerships (Turcotte & Pasquero, 2011, 
p. 457).   
4.11.4. Consensus  
According to Gray (1989) and Turcotte and Pasquero(2001) consensus is the 
expected outcome of MSH processes.  These processes are convened in order for 
stakeholders to form consensus around specified issues in an effort to further or solve 
issues.  Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) note that consensus may be easier to achieve on 
broad topics or umbrella issues.  The details or specific mandates may be areas where 
consensus is harder to achieve or stakeholders may be unclear on what is to be agreed 
upon.  Since MSH processes are generally convened to solve complex problems, goals 
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may be quickly agreed upon, but how to achieve those goals may be more difficult to 
agree upon.  Even when appropriate solutions can be agreed upon, stakeholders may lack 
the resources necessary to carry them out, thus consensus must be considered in a 
multifaceted way.  There are goals and then there are the means of achieving those goals 
both of which need to reach consensus to be carried out.  As stated previously, the 
learning process may facilitate consensus on issues in multiple ways. 
4.11.5. Capacity Building 
Capacity building has been defined in terms of MSH processes as “the 
accumulation of intellectual capital, skills, and competencies; development of a relational 
infrastructure for the domain, as represented by stakeholder constituencies, collaborative 
alliances/dynamic coalitions, and network communities; and emergence of a common 
global consciousness” (Antonova, 2011, p. 436).  These aspects of capacity building lead 
to innovative solutions, also known as collaborative advantage (Antonova, 2011, p. 427).   
4.12. Discussion on Multistakeholder Theories Application 
 Anticipated uses of MSH theories include strategic silence by stakeholders to 
influence the process.  For example, Facebook and Google have had representation in the 
current MSH process but had not participated directly even after repeated requests to do 
so.  Facebook, however, did eventually contribute to the process.  Why would two of the 
most reputable companies in the space refuse to participate for so long?  Will the 
legitimacy of the code of conduct be enhanced or tarnished if they choose not to agree to 
and abide by it?      
 It is expected that stakeholders will exhibit different amounts of power based on 
their resources and relative distance to the physical meeting location.  For example, there 
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are three main ways to follow the MSH process on FRT: telephone, webcast, and 
physical presence.  Those who are physically present at the meetings wield the most 
power as they are able to speak up at almost any time during the process.  Stakeholders 
who participate via telephone wait until the operator puts them into the question and 
answer mode.  Stakeholders who participate via the webcast may be able to e-mail, but 
this was not revealed during the observed meetings.  As the venue for the process has not 
changed, those stakeholders residing in the Washington D.C. area have the inherent 
advantage of easily attending the meetings, increasing their potential influence or power.   
 The learning process can have material outcomes on MSH processes.  During this 
process, competing ideas often led to different learning outcomes.  Both privacy 
advocates and industry technologists have been invited to make presentations illustrating 
technology usage, necessary data, and technological capabilities.  These presentations 
have ultimately resulted in different conclusions.  Who is to be believed about whether a 
series of numbers can be reverse engineered into an image?  What are the present 
limitations of the technology?  Answers to these questions are likely to have material 
regulatory outcomes.   
4.13. Summary 
 This project is informed by the social constructivist view that FRT can be 
regulated in meaningful ways.  The process is a rejection of the technological determinist 
view that the technology will change the ways humans interact.  The process and its 
outcome clearly demonstrate that individuals not only control appropriate uses of the 
technology, but also the meaningful limits on its usage.   
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 Each of the three theoretical fields presented above are complex and multifaceted 
on their own.  These fields have converged in this project to improve understanding about 
the developing regulatory regime for FRT and the privacy implications that result.  The 
MSH format has been employed to help develop “soft” regulation for FRT in the form of 
a voluntary code of conduct.   
 Given the complexity of privacy views and the international nature of many of the 
companies likely to be affected by this regulation, the MSH format plays an important 
role in ensuring the presentation of diverse views and opinions.  The nature of the 
voluntary code ensures that the technology can continue to develop while providing 
consumers with confidence that their privacy is being protected.   
 How privacy is constructed at the MSH meetings is likely to have material effects 
on the regulation created.  Privacy views present at the MSH meetings are anticipated to 
include information, physical, cognitive, and privacy conceived of as a commodity.  
Conceptions that have disproportionate representation through the process may have 
enhanced regulatory safeguards.  Conversely, conceptions of privacy not represented at 
the process, or minimally represented, may lack meaningful regulatory protections.  The 
safeguards developed out of the MSH process represent the only meaningful limits 









 This chapter provides insight into the philosophical paradigm employed 
throughout this project.  Explanations are provided as to why particular research methods 
were chosen as well as their anticipated contributions to the project.  All research 
methods have shortcomings, and these will be discussed as well.   
5.1. Philosophical Underpinnings 
 Much of this research subscribes to a social constructivist worldview applied to 
technology.  Following this paradigm is the notion that individuals ascribe meaning to 
events and past experiences which impact their interactions (Creswell, 2009).  Under this 
paradigm meaning is created through discussion and interactions with others.  This is 
precisely what the multistakeholder process for facial recognition technology seeks to do; 
it seeks to create shared meaning among the stakeholders to produce a voluntary code of 
conduct for commercial uses of FRT.  Much of this research focuses on the interaction 
between government entities, individuals, companies, and industry representatives, to 
build consensus on legitimate FRT uses.   
 Important to the social constructivist paradigm is history and culture.  Many 
Americans strongly identify with individualism and are skeptical of too much 
government intervention in their lives.  Multistakeholderism is a way to create governing 
principles without the heavy hand of government, giving citizens a chance to directly 
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express their concerns.  Current events tend to shape human experiences, and the 
developmental code of conduct is occurring in the context of a post-Snowden world 
where Americans are more aware of privacy violations.  As this is the reality, citizens 
may be more sensitive to issues that FRT creates than they were previously.  Continually 
incorporating these varied perspectives is important in providing the most holistic 
explanations possible for this dissertation. 
 The varied perspectives represented at the meetings may demand a social 
constructivist paradigm.  The complexity of views, participants, and positions cannot be 
adequately covered by more limited paradigms.  Technologists who develop, use, and 
promote the technology have been responsible for educating participants on the 
capabilities of FRT.  However, some technologists who previously supported robust 
growth of the technology have reconsidered and now advocate for more limited uses 
(Opam, 2014).  This is just one dynamic that could be covered between privacy 
advocates, technologists, foreign government representatives, businesses, trade 
associations, private citizens, and physically present participants versus phone or webcast 
participants.  
 The complexity of the meetings is not just dictated by the participants and their 
advocatory views, but also values and controversial scientific conclusions.  Privacy lacks 
a definition that can be agreed upon in the academic community, and amongst citizens in 
general. Since privacy lacks a clear definition, it has been conceptualized in many 
different ways.  A participant’s conception of privacy and its subjective value makes the 
issue very complex.  Furthermore, these meetings are not only regulating the current uses 
of FRT but also potential future uses.  What the technology will be capable of in the 
 
93 
future is uncertain, but can be determined through regulation.  For instance, there is one 
method of facial recognition called face “hallucination” where the technology takes 
poorly pixilated images and begins to “guess” what the face looks like by comparing it to 
millions of other known images.  Whether or not this is a viable method of facial 
recognition remains to be seen, but there are implications brought forth by this method 
that may not be present in current methods.  Social constructivism is best suited to 
encapsulate the varied perspectives and participants as well as the highly complex nature 
of the meetings and the interactions within.    
 In contrast, positivist approaches, derived from scientific and observable 
knowledge, fail to grasp the complex issues that FRT raises.  Essentialism, having certain 
base qualities, may seem like an appropriate approach to the technology because it is 
usually seen as being used for identification but there are multi-model methods of 
conducting FR and the debates at the NTIA meetings are too complex.  It is true that 
stakeholders have ideas they would like to see incorporated or not incorporated into a 
voluntary code of conduct, but the creation of the code evolves through negotiations and 
stakeholders have to compromise their positions in order to broker a deal that companies 
will actually agree to.  Other philosophical paradigms also fail to adequately explain the 
dissertation’s aims.         
 Rationalistic approaches are not useful to codes of conduct that regard privacy 
because there is no academic consensus defining privacy.  Furthermore, an individual’s 
need for privacy is subjective.  Even if consistent expectations of privacy existed, the 
government may continue to invade individual’s privacy through taxes or privacy 
mandates, such as requiring clothing in public.   
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 Technological determinism is a popular reductionist viewpoint that believes 
technology is an independent force which has left society in its servitude (Alvarez, 1999, 
p. 405).  This project fundamentally refutes the idea of technological determinism.  The 
whole point of the MSH meetings on FRT is to directly impact technology by “allowing” 
it to impact society in beneficial ways.  If the premise of technological determinism is 
taken seriously, then there is no need to attempt to regulate the technology.  The social 
constructivist view and the MSH meetings allow for normative values, such as privacy, to 
be embedded in the deployed formats of FRT.  As David Nye (2006) stated: “Rather than 
assuming that technologies are deterministic, it appears more reasonable to assume that 
cultural choices shape their uses” (p. 21).   
 How the challenges of FRT are framed during the MSH meetings will largely 
determine the regulatory regime for the technology.  For instance, stakeholders have been 
informed that they are to focus on commercial uses of the technology and that 
government uses are outside the scope of the group’s work.  Given these limitations, the 
group will only be able to regulate the technology in limited ways, further amplifying the 
appropriateness of the social constructivist paradigm in this research project.   
5.2. Research Design 
 The research design for this project is that of a case study.  The FRT debate, 
convened by the NTIA, constitutes an important case of developing a regulatory policy 
regarding privacy and technology development.  These MSH meetings are the first U.S. 
attempt at regulating FRT.  The case study design has been chosen specifically in relation 
to these factors. 
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 Robert Yin (1984) defined a case study as a research approach that allows for 
investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 23).  He specified that the case study is the 
most appropriate research design for studies, where “how” or “why” questions are the 
primary concern of the researcher; he also suggested this format for studying current 
phenomena on which the researcher has little or no control.   
 Similarly, Peter Swanborn (2010) described a case study as a research approach 
that focuses on one or only a handful of events, but draws data from a variety of sources, 
including documents and observation.  Furthermore, Swanborn (2010) states that case 
studies are appropriate for answering broad research questions by tracking how a process 
develops.  This research approach allows for comparisons to be made between the 
positions of the various stakeholders.  These comparisons will underscore outcomes from 
NTIA meetings.  For instance, heavy privacy protections may imply that NGOs, such as 
the Center for Digital Democracy, had a strong influence in the meetings.  Conversely, if 
rapid innovation is favored, commercial organizations may have had a profound impact 
on the debate.  The case study design was chosen for this project as it helps answer 
“why” questions, as defined by Yin (1984).  The discourse analysis of meeting 
transcripts, research interviews, and documents collected will help answer questions of 
why particular provisions and considerations have been included in the code of conduct. 
 The case study design is not without its critics or controversy.  One criticism 
leveled against the design is that researchers may allow their views to influence the 
findings and conclusions (Yin, 1984).  Triangulation of multiple methods of data 
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gathering, interviews with participants, participant observation, and meeting transcripts 
are employed to try to alleviate this concern.   
 The case study design is suited to the project given the complexity of the MSH 
meetings on FRT.  As “a research endeavor, the case study contributes uniquely to our 
knowledge of individual, organizational, social, and political phenomena” (Yin, 1989, p. 
14).  The NTIA MSH process on FRT is a politically directed and motivated process 
mandated in President Obama’s CPBR.  A wide variety of organizational interests are 
represented and advocated for during the process which will likely affect individual 
consumers.  Given these diverse situations and the potential for profound social impact, 
the case study is the most appropriate research design for this project.   
 This study proposes the use of three qualitative methods for data gathering: semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis of meeting 
transcripts.  Triangulation, according to Donald Treadwell (2011), is the use of multiple 
methods so that the researcher can have greater confidence in his or her findings.  
Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt (2011) believed that the use of multiple methods, 
with their own strengths and limitations, could provide cross validation of conclusions 
and thus to help assess the overall validity of findings.      
5.3. Stages of Research 
5.3.1. Data Collection 
 The NTIA meetings started on February 6, 2014.   The debates at the meetings 
were recorded via Replay Video Capture 7 software and a Sony IC recorder, a digital 
recording device, for redundancy.  The software records the NTIA webcasts in .mpg 
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format, which is accepted by the HyperRESEARCH platform, the data analysis software 
platform.   
5.3.2. Participant Observation 
 Participant observation is a method to collect data in settings where researchers 
observe and/or take part in the activities of the study participants (DeWalt and DeWalt, 
2011).  Participant observation provides context for data, which supports the process of 
identifying potential interviewees, formulating questions for the semi-structured 
interviews, and detecting power structures in the MSH collaborative process.   According 
to DeWalt and DeWalt (2011), participant observation has several advantages, including 
enhancing the quality of data obtained during fieldwork, helping to interpret said data, 
and aiding in the formulation of new research questions based on the observations made 
in the field.   
 This researcher traveled to Washington D.C. in order to observe the meeting that 
occurred on June 24, 2014.  This observation provided important context for how the 
stakeholders actually experience the meetings.  During this trip, the researcher learned a 
significant amount about the venue and the meeting’s intricacies which could not be 
experienced through the webcast alone. For example, many more individuals are in the 
room than can be observed via the webcast. This has provided greater context and insight 
for this research. 
 Meeting notifications are posted on the NTIA website as well as emailed out to 
participants and viewers who signed up for the email list serve for the process.  During 
the meetings participants were observed in regards to their attendance and participation 
during the meetings.  When individuals participated in the meetings, their positions on 
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specific issues were noted as well as their reasoning for having that position in contrast to 
others discussed.  After positions on a specific issue are offered and discussed, 
observations were made as to how those positions were incorporated into the code of 
conduct.        
5.3.3. Semi-Structured Interviews 
 The participant observation and document analysis allowed for surveying the 
stakeholders’ positions.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen 
participants selected on the basis of their expertise, level of engagement with the debate, 
and to be representative of the stakeholder groups.  (See Appendix B for a list of 
interviewees.)  The goal of conducting the interviews was to explore particular 
stakeholder positions on issues, encourage reflection on the process, and explore their 
feelings about outcomes for the code of conduct.   
 This study employs semi-structured interviews to enhance exploration of the 
public debate while allowing interviewees to share direct personal experiences and 
reflections on the subjects discussed in the NTIA meetings.  Fiona Fylan (2005) 
described semi-structured interviews as those where the researcher has a number of topics 
to cover, but the conversation is free to vary and may change substantially between 
subjects.  The semi-structured interview format is the best structure to achieve the 
research aims and accommodate the varied view points and opinions of the interviewees.  
A variety of issues and viewpoints are presented at the NTIA meetings thanks to 
multistakeholder collaboration.  The semi-structured nature of the research interview 
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process allows the investigator to consistently address topics in the interview protocol,23 
as well as collect information that informants feel is pertinent.       
5.4. Data Analysis 
 The empirical data collected through the above methods have been subjected to 
discourse analysis (DA).  As a research method, DA has a complex history and has been 
adopted by many different branches of social science without clear consensus on what 
‘discourse’ actually means (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000).  However, Strauss and Feiz 
(2014) described discourse as, “[T]he social and cognitive process of putting the world 
into words, of transforming our perceptions, experiences, emotions, understandings, and 
desires into a common medium for expression and communication, through language and 
other semiotic resources” (p. 1).  This definition encapsulates why the social 
constructivist paradigm was chosen for this research project.  According to social 
construction epistemology, reality is discursively constructed and the examination of that 
discourse has important effects on society (Creswell, 2009).  Under this paradigm, the 
conversations held at the NTIA meetings may have a profound effect on society 
depending on the nature of the regulatory regime being developed for this technology.   
 Similarly, Starks and Trinidad (2007) noted that discourse analysis, “is concerned 
with language-in-use; that is, how individuals accomplish personal, social, and political 
projects through language” (p. 1374).  For the present project, discourse analysis is 
chosen as a research method to provide understanding for how participants attempt to 
accomplish their particular goals while moving collaboratively towards the creation of a 
code of conduct for FRT.  This method of analysis has been paired with the data 
                                                          
23 See Appendix G for the interview protocol.   
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collection method of interviewing to enhance this understanding.  DA is enhanced with a 
variety of perspectives, “Within discourse analysis sampling different groups that 
participate within a given discourse can illuminate the ways in which participants appeal 
to external discourses and identify their influence on the discourse under study” (Starks 
& Trinidad, 2007, p. 1375).  Utilizing multiple research methods can enhance the 
understandings of a singular method.     
 Fairclough (1995) noted that certain discourses are associated with particular 
social institutions.  The expectation for the explored case is that certain ideologies can be 
identified with the particular stakeholders and social institution being represented.  For 
example, less regulation will be associated with business entities and enhanced privacy 
protections will be associated with consumer advocacy groups.  The discourse examined 
concerning FRT at the NTIA meetings, the stakeholder groups participating, and the 
transfer of knowledge provided an explanation on the crafting of the voluntary code of 
conduct and its implications.   
 An important layer of discourse analysis is to distinguish discourse from actions 
taken.  Determining differences in the discourse between the MSH meetings and the 
emerging code of conduct, aids in identifying stakeholder positions, “Nothing in 
discourse is neutral.  Each and every instance of discourse is imbued with some element 
of stance; it is motivated by a perspective” (Strauss & Feiz, 2014, p. 3).  Stance is 
concerned with a speaker’s inherent attitudes, biases, and perspectives, which are 
prevalent in all humans.  These positions are in flux and are constantly being re-
negotiated (Strauss & Feiz, 2014, p. 4).  Since the speaker’s stance is in a state of 
constant negotiation, and those speakers, at times, represent larger institutions, it can be 
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assumed that institutional positions are in a state of negotiation as well.  In fact, the MSH 
format ensures that positions are negotiated through interaction and their actions or 
outcomes are negotiated by the stakeholders.  This flux of speaker and institutional 
stance, as well as the negotiating of actions or outcomes, reinforces the social 
constructivist paradigm driving this project.   
 The expertise of stakeholders utilized in creating a voluntary code of conduct at 
the NTIA meetings facilitates the creation of the regulatory regime of FRT.  The 
objective of this research project was to gain a clear understanding of group dynamics, to 
identify privileged positions of authority and expertise, to recognize resistance strategies, 
to create and transfer knowledge, and to realize the impact these factors had in the 
creation of the voluntary code of conduct.  Language was looked to in terms of action, 
“[P]eople use their language to do things: to order and request, persuade and accuse.  
This focus on language function is also one of the major components of discourse 
analysis” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 32).  This project is an analysis of how 
stakeholders “do” things, create a code of conduct, with language.   
 Mediated discourse analysis (MDA) has largely been employed to discover 
participant stances and the material impact on the creation of a code of conduct.  MDA is 
a more recent conception of DA that has been utilized in the academic community 
(Jewitt, Kress, Ogborn, & Tsatsarelis, 2001; Johnston, 2004; Jones, 1999; Jones, 2007; 
Kress & Leeuwen, 2001; Scollon & Scollon, 2004; Raudaskoski, 2010) to interpret a 
wide range of social issues.  This method is used to identify actions: “As a theoretical 
position, it [MDA] focuses on linkages between discourse and action and how these play 
out in complex social situations” (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 66).  MDA 
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focuses on “the outcomes of social interactive processes of production” (Scollon & de 
Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 66).  MDA attempts to understand social action by discovering 
the intersection of three material entities 1) the historical body of social actors, 2) the 
configuration and social structure of individuals present, and 3) the discourse carries out 
social action (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012, p. 71).  In other words, “[I]n democratic 
public discourse positions are stated, positions are argued, positions are negotiated and 
the actions which are taken and which become policy and practice are the outcome of this 
dialectic” (Scollon, 2008, p. 162).  The negotiation of positions and actions are of 
primary importance to this project.     
 The dissertation utilized MDA to discover actions taken by the participants, what 
their role in the process is, and why they are involved, and how discourse has shaped 
those actions.  Transcripts were created based on the debates at the NTIA meetings on 
FRT and were subsequently coded for themes that help answer the formulated research 
questions.  Specific mention of individual participants in the dissertation were only 
identified when their comments were made publicly.  Stakeholders have been interviewed 
for this project and to protect their anonymity, their views are simply attributed to the 
larger stakeholder group they represent, NGOs, academics, government, and business. 
 MDA was not utilized to its full potential in this project.  The research design and 
methods chosen were selected predicated on the initial timeline set for the MSH 
meetings, predicted to end around one year’s time.  The timeline was altered due to 
stakeholder concerns and scheduling logistics.  As such, it was difficult to track the 
changes to the code of conduct that resulted from the discourse of the group.  A final 
code of conduct has yet to be created and therefore it is problematic to pinpoint discourse 
 
103 
that led to material language or changes in the code.  Some changes were able to be 
identified; however, this method fell short of expectations due to unforeseen 
complications that arose with the timeline for the creation of a code of conduct.              
 Silences in public debates have been studied as a significant discursive strategy.  
According to Huckin (2002), “[O]ften what is not said or written can be as important, if 
not more so than what is” (p. 348).   Huckin (2002) defined textual silence as “’[T]he 
omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand’” (p. 348).  
Textual silence can take on several forms, each with unique implications.  Huckin (2002, 
p. 348) described five types of textual silences.  The first silence described is a speech act 
silence.  This silence is demarked by such force that the listener/reader is easily able to 
interpret the meaning of the silence by pragmatic rules of language.  Presuppositional 
silences occur when the speaker does not state what is assumed to be common 
knowledge.  Individuals may employ discreet silences to avoid stating sensitive 
information.  Genre-based silence are dictated by conventions (obituaries usually omit 
negative details about the deceased).  Finally, and perhaps most troubling, are 
manipulative silences, when pertinent information is deliberately concealed.  Similar 
discursive strategies were observed in the NTIA meetings.  Technical presentations, for 
example, contain some presuppositional silences, which is problematic for interested 
laypersons.  Manipulative silences were observed in the repeated calls for companies like 
Facebook and Google to make presentations about their use of FRT.  Examining these 
silences produced important insight into the information omitted from the meetings and 
the motivations for the omissions.  Huckin (2002) wrote that context is the key 
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component to identifying manipulative silences, otherwise all things unsaid would count 
as textual silence (p. 353).     
 Discourse analysis was facilitated by the software HyperRESEARCH.  The 
software supports the case study design that was employed for this project 
(Researchware, 2014).  HyperRESEARCH is a software tool that aids in qualitative 
research approaches by allowing the use of audio and video files for the coding of data.  
Audio files were created by recording the proceedings of the meetings.  The files were 
then opened in HyperTRANSCRIBE where this researcher recorded manually the spoken 
details of the meetings verbatim.  After the meetings were transcribed this researcher 
used HyperRESEARCH to create a code book24 of important aspects of the meetings, or 
trends observed, and then applied these codes to the text created in HyperTRANSCRIBE.  
HyperRESEARCH then organized all relevant sections of text according to how they 
were coded facilitating the discourse analysis utilized for this research.  Noticeably, 
responses from participants were not attributed to individuals to protect their anonymity.     
 To enhance the quality of the applied discourse analysis the researcher attended 
online webinars hosted by HyperRESEARCH.  During the webinars, HyperRESEARCH 
employees explained the various facets of the research platform.  Examples of research 
projects were presented along with explanations on how to code and identify important 
trends.  This additional support ensured that the codes and research conclusions were of 
the highest quality.   
                                                          
24 See Appendix H for a table of codes used.   
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5.5. Research Questions 
 The methods chosen and discussed above are designed to help clearly answer the 
research questions presented in this project.  The first question this research addresses is 
“How is the regulatory regime of FRT emerging in the U.S.?”  Currently, the voluntary 
code of conduct created by the MSH process are the most robust regulation to date, which 
is why discourse analysis was selected to examine the arguments presented, the 
participants who presented them, and the ultimate solutions proposed and passed to solve 
those arguments.  Discourse analysis lends itself to understanding the meanings behind 
the arguments, as well as the solutions created.   
 The second research question is: “What are the roles of the various stakeholders 
in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?”  Semi-structured interviews, discourse 
analysis, and participant observation were employed to answer this question.  Semi-
structured interviews allowed the participants to define how they see their roles in the 
process and describe in detail the ideas and solutions they are advocating for.  To help 
provide further insight to their answers, discourse analysis and participant observation 
were employed.  Discourse analysis analyzed stakeholders within the context of other 
participants, as well as by the discourse created using the MSH process.  Finally, 
participant observation provided a unique “behind the scenes” perspective.  Those who 
call in to the meetings, or follow along with the webcast, miss the conversations that 
occur during the breaks.  They are also not privy to all the people in attendance.  Being 
present for the meetings provides a larger perspective in seeing the collegiality of the 
group, and it helps identify which participants have better working relationships than 
others.   
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 The final research question is “How does FRT challenge our current conceptions 
of privacy?”  Discussion of the various uses of the technology has revealed new 
challenges to our current understandings of privacy.  Analysis of the discourse at the 
meetings as well as the varied privacy conceptions of the stakeholders has provided 








EVOLUTION OF DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
 Data protection has been an important topic of regulation between the U.S. and 
the European Union (EU) since the differing views on how to regulate data protection 
have created some tensions.  The Edward Snowden revelations of the National Security 
Agency spying on U.S. and EU citizens (collecting phone records and meta-data without 
warrants) have even caused animosity between the entities.  The EU is in many ways 
leading the fight for the protection of citizen data and increased privacy protections for 
citizens.  Since many U.S. based companies involved in the facial recognition technology 
space are international in nature it is important to understand the data protection 
relationship between the U.S. and EU.       
6.1. History and Development of Data Protection 
 Increased use of technology led to greater accumulation of user data.  In light of 
the increased amount of data collected, the first data protection law was enacted by the 
German state of Hesse in 1970 (Cate, 1994, p. 431).  The rise in the use of information 
technology provided motivation for Germany to enact this state law nationally; it was the 
first data protection law in the world (Wilhelm, 2015).  In 1983, the Highest Court in 
Germany declared a constitutional right to what was referred to as informational self-
determination.  This decision was in part, due to a population census and rising fear of 
surveillance amongst German citizens (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009, p. 85).  German 
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citizens are acutely aware of the power of the census given their history prior and during 
WWII.  Informational self-determination was as a cornerstone of democratic exchange 
because “The protection of personal data is essential for a free and self-determined 
development of the individual. At the same time, the self-determined development of the 
individual is a precondition for a free and democratic communication order” (Hornung & 
Schnabel, 2009, p. 86).  The Germans understood that information about the individual 
needed to be under his/her control.  Information regarding dissent not under control of the 
individual, could have a chilling effect on free and open communication.  Hornung and 
Schnabel noted that: 
If citizens cannot oversee and control which or even what kind of 
information about them is openly accessible in their social environment, 
and if they cannot even appraise the knowledge of possible 
communication partners, they may be inhibited in making use of their 
freedom. If citizens are unsure whether dissenting behaviour is noticed 
and information is being permanently stored, used and passed on, they will 
try to avoid dissenting behaviour so as not to attract attention. They may 
even abstain from making use of their basic and human rights. In a 
potentially all-knowing state, freedom of speech and freedom of choice 
are virtually impossible.  (p. 86)  
Providing citizens with robust data protection strengthens open communication and uses 
for political dissent, important components of healthy democracies.  The right to 
informational self-determination benefits the individual and the public in fostering open 
communication.   
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 Before the formation of the EU in 1993, guidelines were issued to further advance 
notions of data protection, “In 1980 the Committee of Ministers of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Rows of Personal Data (Guidelines)” (Cate, 1994, p. 431).  The 
guidelines had no real legal force and allowed for flexible implementation by individual 
nations.  Data protection had important implications for not only democracy, but also 
commerce.  In 1981, the OECD released a document titled “For the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,” a convention very 
similar to the guidelines previously issued, but with a focus on protecting personal 
privacy.   
 In 1990, the European Community Commission published a draft document that 
would later become the EU Directive on Data Protection entitled, “Council Directive on 
the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data” (Cate, 1994, p. 432).  The directive was passed after 
adding an amendment which eliminated the distinction between public and private sector 
data.  Treating public and private sector data as equal is a novel protection that puts 
government on an equal footing with private entities, a provision not currently adopted in 
the U.S., they share equal protections and require equal thresholds for examination.  The 
directive required countries to create laws governing the processing of personal data.  
Processing personal data was broadly defined as, “any operation or set of operations 
including but not limited to collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction” 
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of data (Cate, 1994, p. 433).  Laws compliant with the directive provided an individual 
with robust data protections including accurate information, legitimate use, consent of the 
individual, the right to access data, and other protections25.  The last point of the directive 
is perhaps the most important for this MSH process under investigation in this 
dissertation as it stipulated that each member state must: Establish laws prohibiting the 
transfer of data to non-member states that fail to provide adequate data protection 
(emphasis added).   
 This last point has become the center of tension between the U.S. and the EU.  
The EU has asserted that the U.S. is doing an inadequate job of protecting its citizens’ 
data.  The U.S. has no comparable data protection regime and is seen as “behind” the EU 
on this front.  Failure to offer adequate data protection could threaten commerce between 
the U.S. and the EU, a relationship worth billions of dollars in trade.   
6.2. Safe Harbor 
 The U.S. and the EU take different approaches to protecting citizens’ privacy.  As 
has been shown, the EU relies on comprehensive legislation with government bodies that 
ensure the data protection laws are followed.  The U.S. has a variety of approaches to 
protecting citizens’ data, including “legislation, regulation, and self-regulation” (Export, 
2013, par. 1).  The U.S. and the EU worked together to create the Safe Harbor 
Framework, which was formally adopted in July of 2000, so that the two entities could 
share data and still be in compliance with the EU data directive (Wilhelm, 2015).  
Participation in the Safe Harbor Framework is voluntary; entities that comply with Safe 
Harbor must notify the U.S. Department of Commerce yearly that they are in compliance 
                                                          
25 For a full list of provisions please refer to Appendix F. 
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with the Framework (Export, 2013, par. 5).  There are seven principles in the Framework 
that must be complied with26.   
 The first principle that must be complied with is that of notice. Organizations 
must notify individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use personal 
information. They must provide information about how individuals can contact the 
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which it 
discloses the information and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting 
its use and disclosure. 
 Notice is the precursor to the second principle which is choice.  Organizations 
must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) whether their personal 
information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose incompatible with the 
purpose for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the 
individual. For sensitive information, affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given 
if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than its 
original purpose or the purpose authorized subsequently by the individual. 
 The third principle is transfer to third parties.  To disclose information to a third 
party, organizations must apply the notice and choice principles. If an organization 
wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so only 
if it makes sure that the third party subscribes to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or is 
subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding. As an alternative, the organization 
can enter into a written agreement with such a third party requiring that the third party 
                                                          
26 The principles can be found on export.gov (2013).   
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provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant 
principles. 
 The fourth principle of the Framework is access.  Individuals must have access to 
personal information held about them by organizations and be able to correct, amend, or 
delete that information where it is inaccurate; however, if the burden or expense of 
providing access is disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy or where the 
rights of persons other than the individual are violated then organizations are not required 
to allow individuals access. 
 Security is another important principle of the framework. Organizations must take 
reasonable precautions to protect personal information from loss, misuse and 
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.  Recent government and 
commercial data breaches have highlighted the importance of this principle in the eyes of 
the public.  In concert with security is data integrity. Personal information must be 
relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization should take 
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, 
and current. 
 Finally, there is the Framework principle of enforcement.  In order to ensure 
compliance with the Safe Harbor principles, there must be (a) readily available and 
affordable independent recourse mechanisms so that each individual's complaints and 
disputes can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded where the applicable law 
or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) must have procedures for verifying that the 
commitments companies make to adhere to the Safe Harbor principles have been 
implemented; finally, must instill (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of a 
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failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure 
compliance by the organization. Organizations that fail to provide annual self-
certification letters will no longer appear in the list of participants and Safe Harbor 
benefits will no longer be assured. 
 Many of these same principles have been discussed in the development of a code 
of conduct for FRT.  Due to the international nature of many companies that use or want 
to use FRT, compliance with Safe Harbor will be paramount in order to transfer data to 
and from the EU.  The U.S.’s fragmented approach to data protection has led to its use of 
the private sector for most of the enforcement.  If private entities fail to comply they can 
be prosecuted under federal unfair or deceptive practice legislation, which is largely 
accomplished through the FTC but, also through state legislation (Export, 2013).   
 Despite having both the U.S. and the EU operating under the Safe Harbor 
Framework there were a series of events that left the EU wondering if they had 
inadvertently created a data transfer loophole due to lower U.S. data protection standards 
(Wilhelm, 2015).  Shortly after the Edward Snowden leaks, which caused increased 
concern in the EU about Safe Harbor principles being violated by the U.S., the EU 
recognized that Safe Harbor needed to be updated.  In March 2014, the EU strongly 
recommended that the U.S. create new data transfer rules to protect EU citizens’ data; in 
the same month, the EU Parliament also called for a suspension of Safe Harbor (Wilhelm, 
2015).  The main concern of the EU, regarded public authorities processing data.  
Primarily, it wanted to ensure that exceptions for national security were limited to only 
what was necessary for safety.  In 2014, the Center for Digital Democracy filed 
complaints against U.S. companies that had not complied with Safe Harbor.  The FTC 
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then filed a complaint against the TRUSTe brand for failing to recertify companies for 
Safe Harbor compliance.  In light of these complaints the EU has considered suspending 
Safe Harbor because of inadequate data protections, an act that would have serious 
consequences for trade relations between the U.S. and the EU.  Currently, as of March 
2015, the European Court of Justice is hearing a case against the NSA that could have a 
profound impact on the U.S. - EU Safe Harbor agreement (Wilhelm, 2015).   
 
Figure 5. EU data protection timeline.  Adapted from the Privacy Association (Ernst-
Oliver, 2015).  
 
6.3. U.S. Data Protection 
 Data protection regulation in the U.S. is a patchwork of state and federal 
legislation enforced by multiple regulatory bodies.  Financial firms follow standards set 
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which promulgates rules for collection, use, and 
disclosure of private information (Sotto & Simpson, 2014, p.191).  Similarly, health care 
providers are bound by the rules set forth in the Health Insurance Portability and 
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Accountability Act (HIPAA).  For non-regulated industries the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) is the primary enforcement body.  The FTC, under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, can enforce the unfair or deceptive acts or practices clause against businesses 
that violate the section rules.  State laws are generally enforced by state Attorney’s 
General; otherwise, state laws allow for individuals to file suit against entities that have 
broken the law.  The following lists states other important laws that concern privacy and 
data (Sotto & Simpson, 2014): 
• Electronic Communications Privacy Act: “[S]tatutory frame-work of privacy 
protections and related standards for law enforcement access covering 
electronic communications and remotely stored electronic records.  
Significantly, the ECPA established the standards that currently control law 
enforcement access to personal e-mail and electronic records, such as pictures 
and date books, stored on remote servers” (Mulligan, 2003, p. 1557).   
• Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Originally created in 1984 to criminalize 
federal computer crimes, the act has been expanded five times and may now 
cover all uses of computers in the U.S., with the potential to regulate abroad 
(Kerr, 2009, p. 1561) 
• Fair Credit Reporting Act: Designed “to protect the privacy of consumer 
report information and to guarantee that the information supplied by consumer 
reporting agencies is as accurate as possible” (Stokes, 1999, p.1)   
• Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act: Designed to fight identity theft, 
increase consumer access to credit, and improve accuracy of credit 
information (Pu Holt, 2004, p.3). 
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• Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act: This act severely limits the 
collection of information about children under the age of thirteen without 
parental consent.  It also curtails the ability of children under the age of 
thirteen to obtain an email account without parental consent as well (Belmas 
& Overbeck, 2012).   
 One of the most important set of laws in the U.S. for privacy and data protection 
is the Fair Information Practices (FIPS).  The FIPS began as a report to the Department of 
Health in the late 1970s, but now some of its principles have been discussed and 
implemented internationally (Gellman, 2014, p.1).  Provisions in addition to the FIPS, 
have become common place in policy discussions and laws regarding privacy.  The FIPS 
have evolved over time.  The Department of Homeland Security in 2008 issued their 
version of the FIPS but updated and renamed it the Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPS) (Gellman, 2014).  The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) also embraces 
the FIPPS.  The CPBR FIPPS outline the following protections (Gellman, 2014, p. 16).   
Individual Control, “Consumers have a right to exercise control over what personal data 
companies collect from them and how they use it.”  Transparency, “Consumers have a 
right to easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security 
practices.”  Respect for Context, “Consumers have a right to expect that companies will 
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in 
which consumers provide the data.”  Security, “Consumers have a right to secure and 
responsible handling of personal data.”  Access and Accuracy, “Consumers have a right 
to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to 
the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data is 
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inaccurate.”  Focused Collection, “Consumers have a right to reasonable limits on the 
personal data that companies collect and retain.”  Accountability, “Consumers have a 
right to have personal data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to 
assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” (Gellman, 2014, p. 16). 
 Despite the lofty protections that the FIPPS tries to achieve, it is inconsistent with 
interpretations found in HIPAA and those put forth by the FTC (Gellman, 2014).  Most 
notable for this project is the inconsistency with the FTC, the enforcement agency for any 
voluntary code of conduct created for FRT.  It remains unclear how the FTC will deal 
with inconsistencies found between the FIPPS, the FTC interpretation of the FIPPS, and 
privacy protections created in the code of conduct for FRT.   
 The U.S. has weaker data protection laws than the EU because big businesses are 
often able to lobby very effectively in Congress.  Coleman (1982) made it clear that 
businesses have grown increasingly influential and powerful in the U.S.  However, the 
EU has taken the opposite approach, granting consumers greater control over their data 
and providing robust protection for them.  As Simon Davies (2015) noted, “Silence from 
the United States over collection of data from non-U.S. persons has fueled support for 
strengthened legal protections over the collection and processing of data on EU citizens” 
(p. 57).  The EU may well suspend the Safe Harbor agreement if the U.S. does not take 
action to provide better protection for consumer’s data and privacy.   
 The established U.S. and EU laws are reflected in the development of a code of 
conduct for FRT.  The code of conduct must comply with existing laws as the NTIA does 
not have the authority to supersede existing laws.  Since many of the corporations 
involved in the creation and use of the code of conduct for FRT conduct business in both 
 
118 
the U.S. and the EU, it is important to understand how both protect data.  The U.S. and 
EU will likely need a new privacy agreement, along with data protection rules and laws, 
so that trade can continue and citizens’ rights and data be protected.  Another important 
right for U.S. citizens is the First Amendment, which applies to photography and is 
important to the FRT debates.     
6.4. Photography, the First Amendment, and Copyright 
 Since FRT is applied to photos, photo creation and photography are important 
legal concepts to discuss.  The United States Supreme Court (USSC) has yet to consider 
the First Amendment rights of photographers, yet it is clear that they have a right to 
expression and a property right interest in the work that they create, usually in the form of 
copyright.  Intellectual property law covers copyright, which exist to, “[P]rotect creative 
works such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, music, film….” (Belmas & Overbeck, 
2012, p. 237).  Photographs constitute creative works and as such can be protected by 
copyright, but there are limits as to what can be photographed publicly.  Similarly, there 
are limits on the protection that the First Amendment provides photographers. 
6.4.1. Photography and the First Amendment   
The USSC has yet to fully address the First Amendment rights of photographers; 
however there are some court cases that do tangentially address the issue.  The First 
Amendment is not limited to strictly the spoken or written word, but also includes 
communicative conduct (Kenworthy, 2012).  In public, to be protected by the First 
Amendment two criteria must be met for communicative conduct (photography).  “To 
achieve First Amendment protection, a plaintiff must show that he possessed: (1) a 
message to be communicated; and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of 
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the medium in which the message is to be expressed.  (Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, 1995)”  (Kenworthy, 2012, par. 6).  One court found a 
limitation when a father taped his daughter’s choir performance, citing that there was no 
“communicative or expressive purpose” and therefore was not protected by the First 
Amendment (Kenworthy, 2012).  With communicative and expressive purposes in mind 
it is clear that most news gathering is covered under the First Amendment, but individual 
citizens can also be afforded the same protection.  In Lambert v. Polk County, an 
individual citizen took a video tape in a public circle with the intent to sell any 
newsworthy content.  The individual happened to tape a fatal fight and the police 
confiscated the tape.  The plaintiff sued the police and the court found that the police had 
violated his First Amendment right, noting that “It is not just news organizations… who 
have First Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events – all of us…. have 
that right” (Kenworthy, 2012, par. 22).   
6.4.2. Photography and Copyright 
As stated previously, copyrights provide owners with a property interest.  Images, 
written works, and databases are but a few examples of media that can be protected by a 
copyright.  The 1976 Copyright Act also protects these works for a very lengthy amount 
of time, 95 years (Belmas & Overbeck, 2012, p. 237).  While the First Amendment 
protects free speech and freedom of the press it is important to note that the news cannot 
be copyrighted.  One major individual copyright concern, with regard to FRT, is where 
an individual’s image resides.  In years past, photo albums were a popular place to store 
photos, usually copyright free.  Today, most or all of an individual’s photos reside online, 
using Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and other popular social networking and interest 
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forums.  In many instances, when an individual agrees to the terms of use or the EULA 
presented by the company, they grant the website service rights to use the images and an 
individual’s likeness for commercial gain.  Furthermore, the individual also grants third 
parties that same right under the EULA.  For example, a recent paragraph in Facebook’s 
terms of service read,  
1. For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos 
and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following permission, 
subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to 
use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP 
License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your 
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have 
not deleted it. 
2. When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to 
emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that 
removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of 
time (but will not be available to others) (Facebook, 2012, par. 4).   
What is most concerning about online image storage and usage is not the “relatively” 
short 95 year copyright protection that the government affords an individual, but the 
ability for an image to survive and be used freely on the Internet for, hypothetically, 
forever.  Facebook’s terms specifically indicate that once content has been shared it will 
not be deleted from another’s account even if the original individual deletes his or her 
profile or profile content.   
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 Presently, there are countless numbers of images on the Internet.  Individuals 
currently post “selfies,” profile pictures, vines, and other such content featuring their 
image without much thought to potential consequences.  As FRT is employed more 
frequently for secure access to property or privilege access the plethora of individual 
photos may prove problematic for secure access.  Individuals are likely to become 
increasingly concerned about where their images reside and how they are being used 
when the government and other businesses grant individuals access to their privileges 
(government benefits) or property (bank accounts) through FRT.  It remains unclear what 
remedy, if any, an individual will have in controlling their image, unless it was taken in a 
manner protected by the First Amendment or if the owner has protected the image with a 
copyright.   
 A final thought concerning copyright and FRT revolves around the algorithms 
and the data they produce.  Suppose an image is copyrighted but FRT is still applied to 
the image, keeping in mind multiple algorithms from different FRT vendors could be 
applied to the image.  Are the integers created by the algorithm protected under the 
copyright?  If the integers are protected under a separate copyright and the image can be 
reverse engineered from the integers, who owns the resulting image and the underlying 








HOW IS THE REGULATORY REGIME OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY EMERGING IN THE U.S.? 
 
7.1. Stakeholders 
 A primary consideration of any multistakeholder process is the identification of 
stakeholder groups, also referred to as stakeholders.  Minue Hemmati (2002) defined 
stakeholders as “[T]hose who have an interest in a particular decision, either as 
individuals or representatives of a group.  This includes people who influence a decision, 
or can influence it, as well as those affected by it” (p. 2).    For the MSH process on facial 
recognition technology four distinct stakeholder groups are represented.  The groups were 
determined by this researcher and citizen members of the public have yet to speak up and 
identify themselves.  The meetings include non-government organizations (NGOs), 
academics, businesses (sometimes called industry or private sector and also includes 
trade groups who represent several businesses), and government.   
7.1.1. Non-Governmental Organizations 
 NGOs involved in the MSH process for FRT consist primarily of consumer 
protection and privacy advocates.  This stakeholder group consists of Consumer Action, 
Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, American Civil 
Liberties Union, Common Sense Media, Center for Democracy and Technology, Online 
Trust Alliance, Technology Freedom, Secure Identity and Biometrics Association, 
Computer Communications Industry Association, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  
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This stakeholder group advocates for increased consumer protections, increased 
protection of privacy, and increased transparency and choice offered by businesses.  
NGO’s have been advocating for the responsible use and deployment of FRT, as well as 
notification, transparency, and consumer choice, all of which will be explained in detail 
later.   
7.1.2. Academics 
 A number of academic presentations have been made to the group.  Academic 
presentations regard diverse issues, including the accuracy of FRT, how FRT works, 
various uses of FRT, how FRT may be used to discriminate against vulnerable groups, 
and how FRT can pose threats to privacy.  Representatives of this stakeholder group 
include UCLA, New York University Information Law Institute, Carnegie Mellon 
University, and Rutgers.  Academics have been invited by various stakeholder groups or 
by the NTIA on behalf of a stakeholder group.  Academics serve the group by filling in 
gaps of knowledge that are not present by the stakeholders.   
7.1.3. Businesses 
 Businesses have a vested interest in utilizing FRT.  Facebook has the world’s 
largest biometric database and its system works better than the FBI’s FR (Brandom, 
2014).  Business interests range from security, loss prevention, interactive advertising, 
and a variety of authentication purposes.  Members that have been identified in the 
meetings include the Internet Association, International Biometrics and Identification 
Association, Motorola, Interactive Advertising Bureau, NetChoice, IBG, Sotero Defense 
Solutions, Business and Performance Research, Software Information Industry 
Association, Application Developers Alliance, Computer Communications Industry 
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Association, Direct Marketing Association, and Marketing Research Association.  While 
businesses have readily identified themselves as supportive of the process most have been 
reluctant to discuss what they are doing or plan to do with the technology in the future.  
As a general statement, business entities have advocated for minimal privacy protections, 
wide latitude in deploying the technology, and minimal regulations to promote the 
innovation of FRT.      
7.1.4. Government 
 There have been two main government bodies represented at the NTIA MSH 
meetings for FRT.  The first is obviously the NTIA itself.  The NTIA is housed in the 
Department of Commerce and has been tasked with convening the MSH process for FRT.  
The only notable foreign government represented has been the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner’s office of Ontario Canada.  Officials from this office have made 
presentations at the meeting and have provided technical support for the duration of the 
meetings.  Other U.S. government agencies represented during the meetings have been 
the Federal Trade Commission and the National Institute for Standards and Technology.  
The FTC has made presentations about their enforcement authority as well as previously 
identified best practices.  NIST has provided technical expertise about the capabilities of 
the technology.   
7.2. Historical Results Impacting the Multistakeholder Process 
for Facial Recognition Technology.  
 
 The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) directs the NTIA to convene MSH 
processes regarding privacy issues.  There was one previous MSH effort before the NTIA 
convened meetings for FRT.  During the Mobile Application Transparency Process 
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(MATP) stakeholders met and ultimately created a code of conduct, yet stakeholders 
encountered several sources of adversity that have impacted the FRT process.  As 
reported by the participants in the interviews conducted for this project, the adverse 
sources included: perceived inefficiencies, issues of participation, differing expectations, 
trust issues, and questionable motives regarding the outcome of the process.  Historical 
results and interaction of stakeholders are important to note for mediated discourse 
analysis as they likely have an impact on the actions designated for the FRT code of 
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012). Data that was recorded during the public 
meetings for FRT will be reported with individuals’ names included; data recorded 
during private interviews will be identified only by stakeholder groups to maintain the 
confidentiality of the interviewees.  Interviewee data is reported according to the 
stakeholder group they represent, this does not imply that stakeholder groups are uniform 
in their advocacy goals, interests, or knowledge base.   
7.2.1. Inefficiencies 
 Inefficiencies in multistakeholder processes can transpire in a variety of forms.  
Some sources of inefficiencies include participation (too much or too little), process 
management , lack of information, decision making, and the inability to implement 
results.  As stated previously, the learning process is very important to multistakeholder 
processes.  Stakeholders need to know how companies use data and information in order 
to understand what regulatory safeguards are needed.   
Inefficiency 1:  Participants and stakeholders may be reluctant to share information to 
protect proprietary advantages or to avoid regulation.  The MSH process can be slowed 
or halted due to lack of information. According to Susan Grant (2014) of the Consumer 
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Federation of America, “As you know I wasn't thrilled with the last process, but at least 
we had active participants from the mobile app community.”  Businesses were reluctant 
to provide relevant information to the group in order to protect proprietary advantages 
over other businesses that attended the meetings.      
Inefficiency 2: Lack of participation by some stakeholders might best be categorized by 
Huckin (2002) as discreet silences, or not revealing sensitive information.  John Morris 
(2014) of the NTIA stated:    
My perception of how the last process played out is that a lot of 
stakeholders kind of got more involved once the conversation moved to a 
straw man or a set of principles or something….I think there's at least a 
chance that if this group moves down a direction of actually talking about 
principles, or a code, that there may be broader engagement.  
This data shows the importance of active stakeholder involvement throughout the MSH 
process.  Stakeholders are cognizant of the importance of collaborating with all 
participants to enhance their understanding of the problem’s challenges and solutions 
(Gray, 1989, p.5).  In the end, very few companies adopted the code; Intuit and Lookout 
were among the few to adopt it (Tummarello, 2014).  One possible reason for the limited 
adoption of the code of conduct in the MATP was the delayed participation of 
stakeholders until the code was being drafted.  Businesses decided not to be actively 
involved until the code of conduct was being drafted, presumably to protect competitive 
advantages.   
There were certainly inefficiencies early in the process.  As it progressed, 
and everyone was transitioning from the research and background into 
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drafting a code, there were a lot of complaints that a few people in the 
room ran away from, that and proposed language that others weren’t 
happy with, but it was too late.  The draft had been written and the 
precedent had been set. (Business).  
Lack of participation and information sharing by businesses in the beginning led to 
creation of language in the code of conduct that, ultimately, very few were able to 
implement.   
Inefficiency 3: How decisions are made can have significant impacts on the efficiency of 
MSH processes.  During the MATP process, a drafting committee was formed to create 
language for the code of conduct.  There was a lack of transparency, or access to 
information concerning the decisions being made, and stakeholders were left out of the 
decision making process (Hemmati, 2002, p. 41).  “So I don't think we are ready for a 
drafting committee and I'm hoping we never get to a drafting committee as opposed to 
some other way” (Business). This comment underscores previous comments made about 
how “insular” the drafting group was.  Creating a decision making process that was 
inefficient was not a goal of the group.  “Since I'm the one he's talking about I will say it 
didn't happen on purpose that way.  There were a lot of things that happened in the last 
process and we were doing the best we could” (NGO).  This comment suggests that 
unfamiliarity with the MSH process in general may have contributed to the inefficiencies 
experienced by stakeholders.  Lack of familiarity with the MSH process was a theme 
echoed by several interviewees.  Borrowing from the literature, no “capacity building” 
had transpired for the MATP (Antonova, 2011).  Creating a complete code of conduct 
and taking a vote on the final product led to animosity among stakeholders in the MATP.  
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Ultimately, this decision making process increased tension among stakeholders, thus 
voting on a final code of conduct with limited input from stakeholders led to a product 
that few could adopt.     
7.2.2. Participation 
 In MSH processes, who the stakeholders are and how they are able to participate 
can have material consequences on results.  Minu Hemmati (2002) defined participation 
as “[T]hat all stakeholders have a voice in influencing decision-making.  Participation is 
the foundation of legitimacy in all democratic systems” (p. 41).     An NGO 
representative noted, “What happens is big business gets behind these issues and put a lot 
of money in their lobbyists and can over dominate discussion.  That puts the advocates at 
a disadvantage.  So issues stall.  That happened in do not track [Mobile Application 
Transparency Process].”  Money also makes attending the meetings easier as well, “The 
other thing is also when you have these meetings they are all in D.C. and not all groups 
are in D.C. who can afford to fly there all the time” (NGO).  Mitroff (1983) noted that 
resources impact the power stakeholders have to influence the process.  No mention is 
made of physical proximity to the MSH venue as a factor impacting stakeholder power.  
Given the static nature of the venue, stakeholders with close proximity to the Washington 
D.C. area have an advantage in terms of ease of attendance and cost savings in terms of 
travel.  This observation confirms that companies with greater financial resources can 
have disparate effects on the process if they so choose (Mitroff, 1983). 
 Advocates have expressed frustration with what they feel is underrepresentation 
compared to industry stakeholders.  Underrepresentation appears to be mostly a financial 
problem.  Frustration has also been expressed in terms of limited financial resources in 
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comparison to industry stakeholders, expressed in an interview that occurred July 23, 
2014:   
There are highly paid lobbyists or tech companies and they can spend all 
day talking about the word "if" because that's what they are paid to do.  
And you have the public interest community who numbers maybe five 
advocates who care a lot about it but don't have the personnel to do 
that…there's an imbalance there.  Certain industry participants have 
disproportionate financial means to influence the proceedings if they so 
choose (NGO).   
 One individual felt that the MSH format favored industry participants, he stated in 
an interview on October 13, 2014  “…[T]he structure would be unfair to non-profit 
groups, consumer groups, because industry would be able to dominate those proceedings 
in numbers [and] in terms of resources etcetera.  So I've been critical” (NGO).  Advocacy 
stakeholders have expressed concern about representation from a purely numerical 
standpoint.  Industry stakeholders have countered these concerns by noting that only one 
person can speak up at a time.  In an interview occurring September 5, 2014 one business 
representative expressed: 
You can be company X and bring 20 people to the meeting, having 20 
people there provides you no particular advantage other than it might look 
good for people back at your company.  If you’re a law firm having lots of 
people there is good for your billable hours.  I don't see that having any 
impact on the process. [It matters little] if you represent yourself or a 
gigantic company, the process tends to be quite a leveler (Business). 
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 While equitable numbers of stakeholder groups may provide individuals comfort, 
meaningful participation adds value to the discussion (Mitroff, 1983).  If stakeholders 
cannot meaningfully contribute to the discussions at the forum, they are unlikely to be 
influential in the process.   
7.2.3. Business Resistance 
 The goal of the MSH process for MATP and FRT has been to create voluntary 
codes of conduct.  The academic literature notes that businesses are generally adverse to 
regulation and therefore have reasons to resist the creation of new regulation (Kolk, 
Tulder, & Welters, 1999, p. 152).  This view is substantiated by one business participant 
in this process in an interview occurring June 24, 2014:   
I still think industry self-regulation is probably the best approach because 
we also know the most about what we do.  But there are benefits to this 
process.  If this discourages some consumer advocates from now 
petitioning for these hard hammer laws then I think that's a real benefit 
for everyone [emphasis added] (Business).   
Stakeholders are mindful of the fact that refusing to negotiate on positions can have 
adverse effects, “[I]t does force you to make a decision or balances that you probably 
wouldn't have struck on your own.  If you’re not open to doing that, this process is 
quickly going to degenerate” (NGO).  Business resistance is a legitimate concern of the 
MSH process, one that was seriously discussed in the FRT process.   
 Two dominant positions have emerged from the MATP that are also present in the 
FRT process.  NGO’s have, mostly, advocated for legislation that provide “teeth” to the 
principles that they are creating in the code of conduct.  Many NGOs have expressed 
 
131 
concerns that because the code of conduct is voluntary if the group enacts serious privacy 
protecting principles companies will not agree to its implementation.  Conversely, if the 
group creates standards that are easy to implement and of poor quality many businesses 
may sign on to the code out of convenience and to give consumers the pretense of real 
privacy protection.  Businesses also feel that they are in the best position to regulate the 
technology and their own business practices because of their expertise in utilizing the 
technology.  Both stakeholder groups have legitimate positions.  These positions have 
been relatively stable throughout the current MSH process for FRT and both stakeholder 
groups are cognizant of the other’s desires and their likely actions towards a code of 
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  The voluntary nature of the code of 
conduct remains a point of contention for both groups.  NGOs worry that businesses will 
not sign on because of privacy protections, while businesses often worry about spending 
time and resources on a code of conduct that ultimately no one will adopt.   
7.2.4. Trust 
 Presumably, participants in the MSH process are there to develop codes of 
conduct.  Determining the motivations of participants is part of developing trust in other 
stakeholders and the process in general.  Stakeholder motivations for the FRT process 
will be discussed in detail later.  Some participants may not be interested in collaboration 
“[A] source of adversity includes sometimes you have groups that are unwilling to budge 
or want to use the NTIA process as more of a stage rather than a meeting room.  That's 
where you are going to see some challenges” (Business).  Stakeholders have misgivings 
about participants who are at the forum to grandstand rather than work towards the 
development of a code, and are particularly cognizant of how fragile the MSH format can 
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be.  “The fact is, if you are not buying into the MSH process, you can end up sacrificing 
[time and resources], essentially you can turn the whole thing into a farce very quickly” 
(NGO).  Due to the fragility of the process stakeholders have to trust that all participants 
are interested in brokering a fair deal.  Unwillingness to collaborate is detrimental to the 
MSH process, and can determine its success or failure (Gray, 1989, p. 59).  The concern 
about the process failing is if some stakeholders feel they are better served by preventing 
an agreement (Gray, 1989, p. 63).   
 With stakeholders obstructing the process trust is vital within the content of the 
document.  During the MATP there was concern that language proposed by participants 
did not end up in the completed document, “Of course the concern is having gone 
through this process once before, we sometimes know that brackets have a tendency to 
just disappear and underlying text remains” (Business).  Returning to issues where 
immediate consensus could not be reached apparently resulted in the exclusion of 
language that was important to certain participants.   
 Stakeholders have concerns about trust beyond the other participants in the room 
and the document created.  The convener of the meetings, the NTIA under the 
Department of Commerce, has been a source of mistrust for some stakeholders, “Right 
away I knew this was not a good way to develop privacy policies” (NGO).  One 
individual noted that the NTIA is housed in the Department of Commerce.  The 
participant felt that the NTIA was incapable of brokering a fair deal when the agency is 
housed in a department whose main directive is to promote American business and has 
not historically been involved in privacy protection, “It's corrupt in a sense that really the 
loyalties of the Commerce Department are industry” (NGO).  These comments make 
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clear that certain stakeholders lack trust in the Department of Commerce, a question 
substantiated by looking at the mission statement of the Department of Commerce, where 
there is not a single mention of the word privacy.  (See Appendix D for mission 
statement).   
7.2.5. Expectations 
 The codes of conduct created outline acceptable uses of the technology and are 
prescriptive about aspects of the technology including data protection.  The expectation 
for a code of conduct is to be actionable so that companies can adopt it, “I would like to 
see something that companies would actually sign onto and agree to follow and see where 
we go with that” (NGO).  Companies must adhere to responsible practices that can be 
adopted and are actionable or consumers may choose other services.  “And the question 
is what can we actually get industry to agree to adhere to that will make consumers better 
off.   And frankly, the only thing that matters is whether they will come to the table and 
sign on” (NGO).  The ability to broker a fair deal is an important prerequisite to 
collaboration (Gray, 1989, p. 62).  Provisions in the code of conduct can determine 
whether companies will sign onto the code of conduct or not.  Code provisions must be 
actionable so they can be implemented, but they must also protect consumers or 
consumers may choose alternative services or products.  Businesses may be reluctant to 
agree to all consumer protecting provisions, in the meeting on December 15, 2014 Carl 
Szabo of NetChoice stated:   
I'm talking about the potential benefit to getting people to sign onto the 
code.  I'm going to look at Bill as the resident attorney at the big law firm 
advising clients.  But if you had a client asking you, “Hey should I expose 
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myself to greater data breach liability?” you are probably going to say no 
(Business). 
Expectations from stakeholders are not to simply create a code of conduct, but create one 
that can be adopted by companies to provide consumers with privacy protection.   
7.2.6. Moderator 
 Moderators are responsible for facilitating MSH meetings, and they can have a 
profound impact on the results of MSH processes.  According to most interviewees, the 
initial moderator for the MATP had a negative impact on the proceedings.  One 
interviewee summed the position up best in an interview occurring September 5, 2014.     
We had a facilitator who was anything but.  He was a condescending 
jackass and tried to treat a room of hundreds of people as if they were 
elementary school children.  Which in one respect, if you knew a lot of 
these people, you could understand why he might approach them that way, 
cranky, childish (Business).     
The relationship between the moderator and stakeholders can have an important impact 
on the proceedings.  The NTIA initially brought in an outside moderator, probably to 
avoid being seen as biased, however the moderator lacked a significant stake in the 
process.  “What the mistake is, is they brought in a 3rd party facilitator and they [NTIA] 
raised their hands as to giving it some direction” (NGO).  The NTIA, in its effort to avoid 
biased behavior, disengaged too much from the process, leading to conflict and a 
deterioration of the process. One participant described the moderator’s effect on the 
process as, “This wasn't going to work, it was going to fail.  Part of it was the facilitator 
was bad” (NGO).  These views express the importance stakeholders place in the 
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moderator for having satisfactory outcomes.  Moderators can be productive facilitators 
leading to productive outcomes, or can obstruct the process as was seen in MATP.  
Academic literature also notes the importance of moderators on the process: 
“Nevertheless, competent moderators who facilitate, push, and maintain the process were 
seen as indispensable (Schwilch, et al., 2012, p. 56).  
7.3. Previous Processes Regarding Facial Recognition Technology 
   The founding document that sought to regulate FRT was the Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights.  The CPBR designated the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration to convene multistakeholder processes on a variety of privacy related 
issues.   After conducting a MSH process on mobile application transparency the NTIA 
convened its second process on FRT.  The NTIA multistakeholder process was also 
predated by an FTC workshop on commercial uses of FRT, held in December of 2011.  
The FTC invited “Researchers, industry representatives, consumer advocates, and privacy 
professionals” (Federal Trade Commission, 2011).  The workshop observed commercial 
uses of FRT.  For a month following workshop completion, public comments were 
allowed concerning the content.  The FTC received 80 public comments from a variety of 
stakeholders.  In October of 2012, the FTC issued a staff report entitled “Facing Facts: 
Best Practices for Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies.”  The report did 
not cover every single use of FRT, but focused on commercial uses of the technology.  
Stakeholders are often mindful, and in some cases involved, with previous processes and 
those experiences inform their positions and thought processes for the current MSH 
process on FRT.  Understanding this history is important when tracking the creation of 
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the current code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  The scope of the 
current MSH process on FRT is discussed later in this chapter. 
 The FTC recommendations from the workshop were based on a March 2012 FTC 
privacy report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change and consisted of 
privacy by design, simplified consumer choice, and increased transparency.  “Privacy by 
design” refers to the recommendation that companies should incorporate privacy 
protections into each stage of the development of a product.  “Simplified consumer 
choice” specifies that companies be consistent with the context of a business relationship 
or transaction, or provide consumers with an alternative option at an appropriate time.  
Finally, “increased transparency” directed companies to make data collection and use 
practices visible to consumers.   
 It is expected by this researcher that the regulation of FRT will emerge via the 
MSH process.  Diverse stakeholders have been invited to offer opinions and information 
towards developing a voluntary code of conduct.  According to Patrick Erwin (2011), 
codes of conduct “are designed to explicitly detail an organization’s commitment to CSR 
(corporate social responsibility) and outline expected conduct from the organization’s 
employees” (p. 535).   
7.4. The Current Multistakeholder Process on Facial Recognition Technology 
 The MSH process on FRT has not occurred in a vacuum.  Stakeholders who are 
interested in participating have preconceived notions about multistakeholderism.  Some 
of these notions may be informed by the previous MATP or experiences they have had in 
the past with other processes.  Gaining insight into what stakeholders perceive as the 
benefits and deficits of the MSH process may affect how they approach the current 
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process for FRT.  Opinions differ, but they can be grouped into two broad categories; 
those who perceive benefits from the process and those who have frustrations with the 
process. 
7.4.1. Perceived Benefits From the Multistakeholder Process 
 Multistakeholderism encourages collaboration and cooperation between diverse 
interests.  Often the process results in positive outcomes for most or all parties.  
Stakeholders have noted the diverse interests represented in the MSH format and view 
this diversity as a positive development.  One interviewee expressed praise for the MSH 
process stating in an interview on October 15, 2014:   
I think one of the benefits to the MSH process is its casting a wider net.  
It's inviting consumer and privacy advocates, academics, in addition to my 
attendance there's been representatives from the Canadian government and 
so it seems to be putting together a wider group of stakeholders (NGO). 
The diversity of stakeholders has had a positive impact helping some understand the 
technology better.  One interviewee supported the academic literature on stakeholder 
learning stating in an interview on June 23, 2014:  
Well some of the benefits, clearly you are getting a much more expansive 
view of the technology, you’re getting it from multiple perspectives, not 
just the perspective of individual company products or an industry 
association that wants to promote the technology itself without really 
sensitivity, necessarily, to what other people might not be as enamored to 
the technology, you get more breadth of opinion (NGO). 
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Bringing together diverse parties not only aids in understanding the technology but also 
in the outcome of the process, “[T]here's a benefit to having both parties at the table so 
there's buy-in on both sides” (Business).  When parties meet to discuss issues they 
disagree on, they can come to solutions that both are willing to accept.  This sentiment 
was echoed by another stakeholder, “[I]t's a longer process but the benefit is you get a lot 
more buy-in” (Business).  There are business benefits identified with the MSH process as 
well. 
 One of the motivators for stakeholder participation can be to avoid legislation by 
Congress (Kolk, Tulder, & Welters, 1999, p. 152).  Stakeholders have recognized that 
participating in the MSH process on FRT may lead to better business outcomes.  The 
following analogy, provided by an interviewee on June 23, 2014, provides insight into 
this line of thought:  
[C]ongress has said, make the water cleaner.  Now you can do that just by 
fiat, the EPA can say here's how you are going to make the water cleaner. 
Alternatively the EPA can get a bunch of people in the room and say "how 
do we make the water cleaner in a way that has the least impact on your 
business, has additional environmental benefits that we don't know about"   
There can be a lot of value in that.  In other words, you want to do as little 
damage as possible and that's one of the things MSH is very good for.  
(NGO).   
Business participants recognize the potential to collaborate with other stakeholders and 
achieve goals in ways that can enhance their business or at least limit any damaging 
effects to their business interests.  Stakeholders are also cognizant that legislation can 
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often be a “one size fits all” approach to nuanced problems.  One interviewee on June 24, 
2014 phrased it as follows:   
Sometimes legislation has a tendency to go down with more of a hammer, 
than with a "let's identify the problem we are trying to address" which is 
discrimination.  Let's say you can't use FR for purposes of discrimination.  
But it's much harder to get those very narrow tailored laws through.  But 
that type of nuance is something we can achieve through the course of 
these MSH meetings (Business).   
These comments echo the literature in that codes of conduct can create elaborate rules to 
resolve problems (Erwin, 2011).  Both business and privacy advocates realize that 
Congress may not protect their interests as well as the MSH process; therefore, the threat 
of legislation has been a source of industry motivation to participate in this process.   
7.4.2. Criticism of the Multistakeholder Process 
 Just as there are perceived advantages to the MSH format, stakeholders also have 
expressed several reservations about the format.  Perhaps the most widely cited complaint 
about the MSH format is the length of time it can take.  One business participant stated: 
“It's longer, it's a lot longer” (Business).  An NGO participant confirmed the previous 
observation stating: “What you sacrifice of course is speed” (NGO).  Stakeholders are 
frustrated with the amount of time and resources that the process demands.  Participants 
also recognize that quality products take time to develop and they do not want to rush 
through the process either, “Yeah, we are trying to create something that lasts and Rome 
wasn't built in a day, for lack of a better phrase, and of course that didn't last, maybe not 
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the best analogy.  But you get the point” (Business).  In short, what is sacrificed in speed 
may be gained in creating a quality outcome.     
 Another frustration with the MSH process on FRT for some stakeholder groups is 
that its outcome is a voluntary code of conduct.  The NTIA cannot compel individuals or 
groups to participate.  “So we did one already on mobile app transparency.  It exposed 
some value but also the difficulty in doing MSH absent underlying legislation.  You 
really do need a stick to get people to cooperate” (NGO).  It is difficult to achieve 
stakeholder cooperation for multiple reasons.  Stakeholders may be reluctant to 
participate in order to protect competitive advantages, discreet silences (Huckin, 2002).  
One interviewee (September 17, 2014) was cognizant of the silence but was 
understanding of their rationale:     
That'd be great to get more information on their (business) process but I 
recognize why a company doesn't want to tell us what they are doing or 
planning or researching.  I don't know what they would gain on the 
corporate side (NGO).   
Observers who do not participate in the process have caused some stakeholders 
consternation.  It is important to hear from business entities that are implementing the 
technology or that have plans to.  Knowing what businesses plan to do with the 
technology can help enact privacy protections for those uses.  Without this input, the 
efficacy of the code of conduct may suffer.   
7.4.3. Convener 
 The role and power of the convener have been broadly discussed in the literature 
on MSH processes (Hemmati, 2002; Schwilch et al., 2012).  In the current FRT case, two 
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views have been expressed in relation to the NTIA, where the convener has faced 
criticism refuting its stance as an impartial broker who facilitates the MSH process on 
FRT.  The NTIA is housed under the Department of Commerce.  One stakeholder noted, 
“[The Department of] Commerce has never historically been supportive of protecting 
consumer privacy.  Department of commerce is an agency that protects the interests of 
American business” (NGO).  After examining the Department of Commerce’s mission 
statement, there is not a single mention of privacy included in the document (see 
Appendix D for mission statement).  On the other hand, the code of conduct created will 
be enforced by the FTC under its Section 5 authority against unfair or deceptive 
practices.  Certain NGOs have suggested that the FTC would be a more appropriate 
convener given its previous experience with the technology, as well as being the entity 
that will enforce the code of conduct.  “We recommended it to the White House to shift it 
[MSH on FRT] to the FTC.  The FTC recognizes that the Obama plan is basically a joke” 
(NGO).  This individual felt that, for political reasons, the FTC was not eager to convene 
the MSH process on FRT; a MSH process for FRT convened by the FTC would likely be 
seen as redundant given their previous efforts. 
 Other participants, though, felt that the FTC, as an enforcement agency, may not 
be the most appropriate convener.  One interviewee expressed his rationale in an 
interview occurring September 25, 2014 as follows: 
[T]he fact that they are an enforcement agency, they come at this with a 
certain perspective; I think you can argue that NTIA may be a better 
broker in this type of discussion.  I think when you look at the agency or 
the administration's influence on the process, I think you would see a 
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heavier hand in some sort of FTC process.  I think NTIA has really made 
the best of, what is a difficult process [MSH processes generally, not FRT 
specifically] (Business).   
In fact, FTC representatives have echoed their support for the NTIA as convener.  An 
interview was conducted with an  FTC representative occurring October 15, 2014 where 
she expressed the following: 
My thoughts to that are, we are observing this process and participating at 
the meetings but really our role would come into play when we would 
enforce the code or enforce against companies that said they would 
comply with the code and then did not.  Whereas [the] NTIA is working as 
a convener of this process.  So I think there are different roles 
(Government).   
 Despite differing opinions on which agency is the most appropriate convener for 
this process, stakeholders were also asked if they felt the NTIA had a particular influence 
on the process.  Several stakeholders acknowledged the difficulty of the process and felt 
the NTIA has been a fair broker.  One interviewee expressed the following (September 
15, 2014): 
I think from my perspective the Department of Commerce, the NTIA has 
done a good job of bringing together… have done a good job of acting as 
a convener of the meetings and organizing and helping to move the 
discussion along amongst stakeholders.  I feel like it's been a discussion 
amongst the stakeholders at the meetings (NGO).   
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It is important that stakeholders and the public feel that the NTIA, as convener, is a fair 
broker in this process otherwise the legitimacy of the outcomes will be questioned.  Other 
stakeholders felt the NTIA did have a particular influence on the process.  One 
interviewee expressed the importance of the role of the NTIA in an interview occurring 
June 23, 2014:  
We wouldn't be here if they hadn't convened a process.  That's important.  
If somebody doesn't get the table and the room and get people talking and 
give it a cover of officialness it won't happen.  [However] the NTIA 
doesn't have any power.  They can't threaten to shut the process down and 
just go with the civil society stakeholder proposal unless industry brings 
something forward.  So what they’re essentially doing is trying to convene 
a group of people and cajole people.  But… it's a tough task (NGO).   
Stakeholders who felt the NTIA influenced the process indicated that the agency has 
added legitimacy to the process.  Even though stakeholders reported influence by the 
convener, they felt said influence added legitimacy to the process which will hopefully 
translate into broad agreement and adoption about the negotiated code provisions, “we 
are here, giving you the venue, the time, we help convene, but we will not be an active 
creator of standards, that makes it a little bit slower.  They have their reasons for doing it 
that way” (NGO.)  
It is important that the NTIA is not seen as a creator of standards for the code of conduct.  
If the NTIA was accused of creating standards, they may be accused of negotiated 
rulemaking, which involves the creation of an advisory committee by an agency, the 
NTIA in this case, for the purpose of creating rules (Coglianese, 1997, p. 1256).  Creation 
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of such a committee would undermine the structure and potential benefits of the MSH 
format.   
7.4.4. Scope 
 The FRT meetings began in February 2014, only several months after the June 
2013 Snowden leaks concerning the National Security Agency (NSA) spying on the 
American public.  Through a series of revelations, highly publicized news reporting, and 
an eventual Ted Talk (March, 2014), the American public became increasingly aware of 
privacy issues and digital technologies.  These revelations prompted some participation at 
the FRT meetings to address what they perceived as a legitimate privacy concern 
government use of FRT.  However, the process was enacted to address commercial uses 
of FRT, and not government uses.  “I just think that the NTIA has a certain jurisdiction 
and law enforcement is not within that jurisdiction it doesn't mean the process is invalid 
just that it's not as broad as people would like” (NGO).   
 The frustration surrounding the inability to address governmental uses of FRT 
have been an ongoing issue during the meetings.   Business representatives in an effort to 
avoid regulation want the process to be constrained so that they can continue to work 
with government entities as a client.  One interviewee noted the NTIA’s role in 
constraining the scope of the process in an interview transpiring on September 5, 2014:   
They have done a reasonably good job keeping it contained.  One of the 
flashpoints that keep coming up is Government access to FR data and 
government use of FR data, which is completely outside the scope; and 
different activists both left and right tried to take it in that direction and its 
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combination of most other people in the room as well as folks at NTIA 
saying that’s not our purview at all.  (Business).   
 At first glance there seems to be a very clear delineation between government and 
commercial uses of FRT.  However, the commercial sector often drives technology 
innovation, and the government frequently contacts commercial entities as a customer for 
the use of certain technologies.  “Exactly, they [NTIA] don't want to go there and it's 
another example of how constrained or restrained the process is” (NGO).  Other 
participants felt that government use could be in the scope of the process in the meeting 
occurring February 6, 2014:   
[W]e can talk about the role of commercial data collection in relation to 
subsequent uses by the government, and it would fit the structures of the 
purpose of the work.  It doesn't run afoul of that, and I think it would make 
the discussion a little bit more kind of refined… it just strikes me as the 
right way to address the issue without restricting what the government 
does (Unknown).   
Some stakeholders feel that government use of FRT may not be out of the scope of the 
process so long as the government comes to a commercial provider as a consumer.  
However, enforcement of a code of conduct when the government is the customer 
remains less clear.  This has been a point of contention amongst stakeholders and the 
convener since the first meeting (February 6, 2014): 
The intent of this process is to implement the Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights and to draft a code of conduct that applies those top level principles 
to commercial facial recognition technology.  When companies adopt that 
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code and move forward, the FTC has the authority to make sure they keep 
their promises.  The FTC does not have authority over government 
entities.  (Verdi).   
Some privacy advocates feel that limiting the scope of the code of conduct to strictly 
commercial use undermines the legitimacy of the code.  Participants countered in the next 
meeting (February 25, 2014) that government use was needed so they could determine 
the overall protection level of the code.  Chris Calabrese from the ACLU said, 
I understand that this group cannot regulate what the Department of 
Justice does or the Department of Homeland Security, that's self-evident.  
However, it's equally evident, at least to me, that what the department of 
Justice or state and local police choose to do with the technology impacts 
the privacy of everyone it impacts whether I want to be in a biometric 
system, whether I can give meaningful consent or not.  So without 
understanding those things I don't see how I can tell anyone yes this is a 
privacy protective code or it isn't. 
However, since the FTC does not have enforcement authority over other government 
entities, it remains unclear how the code of conduct would apply to the government when 
they act as a consumer of FRT.   
 Beyond contending with the U.S. government, and issues with the government as 
a commercial customer, many of the companies involved in FR are global.  Entities such 
as Google and Facebook must comply with not only U.S. law but international law, as 
well as the laws of the countries in which they operate.  For the first time, during the 
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December 15, 2014 meeting, a representative from Facebook articulated this 
multinational view stating: 
I think when we are looking at a lot of companies like Facebook, Google, 
and others that are multinational.  We have obligations in other 
jurisdictions and by saying a U.S. based standard, even if it does evolve it 
could prove problematic if there might be different standards.  I'm trying 
to be open-minded and look more towards the global view and hoping the 
code be interoperable with other requirements in other jurisdictions 
(Business).   
The code of conduct is clearly limited to U.S. jurisdiction because of the FTC’s 
enforcement capacity.  Stakeholders must contend with the international nature of some 
companies while also ensuring they comply with U.S. standards.  It should be noted that 
Facebook’s initial participation at the meetings was to try and avoid U.S. regulation.   
 The NTIA is charged with convening and moderating the MSH process on FRT, 
but has also been influential in limiting the scope of what the group, and ultimately the 
code, will address.  One interviewee (June 24, 2014) described their role in limiting the 
scope of the process as:   
They also helped to keep it tailored.  One of the things that John Morris 
[Associate Administrator and Director of Internet Policy, John Verdi’s 
boss] was lambasted about was the removal of government from this 
[MSH process].  But it was important to remove that at the outset because 
as much as we may want to limit government access… [An] industry code 
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of conduct cannot regulate the federal government.  That takes an act of 
Congress or that takes an act of the executive branch itself.  (Business). 
The NTIA finds itself in a precarious position around the regulation of FRT with limited 
ability to regulate government use, particularly after the Snowden revelations heightening 
public awareness about government intrusions on individual privacy.  In the public’s eye, 
failure to adequately address the concerns of the stakeholders and the public could 
jeopardize the legitimacy of the voluntary code of conduct.   
7.4.5. Moderator   
 Several stakeholders expressed disappointment in the third party facilitator 
initially brought in by the NTIA.  Others expressed increased satisfaction after the 
facilitator was replaced by John Verdi, the NTIA’s director of privacy initiatives since 
2012.  As one participant put it, “He [Verdi] is night and day from the professional 
facilitator that we had for the first few meetings [of the MATP, April 2012].  It's pretty 
amazing.  John hadn't done anything like it before but he is a natural facilitator” 
(Business).  Broad stakeholder acceptance of the moderator is an important aspect of 
facilitating MSH processes (Hemmati, 2002, p. 222).  Verdi (2014) explained his role in 
an interview as strictly a facilitator, he noted:   
I'm a facilitator.  That's it.  [T]here are different models; I'm not an active 
chair.  There are some organizations that have an active chair that rules up 
or down on issues.  I don't do that.  I don't hold the pen on drafts.  I 
facilitate discussion.  I try to identify areas where conversation is going to 
be constructive.  I try to help folks identify and refine areas of agreement 
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and sort of work towards consensus on areas of disagreement.  But it's 
facilitation pure and simple (John Verdi, 2014, used with permission).  
Being a facilitator in this way limits the opportunities for stakeholders and observers to 
claim that the moderator is influencing the process.  Verdi has been explicit about his role 
with stakeholders which is another important aspect of facilitating MSH processes.  Verdi 
also has a background in computer programming, privacy advocacy, and is a lawyer, so 
he is “representative of the various stakeholder groups” and has valuable knowledge that 
contributes in identifying issues and promoting consensus (Hemmati, 2002, p. 222).  
Contrarily, an approach that is too involved also caused problems with the previous 
process on mobile apps.  Verdi may be aware of his role in facilitating the process due to 
his previous experience as a privacy advocate.   
 John Verdi remains the moderator for the MSH process on FRT.  It is important to 
note that Verdi could be seen by some stakeholders as inherently biased.  Formerly, John 
Verdi was senior counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). EPIC is an 
important non-profit organization that advocates for privacy self-described as, “EPIC is 
an independent non-profit research center in Washington, DC. EPIC works to protect 
privacy, freedom of expression, democratic values, and to promote the Public Voice in 
decisions concerning the future of the Internet” (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
2015b).  Despite being a former privacy advocate, stakeholders seem receptive to Verdi 
moderating the meetings.  During the current process, stakeholders have expressed 
positive sentiments about John, stating.  “I respect John; he has done a really good job in 
a difficult position in terms of having to corral a lot of people with different viewpoints 
and can be hostile” (NGO).  Having broad stakeholder support for the moderator is 
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certainly a positive aspect of this process, especially considering that the animosity 
towards the previous facilitator had a negative impact on the MATP.  Stakeholders kept 
the moderator who was productive at facilitating the process, an action drawn from 
historic results (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).     
 Beyond having a personal affinity for Verdi, stakeholders attribute positive 
facilitation of the meetings to his moderation style.  His facilitation of the meetings has 
been described in the following terms: “I feel like John Verdi and the NTIA have been 
very good at trying to speak with everyone and get everyone involved and make sure 
people are heard and run the meetings so they are efficient” (NGO).  The previous 
observation was confirmed by another participant who stated, “I think John Verdi has 
done a really good job of trying to make it much more inclusive” (Business).  
Stakeholders seem to not only appreciate Verdi, but the NTIA’s job of inviting 
stakeholders and making their contributions heard and valued.  “I applaud John Verdi for 
being able to facilitate such a diverse group” (Business).  Verdi seems to have garnered 
the respect of many participants involved in the process 
7.4.6. Participation 
 As with the MATP, issues of participation again cropped up in the FRT process.  
There are other groups that some feel have been left out.  “There's no minorities, there's 
no academics.  The NTIA has been just terrible.  The NTIA is a creature of the industry 
ultimately and the NTIA has no courage, no interest” (NGO).  These comments are 
directed at the NTIA because they are housed within the Department of Commerce, 
which is mandated to support American business.  No minority advocacy groups have 
been explicit about their participation in this process; the groups closest to representing 
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minorities would be the ACLU and Common Sense Media.  As to the statement that there 
are no academics, this is patently false, but there are individuals who would like more 
presentations from academics to be made in order to increase stakeholder-knowledge on 
the issues and technology.  Susan Grant of Consumer Federation of American explained 
to the group in the meeting occurring April 29, 2014 that companies who operate/employ 
FRT are missing from this process:   
As you know I wasn't thrilled with the last process, but at least we had 
active participants from the mobile app community.  We don't have the 
active participants that we need in this [process].  We've got the vendors, 
but I think very little of this has to do with the vendors actually and more 
of it has to do with the users of facial recognition and we don't have them 
actively participating (NGO). 
Google was noticeably absent for the entirety of the process, Facebook has been mostly 
absent, and both have been a source of concern for some stakeholders.  There are two 
ways of addressing the silence that Google and Facebook have exhibited.  These 
businesses would describe themselves as employing discreet silences in not wanting to 
reveal sensitive business practices (Huckin, 2002).  Conversely, these companies can also 
be viewed as employing manipulative silences to deliberately conceal current or future 
business practices that they wish not to fall under the code of conduct (Huckin, 2002).  
“[W]ill the NTIA ask that Google and Facebook present for the next session” (NGO).  
This question was immediately followed up in the next meeting on March 25, 2014 by 
Jeff Chester from the Center for Digital Democracy:  
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I have a question John.  At the last meeting I, and I think we were 
seconded by several others, asked that Google and Facebook come to this 
meeting to talk about what they do in terms of commercial recognition 
given the fact  [that] they are market leaders, to explain what they do and 
what they plan to do.  When we talked yesterday you told me that you did 
request that they speak and that they declined (NGO).   
Despite the NTIA making the requests, the MSH process is voluntary, thus facilitators 
cannot compel groups to come forward and share information.  As previously discussed, 
businesses have legitimate reasons to keep proprietary information private to protect their 
competitive advantage in the marketplace.    
 There have also been issues of false or incomplete representation among 
stakeholders.27  There has only been one instance, so far, of a stakeholder misleading 
participants as to the totality of the constituents they represent, a manipulative silence 
(Huckin, 2002).  While this was a brief point of contention, it was most likely known by 
all stakeholders involved in the MATP that Mr. Sperapani represented the Application 
Developers Alliance, which “[I]s a non-profit global membership organization that 
supports developers as creators, innovators, and entrepreneurs. We promote the continued 
growth of the industry and advocate on behalf of our members on public policy and 
industry issues” (Application Developers Alliance, 2015).  Misrepresentation could cause 
confusion or lead to animosity amongst participants as was seen in the MATP. 
                                                          
27 “Chris Calabrese- I'll ask a moderately pointed question.  You introduced yourself as Tim Sperapani 
concerned citizen, are you representing app developers who want to adopt a code as part of this process.” 




 During the meetings, the moderator has repeatedly stated that the goal of the 
CPBR and the NTIA is a voluntary code of conduct for FRT to protect consumer privacy.  
This goal has been questioned by Chester and by the convener at the March 25, 2014 
meeting.   
This is a stakeholder driven process.  What we just heard [is] that the 
NTIA goal, the administration’s goal, is to develop a code of conduct.  
But… if the stakeholders decide that it's too premature… to develop a 
code, then won't in fact [the] NTIA and the administration simply accept 
the will of the stakeholders? 
This was the first occurrence of a participant questioning the stated outcome of the 
process.  NGO participants have expressed a strong desire to provide consumers with 
robust privacy and data protections, if that cannot be achieved they are unwilling to 
endure the process for a result that will question their legitimacy and abilities in the eyes 
of their constituents.  The fact that the process could end without achieving the stated 
outcome after only three meetings caught the moderator off guard.   Verdi countered, “It's 
a stakeholder driven process… with the goal of developing a code of conduct.  Is your 
goal to develop a code of conduct or to not develop a code of conduct?”  Jeff Chester 
(Center for Digital Democracy) responded in kind stating: 
My goal is to protect privacy.  But I'm certainly not willing… I could not 
be railroaded to do it because that would not be dealing with the public 
interest that I hold in my job.  So it's a stakeholder driven process with 
conditions and that's quite interesting. 
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At this point the ACLU decided to support the notion that acceptable privacy protections 
must be achieved by this process or the NGO participants could not participate further.  
Calabrese stated: 
I think Jeff's got a point.  Fairly stated, the end goal is to advance privacy 
through a code of conduct.  However, if the stakeholders can't do that then 
we won't have a code of conduct.  You know, I think that goes without 
saying doesn't it? 
The exchange clarified that everyone had the same expectations; to create a code of 
conduct.  The discussion also highlighted the power stakeholders have to ensure a strong 
code of conduct is created, particularly one that protects consumer privacy.  Expectations 
were again questioned as issues of representation cropped up later in the same meeting.  
Rather than scrap the process if a code of conduct could not be created Susan Grant 
proposed an alternative way forward.     
I'd like to make a constructive suggestion picking…if we shouldn't be 
thinking more in the way of principles and less in the way of a code of 
conduct, that we have no indication that the real players here are going to 
help fashion and adopt anyway.       
Grant was unsure that the current expectations for the group could be met and tried to 
further privacy protection via less formalized principles, similar to the best practices 
issued previously by the FTC.   
7.5. New Strategies Adopted to Encourage Stated Outcome Success 
 As stated in the MDA discourse, historic positions and actions can affect the 
actions presently taken by individuals, thus understanding how the historic results affect 
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future action is important for the present study (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  The 
current MSH process on FRT has had the benefit of learning from the experiences of the 
previous effort on the MATP. Some stakeholders have been involved in both of the 
processes.  One of the frustrations with the last process was the limited adoption of the 
created code of conduct.  Participants voiced varied opinions about the final code of 
conduct and its adoption.  Some participants were convinced it the process was wasted, 
“It wasn't adopted at all” (Business).  Others felt there was limited adoption, “I think 
there were only two or three companies that signed on” (NGO).  The most positive 
comment regarding the previous code of conduct was this, “So we came up with 
something and that was fairly successful” (NGO).  Current stakeholders are cognizant of 
the limited adoption of the previous code of conduct and have been mindful of trying to 
improve the adoption rate.  “I'm also coming from it from the angle of I don't want to see 
it end up where the last approach did where basically only one company signed on, 
because the document was that unworkable” (Business).  These comments suggest that 
stakeholders are aware of the results of the previous process and are willing to pursue 
strategies that will encourage wider adoption of the code of conduct for FRT. 
7.5.1. Personal Communication Strategies 
 Since the comments from interviewees and individuals during the meetings 
suggest that many stakeholders had a negative experience during the first process, 
stakeholders skeptically entered the second process.  One potentially positive outcome 
from the first process is that the stakeholders learned what processes help develop a code 
of conduct and which do not.  Learning about the process was as important as learning 
about fellow stakeholders.     
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 Learning about other participants is also important.  The NTIA also learned the 
importance of having a moderator who can manage the process in an effective manner.  
Stakeholders involved in both processes have been mindful of the importance of 
respectful communication, as well as learning about the organizations and their goals.  
These previous experiences align with certain aspects of capacity building discussed in 
the literature.  With these experiences in mind, stakeholders took steps to ensure that they 
had a more positive experience with the second process.  “I think everyone’s been very 
respectful” (NGO).  “It’s gone a lot better than the last one so far” (Business).  
Stakeholders appear to have adopted new modes of conduct and interaction with one 
another to create a more positive and productive atmosphere.  “I don't think people are 
being willfully problematic this time around and I appreciate that” (NGO).  Stakeholders 
have strategized ways to compromise and are respectful of diverse views.  While mostly 
negative feelings about the MATP persist, stakeholders appear to have put that 
experience largely behind them and are creating an atmosphere of “good faith.”   
 Stakeholders have changed their approach to the MSH process in several ways.  
From the comments listed previously in the MATP, it is evident that there was animosity 
in the room; one stakeholder went as far as to call other participants “pretentious.”  
However, the FRT process has resulted in a different group dynamic as reported by in 
one interview occurring August 6, 2014.   
At the last process I think some people’s reputations hampered their 
ability to make their points.  There were a few people on the mobile app 
that were obstructive, or oppositional, or to prevent any compromise from 
happening.  Those people were not seen favorably by the group (NGO). 
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Participants seem conscious of the fact that to achieve a positive outcome they need to 
engage respectfully with one another.    
7.5.2. Decision Making Strategies 
 Aside from participants being respectful of one another, stakeholders changed the 
way that they make decisions throughout the process.  For instance, they found during the 
first process that voting on a finalized code of conduct at the end created arguments and 
limited adoption.  However, they changed the format for the process on FRT as noted by 
Carl Szabo of NetChoice at the November, 6 2014 meeting: 
One of the nice things I think we have done this time around, and the 
lessons learned, is we have avoided putting the cart before the horse like I 
think we did last time.  Last time, a couple people quickly ran to the pen 
and started writing a code of conduct and then we started talking about the 
big issues and that's where things broke down.  That's why I think you 
have seen so little adoption as we have from last time.   
Stakeholders learned that this decision making approach hampered the creation of an 
effective code of conduct that could be widely adopted by companies.  This comment 
also acknowledges the learning that has occurred amongst the stakeholders. The 
importance of learning in MSH processes cannot be overstated as “MSPs will only 
[emphasis added] work if all participants are willing to learn from each other. (Hemmati, 
2002, p. 53).  Having an insular group drafting language was not effective, thus “Going 
forward in this process we are trying to completely avoid that” (Business).     
Stakeholders have learned from their past mistakes, thus have changed the way that they 
make decisions in the MSH process for FRT.   
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 By avoiding insular drafting groups, stakeholders hope the adoption of a new 
decision making process will achieve wider acceptance of a code of conduct.  One 
interviewee described the new decision making process on September 5, 2014:   
[T]he benefit of going through that mess [MATP] was learning what 
works, how to work together to find common ground, how to work 
towards that common ground between parties that tend to not cooperate on 
anything.  It was a very long painful dry run to work out a lot of the things 
that don't work.  The key thing that was dropped…was the idea of having 
a small group of people who were designated as the drafting team 
(Business).   
Stakeholders have adopted a more piecemeal fashion of making decisions on multiple 
smaller issues rather than one comprehensive code.  The new decision making process 
has evolved in stages.  The first stage identifies an issue the group thinks they can come 
to an “easy” or relatively easy consensus on.  This is a best practice cited in the literature: 
“It was recommended that MSPs should always tackle the easiest objectives and common 
ground first in order to build trust and pull out some real initial achievements; then it can 
start to face the more contentious areas” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 116).  Then individuals draft 
code language on that issue, where individuals volunteer based on interest or specialized 
knowledge.  The draft code language is then brought back to the group to decide if 
consensus can be reached.  Assuming consensus is reached, the language is “frozen” and 
stakeholder groups can take it back to their constituents for comments and suggestions.  
This point was explained in an interview occurring September 5, 2014 as:   
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There have been sort of small groups of people that have gotten together 
to hash out lists, they don't make decisions but they make lists.  What are 
the things we need to worry about on topic X.  So you have a group of 
people working on definitions and coming up with common definitions 
that the group can look over and work on.  Eventually perhaps agree on 
(Business).   
The definitions list is included in Appendix C for illustrative purposes.  This approach 
has been supported by a number of stakeholders.  Bill Baker of Motorola supported the 
notion at the April 29, 2014 meeting stating: 
What I might prefer we have, is a point of where we have little drafting 
committees taking on pieces of it instead of one drafting committee taking 
on the whole thing which I didn't think was a particularly good way of 
getting it done last time.   
Stakeholders have decided to have multiple working groups for issues.  Participants hope 
that having multiple small groups working on issues will achieve broad consensus not 
experienced at the MATP and produce better outcomes.  Evidence suggests that certain 
stakeholders are happier with this approach: “It's gone a lot better than the last one so far” 
(Business).   
 Stakeholders are not the only groups who have supported a change in the decision 
making approach.  An interview respondent explained it as follows (September 25, 
2014): 
This time around I think NTIA has been careful not to have groups come 
to the table too early with a complete code which then becomes the base 
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draft.  Instead trying to piece that together as more section by section and 
more based on where the group can find consensus.  I think to their credit 
they are trying to be a little more, I don't know inclusive in the drafting 
process (Business).   
Stakeholders would soon learn, however, that the new approach was not without its own 
set of problems.     
 Some stakeholders expressed frustration with the smaller groups.  “One of the 
problems with this process is that there's no executive committee or a designated group of 
people to actually draft something” (NGO).  Despite not having a designated drafting 
committee, other participants felt that drafts would still get done, “My experience last 
time is the way this tends to work is you find a couple of people on the same page as you 
and you look for some buy in.  That may not work on a piece by piece basis” (NGO).  A 
fragmented approach lacks a complete document to work with and has resulted in new 
frustrations such as increased length of the process.  Walter Hamilton, of the IBIA, at the 
December 15, 2014 meeting noted: 
I might also say that… I have no real issue with most of the language that 
is there, but it's me speaking for myself.  We have not had… [an] 
opportunity to go back and fully vet this language, or the code in general 
since this is a piecemeal approach, with our members and down through 
our members to their customers where there could be legitimate concerns 
expressed about various aspects of this.  That's where we are today.   
Without a complete document it is difficult for stakeholders to take anything substantive 
back to their constituents.  Since some stakeholders represent several companies 
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soliciting all of their opinions and meaningful comments is very important.  “This 
demonstrates the need for participants to work closely with their constituencies, 
particularly in MSPs which aim at agreements and implementation” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 
117).  A third decision making process was suggested to avoid previous problems and 
any current complications that may arise from the new fragmented approach. 
 To avoid the problems of the MATP as well as the complications arising from the 
disjointed format adopted in the FRT process, it was suggested that the NTIA hold the 
pen as an independent unbiased body.  Yet, there are limits to what the NTIA feels 
comfortable contributing in this process.  The NTIA has defined their role in the process 
and self-imposed not drafting language for the group.  Verdi in the November 6, 2014 
meeting stated:    
I actually don't have authority to say NTIA can pick up the pen on 
something like this.  To be honest, it makes me a little nervous to have 
NTIA do much more than we have which is group issues, figure out 
related stuff, mechanical fair broker type process.  That is something I'm 
comfortable doing because I think it helps the group move forward and 
I'm using stakeholder language.  In terms of NTIA picking up the pen and 
creating language, my suspicion is that will cause angina.  I don't know 
that’s the role that we are best situated to play in the process but I am 
happy to take it back.   
This suggestion received resistance from other stakeholders, particularly Szabo of 
NetChoice stating:   
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I was going to second your comments just from the optics of it.  The optics 
of the government, it might be misconstrued as the government is creating 
a privacy policy, can we really trust them after all the issues that they have 
had recently.   
The suggestion for the NTIA holding the pen on a complete code of conduct was not 
adopted.  In fact, the opposite has tended to be the case; rather, the NTIA has been 
instrumental in getting stakeholders to hold the pen on various issues.  “But who wants to 
take the pen on this?”  “Others who want the pen?”  The NTIA has been vocally hesitant 
to even appear to hold the pen on any issue.  Verdi offered an alternative option stating:   
A third way to do this is I can comb through I, John Verdi, can comb 
through the documents submitted by stakeholders and other principal 
documents submitted…and put together a combined document which 
won't look like a rational code and isn't me holding the pen because I will 
just copy and paste.   
This supports the position of the NTIA as strictly a process facilitator.  The NTIA has the 
difficult job of moving the process forward while traversing diverse views and a 
complicated past with the MATP.  It makes sense some participants would want the 
NTIA to hold the pen to avoid the drafting problems experienced in the MATP.  
However, if they do create the draft language, it would no longer be a stakeholder driven 
process and would detract from the legitimacy of the MSH format.  The NTIA has been 
mindful of both of these views and has struck a middle ground between them by 
compiling comments received from stakeholders; in doing so, they help to facilitate and 
move the group forward, while maintaining transparency and adjusting any language 
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submitted in view of the whole group.  In fact, Verdi has the webcast cameramen show 
before and after screen shots of code language so that viewers at home can see what has 
been changed.  Providing this level of transparency and facilitation is a good compromise 
between holding the pen and maintaining the legitimacy and benefits of the MSH format.   
7.6. Complications With the Multistakeholder Process on 
Facial Recognition Technology 
 
7.6.1. Disparate Opportunities to Participate in the Decision Making Process 
 Despite adopting new strategies for making decisions, not all stakeholders have 
had equal influence on the process.  The meetings can be “attended” in one of three ways: 
physically, via telephone, or via webcast streaming.  These three methods are employed 
to facilitate convenient access to the meetings.  An unintended consequence of these 
modes of access is stratification of participation, and thus influence.   
 Ease of attendance and financial travel savings are not the only advantages for 
stakeholders who can physically attend the meetings.  “Unfortunately, when you are on 
the phone you have about one tenth the ability to interact and such” (NGO). An 
interviewee provided further insight (October 15, 2014): 
I think you are limited by calling in mainly because it's hard to break into 
a conversation that’s going on among a bunch of people in a room if 
you’re on the phone.  I also think you are a little more limited because it's 
hard to maintain focus for four hours if you’re on the phone (NGO).  
Through meeting observation, participants are able to monitor the process and contribute 
over the phone, but in limited ways.  Attendees in the room can speak into the 
microphones located at their seats at almost any time they desire, though there is usually 
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an order designated by the moderator.  For phone participants, the moderator designates 
to the operator when to enter “Q and A” mode where phone participants can be heard by 
the rest of the group.  Callers are muted by the operator when not in “Q and A” mode.  
Additionally, stakeholders who monitor the meetings via the streamed webcast have no 
opportunity for interaction with the proceedings, as there is no way for webcast viewers 
to communicate with the group.  Therefore, stakeholders who are able to physically 
attend the meetings have a distinct advantage if trying to influence the process.     
 The NTIA has done a good job of being inclusive and inviting diverse 
stakeholders according to participants.  Various communication channels, represented in 
the NTIA meetings, all have distinct advantages and disadvantages.  Electronic 
communication has the benefit of “neutralizing differences in status and personality as 
related to gender, age and ethnicity” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 87).  Electronic communication 
also focuses attention on the content of the communication rather than the subject.  
However, electronic communication also promotes heterogeneity in the group and may 
be ideal for gathering diversity of opinion on a given matter (Hemmati, 2002, p. 87).  
Since the NTIA will convene another MSH process on drones, they should consider 
adding an interactive component to the webcast so that online participants can more 
effectively engage with the process.   
7.6.2. Perceived Representation Issues 
The NGO representatives in the FRT meetings have voiced concerns to this researcher 
that they lack the resources of industry members (August 6, 2014).     
There are two advocates in the room, not everyone can be at every 
meeting.  There probably isn't more than ten of us. [There are usually 40-
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50 participants in the room at any given meeting]  I think we are 
outnumbered by other interests.  We don't have the capacity to monitor on 
the advocacy side.  Everyone who goes has to be strategic about what they 
are doing (NGO).  
NGOs continued to discuss their limited resources stating, “In addition there are about 
five or six advocates and the rest more or less are from industry.  Of course the 
advocates, not only do we have small organizations but we are dealing with multiple 
issues” (NGO).  As the literature has shown, privacy is a complicated issue that is of 
primary concern in many venues, thus advocates must choose strategically where to 
deploy their resources.  However, other stakeholders, representing business interests, do 
not view numbers or resources as an issue.  These stakeholders contend that bringing 
value to the discussion is the most important aspect of a stakeholder’s participation, a 
position supported in the academic literature (Mitroff, 1983).  If a stakeholder can 
contribute to the discussions meaningfully then they will be heard, regardless of who they 
represent or what their resources are.  An interviewee expanded on this view stating 
(September 5, 2014):     
There is a guy, an elderly man who is a consultant, he is extremely cranky 
but he has been an interesting addition to the mix.  He doesn't represent 
anyone other than himself but he speaks up and he has sometimes very 
useful things to add to the process and therefore he is influential.  It 
doesn't matter; do you bring anything of value?  Do you bring value when 
you speak and participate?  That's the most important thing (Business).   
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There are differing opinions present about representation in terms of numbers and 
representation, in terms of value added to the discussion. Stakeholders are generally 
referred to in the literature in terms of unique knowledge, experiences, or resources, not 
in terms of their numbers (Gray, 1989; Mitroff, 1983).  Participants can add value to the 
discussion in a variety of ways, including expertise, practical solutions to implementation 
problems, and clarification of diverse views, all of which can help facilitate consensus.  
One participant’s contribution in the meetings is to clarify complicated views that appear 
to be oppositional. However, he is usually able to strike a compromise.  Hearing from 
groups that would actually adopt the code of conduct is an important part of the process 
as well.   
Those who are to adopt the code of conduct need to be represented and have their 
input heard.  This view was expanded upon in the first meeting (February 6, 2014).   
I mean my recollection of the previous one [process]… a lot of people that 
weren't involved in it.  And I think it would be a really good idea to make 
sure that everyone that might be impacted by this, [code] because even 
though it's not a regulation the people that might be encouraged to adopt 
it, ought to all try to be in the room…(Unknown).   
In the MATP, the late participation of groups who were to adopt the code of conduct 
produced a multitude of problems in adoption of the code; stakeholders for the FRT 
process remember these issues and have tried to incorporate stakeholders who would 
adopt the code from the beginning of this process.  Despite their efforts, there is a 
continuation of this trend as many potential adopters have yet to provide meaningful 
input into the process, at least initially.   
 
167 
7.7. Towards Creating a Code of Conduct 
 As a result of the efforts to increase respectful dialogue between stakeholders and 
adopt a more effective decision making process, stakeholders are more satisfied with this 
process than the MATP.  Respectful communication has led to stakeholder collaboration 
on draft code language, as well as offline meetings to discuss differing views in an effort 
to reach a compromise on issues.     
 Part of the benefit of a negative initial start is learning which processes are most 
effective at creating a code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  The last 
process involved a group of people drafting code language and then conducting a group 
vote at the end.  This process was not productive in creating a code of conduct.  Marking 
the differences between the two processes highlights effective strategies for future use.   
 The FRT process has differed from the mobile app process in that the group has 
decided to tackle issues in a piecemeal fashion, whereas the last process had a small 
group bring back a complete code to the group.  The moderator has suggested and 
directed the group toward issues that appear to lend themselves to easier consensus, so 
called “low hanging fruit.”  Parties who are interested in a specific topic or topics have 
the ability to form a small group to develop draft language; afterwards, the entire group 
can add comments or suggestions and vote on whether it is acceptable.  While this way of 
creating a code of conduct may be easier to reach consensus on, there have been some 
concerns about where to include certain items in the code.  Stakeholders are concerned 
that as items are tabled for inclusion into other sections of the code of conduct, they may 
be forgotten.   
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 Once sections of the code come back from the drafting group, they are presented 
to the group.  If the group approves the language initially, it is “frozen” so that 
stakeholders can take the language back to their members and receive comments from 
their constituents before the language is finalized for the code of conduct.   
7.8. Conclusion 
 The regulatory regime of FRT is emerging via the MSH format.  Stakeholders 
have experienced a variety of challenges, creating a voluntary code of conduct that 
includes representation issues, disparate opportunities to influence the meetings, limited 
regulatory scope, and differing views of expected outcomes.  The process has succeeded 
in bringing together diverse groups to holistically represent the technology and its 
capabilities.  Stakeholders have worked to adopt productive strategies for creating 
regulation, including respectful discourse, completing small sections of code that can be 
agreed on instead of decision making from a completed code perspective, and early 
interaction with representative stakeholders.  Although the process is far from completed, 









REGULATION OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the development of regulations for facial recognition 
technology.  This development has been influenced by the knowledge obtained from 
experts, as well as discussing the various modalities of FRT and the privacy implications 
that are attached to each use.  Extensive discussion of these privacy implications are 
covered in chapter nine.  Stakeholders continue to grapple with issues related to 
providing appropriate consumer privacy protections.   
 As discussed earlier, stakeholder learning is a continuous part of the 
multistakeholder process and an intangible outcome of the proceedings (Argyris, 1976; 
Held, 2006; Gray, 1989; March, 1991; Roome & Wijen, 2006).  The first part of the 
MSH process on FRT, between February and April 2014, was dedicated mostly to 
exploration learning or seeking new information on the technology (March, 1991).  Not 
all stakeholders entered the process with the same amount of knowledge regarding FRT.  
In the first few meetings, stakeholders spent a majority of their time listening to technical 
experts reporting on the capabilities of the technology and had the opportunity to ask 
questions. In an effort to learn more about the technology, stakeholders wanted to know 
where the technology was deployed, how it was being used, what the anticipated future 
uses were, along with other relevant contextual information. 
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8.1. Deployment of Facial Recognition Technology 
 At the first meeting, February 6, 2014, Microsoft presented to the group about 
their use of FRT, which they utilize in their Xbox gaming platforms.  Specifically the 
game system works in conjunction with Xbox Kinect.28  Kinect tracks the game player’s 
body movements and has the on screen character mimics the users; for example, if the 
user jumps so does the onscreen character.  Microsoft built a user notice into the system 
that alerts the user to the use of FRT, which operates via a colored light on the gaming 
system.  Microsoft also allows the games to be played without the use of FRT, so users 
can turn it on and off as they see fit.  However, Kinect also includes an audio detection 
component that is always on, “In fact, the new camera and microphone system is so 
sensitive to your presence, that Microsoft says the new Kinect can even read your 
heartbeat while you're exercising, and recognize and process audio that's personalized to 
specific individuals” (Sottek, 2013).  Notice and choice, as well as the ability to turn FRT 
on and off, are important concepts that merit their own discussions and will be addressed 
later in this chapter.   
 At the second meeting, February 25, 2014, Marc Vaillant from Animetrics 
informed stakeholders of the accuracy of the technology currently deployed as well as the 
factors that affect the accuracy of FRT.   Vaillant discussed technical aspects of FRT 
including lighting, pose, false positives, false negatives, and other confounding variables 
to accuracy discussed previously in chapter two.  Depending on the application, there are 
reasons to have higher and lower accuracy rates.    
                                                          
28 Xbox Kinect is an add on product to the Xbox gaming system and works by utilizing a camera to track 
body movement, gestures, and even voice commands.   
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 Noticeably absent from the meetings were two of the largest companies deploying 
FRT: Google and Facebook.  Facebook finally contributed to the meetings on December 
12, 2014.  Their unwillingness to present has been a source of frustration for some 
stakeholders.  Nonetheless, several other companies presented information to the group 
about the usage of FRT and its best practices.   
 At the third multistakeholder meeting, March 25, 2014, Alessandro Acquisti from 
Carnegie Mellon University presented a proof of concept study.  In this study Acquisti 
determined a student’s identity while they filled out a three page privacy survey.  His 
experiment proceeded in several stages:   
So the first experiment, online to online, the idea is we use data from 
social networks, where people use their names to identify profiles on 
dating sites where people do use their photos because [if there are] no 
photos, no date.  But they don't use their names because there is still a 
certain social stigma associated with using online sites for that (Aquisti, 
2014).   
Our identities are negotiated in the physical world but also online.  Acquisti notes the 
importance of selective anonymity online.  Consumers reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves via social networking sites and yet value a certain amount of anonymity 
in certain online interactions, in this case online dating.  The experiment tested whether 
an individual could reveal personal information and still remain anonymous:   
Now clearly our goal was not to expose these users.  Rather, it was to see 
whether it is even possible to remain anonymous online if you are using 
your face.  And, therefore, if you make yourself trackable across different 
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sites.  [In] this approach we identified one out of ten dating site members 
(Acquisti, 2014).   
As this experiment shows, an individual’s face has the ability to link known profiles with 
anonymous profiles online.  Currently, the technology is limited in its ability to make 
these linkages, but as the accuracy of the technology continues to improve, and as 
consumers continue to upload dozens of images of themselves online, we can expect 
anonymity, and privacy by extension, to erode.  However, this technology is not limited 
to just exposing anonymity online:   
Now the second study was offline to online.  The same idea only now the 
anonymous photo was taken from offline specifically from students 
walking in a campus building.  The subjects were asked to sit in front of a 
desk and we took three shots of them using a cheap webcam.  Using this 
approach we identified one in three subjects in the second experiment 
(Acquisti, 2014).  
As the second experiment demonstrates, FRT possesses the ability to take anonymous 
individuals in the physical world and identify them via content they have posted online.  
Before FRT, individuals involved in unpopular speech or found in compromising 
situations could expect to remain anonymous; however, now with cloud computing and a 
camera phone these individuals can be identified. 
 Losing anonymity, and by extension privacy, is a compelling enough reason to be 
concerned about the accuracy and increased utilization of FRT but the technology can 
also reveal additional sensitive data.  In a previous proof of concept study Acquisti and 
colleagues demonstrated an ability to predict social security numbers from profile 
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information found on social networking sites.  In his follow up study Acquisti was able to 
derive a social security number from an individual’s image.     
  In other words, can we predict a social security number from a face?  
And the answer is yes.  It’s difficult of course, the accuracy as you can see 
keeps degrading.  Its proof of…. a broader phenomenon that I call data 
accretion.  The term is beautiful term that is not due to me and due to Paul 
Hall a scholar at the University of Boulder Colorado.  It’s like money an 
investment accrues over time, data, personal data, accrues across databases 
(Acquisti, 2014). 
Often we feel the information that is collected about us is innocuous. Since the 
information is viewed as benign we reveal this information for our personal benefit a 
perfect example of, privacy as commodity.  Acquisti’s experiment showed that data 
accretion, when properly analyzed, can reveal sensitive information, such as sexual 
orientation, political affiliation, credit score, and other sensitive details about an 
individual.  More concerning still is the reality that this can currently be done using 
technology available to the public:   
[T]his iPhone app uses the iPhone camera to take a shot of the person in 
front of you and then it does what the experiment did but does it in real 
time.  So [it] takes a shot, uploads it to the cloud, the cloud the server 
based part of the app tries to find a match between faces from social media 
and the shot coming from the iPhone.  And then if it finds a shot now with 
the presumptive name, with the presumptive name…tries to find 
demographic data…tries to predict the SSN and then it sends this 
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information back to the phone all relying on the face of the person.  This is 
what I'm referring to as augmented reality (Acquisti, 2014).   
This example highlights some of the capabilities of FRT.  Both of the studies referenced 
above can now be reviewed in detail,29 but at the time of the presentation the latest 
experiment was unpublished.30  Researchers can track people across the Internet, 
destroying virtually any sense of user anonymity.  Anonymity, which is highly valued on 
online dating sites, is being eroded with the use of FRT and readily available technology.  
While FRT may have some obstacles to overcome to be viable in real time, the 
technology is developing rapidly.  According to Acquisti (2014), “The federal program 
which tries to standardize the performance of facial recognition in about 14 years 
improved by almost 3 orders of magnitude.”  If this trend continues, FRT may be viable 
in real time in the near future.   
 Acquisti’s experiment is impressive but is not how the technology is regularly 
used today.  FRT is commonly used for 1) face detection 2) authentication and 3) 
identification.  One of the most popular uses of FRT is authenticating identification 
credentials.  Russell King from Picasso, a company involved in authenticating 
identifications, also presented at the March 25, 2014 meeting.  King said, “Picasso 
provides solutions for both identity management and identity assurance.”   
                                                          
29 Acquisti, A., & Gross, R. (2009). Predicting Social Security numbers from public data. Proceedings of 
the National academy of sciences, 106(27), 10975-10980. 
 
30 Acquisti, A., Gross, R., & Stutzman, F. (2014). Face Recognition and Privacy in the Age of Augmented 




Picasso is headquartered in London, but also has offices in the U.S. (King, 2014).  Unlike 
the one to many matching scenario presented by Acquisti, Picasso does one to one 
matching for authentication purposes as King explained:   
We take a government issued ID…We actually extract data from the ID 
and we then compare the photo on the ID with a live individual looking at 
the camera.  That provides a level of confidence to our clients that they in 
fact have the individual they are purporting to be.  Performing the one to 
one match is not all that useful if the identification document is forged.  
Picasso also looks at various features on the identification credential to 
ensure it has not been tampered with. 
Most modern passports contain a chip that contains the individual’s face and personal 
information (King, 2014).  Picasso has the ability to read the chip.  The chip also has 
information from the issuing authority that can verify that the chip belongs to the 
appropriate document (King, 2014).  One of the main uses of the Picasso platform is for 
airport security, but they are expanding into other areas. 
So the purpose of our products is to simplify the onboarding experience of 
a consumer, as well as elevating the level of assurance to our client that 
the customer is who they say they are.  Within a healthcare capacity, it's 
patient assurance, which is a clear patient safety issue.  Unfortunately, we 
have a tendency of having multiple patient records.  The ability of 
biometrics to reduce the exposure to that sort of issue is quite a useful and 
powerful proposition (King, 2014). 
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FRT has the ability to help reduce fraud, increase security with increased authentication 
confidence, and prevent gambling addicts from entering gaming facilities if gambler so 
chooses.  Picasso is only one company in the FRT space, but many other companies are 
employing FRT for different uses. 
 During the next meeting, April 29, 2014, Brian Brackeen CEO of Kairos, 
presented on how his company uses FRT.   
We focus only on facial recognition in the commercial space, so very 
germane to these discussions.  We do it for a number of types of 
customers.  Facial recognition via a time clock product…we capture the 
image with the person kind of saying take the button, up to the cloud, back 
down, we've identified you and then you’re checked in.  That data then 
goes into the company's payroll system (Brackeen, 2014). 
Payroll is only one finance area in which Kairos is involved.  Worldwide, credit card 
fraud is a yearly hundred billion dollar problem.  Kairos has introduced a product they 
call Kairos Trust to help combat credit card fraud by utilizing FRT; this product is 
expected to be introduced soon.  Despite the firm’s development just two years ago, 
Kairos has already had an interest in their products from over 320 companies (Brackeen, 
2014).  The products that these companies are potentially interested in vary greatly.  
During the meetings, Brackeen discussed the utilization of FRT by a cruise ship to help 
organize photos taken during vacations.  However, the same technology can also be 
utilized to provide physical safety to customers and not just for mere convenience. 
Another example… is a hospital, a private hospital, it's a children’s 
hospital actually.  What they do currently is, when you go to check in, 
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when you walk in any one of the doors, you give them your ID, they take a 
picture, the picture kind of gets printed onto your badge and that's 
generally how they know that  people aren't on like a Meagan's Law list or 
things of that nature.  There are also other certain doors, like ER and some 
other kind of back doors where there aren't guards present because they 
are either not used very often or because in an ER situation you don't want 
to stop people coming in.  So there's a concern that there could potentially 
be predators sort of intentionally going into these like soft openings and 
soft doors.  (Brackeen, 2014).   
Age is a factor that determines whether FRT will be used or not.  In the cruise ship 
example, FRT is only used on passengers who are the age of majority, 18 in most 
jurisdictions.  In fact, Kairos does not accept clients who would use FRT on minors.   
 These three presentations constituted the bulk of the commercial uses of FRT 
presented to the group.  Stakeholders identified numerous concerns about the possible 
uses of FRT; these will be discussed in detail later.  Age was identified as an important 
concern to the NGO stakeholder group.  NGOs asked for further presentations on the 
intersection of age and FRT.   
 Adriana Galvan, from UCLA, presented information on the brain maturation of 
adolescents at the July 24, 2014 meeting.  Her presentation included information on 
adolescents, now to include college aged individuals, particularly concerning their 
decision making process and their perception of rewards and consequences.   
It's meaningful because a more excitable reward system means that people 
in this age group are more responsive to incentives.  In other words they 
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will work towards receiving incentives than other age groups with less 
consideration of consequences associated with those behaviors.  They are 
more susceptible to social rewards and this includes faces  (Galvin, 2014).   
Common Sense Media was an NGO partly responsible for Galvin’s presentation.  In a 
consumer context adolescents present a troubling case because they are not of the age of 
majority yet they typically have access to money making them valuable consumers to 
commercial entities.  Other research referenced in the presentation showed that 
adolescents’ brains were more excited when presented with faces than children or adults 
and this made them susceptible to wanting social rewards more.  Galvin continued 
noting: 
So all of these factors have implications for policy and thinking of ways 
adolescents should be considered a special developmental periods when 
making choices or regulations for adolescents.  The development of an 
adolescent appropriate policy is critical… adolescents benefit from 
explicit examples of consequences. Abstract concepts are still challenging 
for them to appreciate.  Adolescents need time to think before they act.  
They need to be given the tools to allow them to consider consequences to 
think about how their reward and behavior may influence later outcomes.  
It's important we provide the scaffolding they need (Galvin, 2014).   
Fairly stated, Galvin’s research underscores the goals of Common Sense Media, to 
provide special protections for children and adolescents in the code of conduct.  A one 
size fits all code would simply fail to address the special treatment that developing minds 
need for robust consumer protection.   
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Since adolescents have limited ability to recognize long-term rewards and consequences, 
the deployment of FRT around minors may need special consideration (Galvin, 2014).  It 
is easy to imagine that advertisers may want to take advantage of the youth market by 
combining peer pressure for products, showing individuals that their friends are wearing 
or using certain products.  The previous research shows that minors are more excitable 
when they see images of people they know, including friends wearing or using various 
products, combined with their limited ability to grasp long-term rewards or consequences 
and it may be quite easy to persuade minors to purchase products or services.   
 While it is relatively easy to imagine advertisers or businesses targeting minors 
for their products, it is harder to imagine a code that can appropriately address these 
concerns.  The previous research shows that the adolescent brain is not fully developed 
till age 25 or 27, yet adolescents become legal adults at age 18 in most jurisdictions.  The 
issue of adequately protecting adolescents becomes more difficult when factoring in 
intelligence and emotional maturity differences present at each age.  Presumably, a code 
of conduct for FRT can only cover “adolescents” until age 18 when they legally become 
adults, yet this leaves many vulnerable years for young adults with regard to FRT.  
Perhaps the stakeholders will address the gap when they discuss adequate notice and 
transparency that must be given to consumers by companies using FRT.     
 Age is not the only sensitive demographic characteristic which FRT is able to 
detect.  Some NGO stakeholders worry about what was initially called facial profiling.  
The term facial profiling drew immediate criticism from some business participants, as 
profiling is a term with a negative connotation.  Business did not want to associate their 
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products with a negatively charged term so they decided on determining demographic 
characteristics.     
 Jerome Williams from Rutgers University also presented information on FRT and 
marketing/advertising uses at the July 24, 2014 meeting.  Williams expressed concern 
about FRT being used to advertise products:   
We are at a point in marketing today where we take a million messages 
and customize them for our purposes, narrowcasting.   Think about all the 
photos available we have elevated the level of sophistication and can tailor 
each message to an individual.  Sometimes we refer to that as 
segmentation (Williams, 2014).   
Williams’ comments echo Brackeen’s, in that, there is a real interest from the business 
and advertising communities to incorporate FRT into their practices.  Faces, due to their 
unique ability to link data, may now represent the best opportunities for marketers to 
personalize their messages to consumers; after all, the face can tell relative age, race, 
interest in product, and even health. 
The next slide is about face marketing; when you have the ability to 
capture all kinds of faces, whether its information or other it allows you to 
very easily target at a very sophisticated level…others that you want to 
use.  We are at the point where you walk down the street and pass a retail 
store or window and the ad appears based specifically on you, your age, 
race, gender, ethnicity, all other kinds of socio demographic variables 
have been captured (Williams, 2014). 
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The technology has the potential to aid advertisers in crafting targeted messages to 
individuals.  While this is a real advantage for advertisers, and potentially benefits 
consumers with messages relevant to their wants, this technology also presents new 
opportunities to discriminate against and marginalize individuals.   
Retailers are deploying FRT to identify customers as a retention 
technique.  On the surface you might say that's a good thing detecting 
which individuals are more engaged in shopping and the store can help 
with loss prevention.  In some of my work…we find some instances where 
one racial group only represents 5% of the customers in the store but 95% 
of the shoppers stopped for shoplifting.   That suggests the technology and 
cameras are focusing on one group (Williams, 2014).   
Racial profiling has been a part of society for quite some time, it appears that cameras 
aided with FRT have the ability to exacerbate this problem.  This problem has gained the 
attention of the news media as well as commercial entities.    
The media has gotten some of this…the cases that talk about “shopping 
while black” or consumer racial profiling, people refer to it as shop and 
frisk.  Essentially you identify people and you pay more attention to them 
in the store and also when they leave the store and using FRT to zero in on 
only certain groups and perpetuate this behavior.  My concern is that if 
FRT is not looked at in terms of the harm it can cause, there could be 
perpetuation of [this] (Williams, 2014).   
It became clear to the group that FRT could be a powerful marketing tool, but that it 
could also lead to disparate opportunities presented to individuals based on age, gender, 
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race, and ethnicity.  Therefore, the group became even more aware of the importance of 
where FRT was deployed.   
 These presentations represent most of what the group has seen concerning the 
potential for discrimination utilizing FRT.  This also constitutes the majority of the 
presentations made from invited guests.  After these presentations, which ended at the 
July, 24, 2014 meeting, the group felt satisfied with their level of understanding and 
moved into more policy heavy issues, as well as the creation of a code of conduct.   
 These presentations illustrate some key findings found in by the group.  The first 
theme found amongst the presentations is the ease with which FR is conducted.  As 
Acquisti (2014) made clear, “if an economist can do FR then anyone can.”  Brackeen 
(2014) has over 320 companies viewing his company’s website looking to utilize FRT for 
business solutions.  King (2014) noted the ubiquity with which the technology is being 
deployed for security and international use.  FRT is easier to implement, and is improving 
rapidly in terms of speed and accuracy.  As Acquisti (2014) alluded to, increases in 
computing power and various FR applications will increase surveillance, making privacy 
harder to protect.   
 Currently, accuracy remains an issue with the FRT and accuracy rates decrease as 
the population size increases.  While low accuracy rates sound like good news for those 
wishing to protect their privacy this may not be the case with data accretion.  The 
Associated Press (2013) reported that Facebook alone has over one billion active monthly 
users.  The ubiquity of social networking sites, the pictures contained on them, and the 
associated data stored with these profiles presents uncountable opportunities to apply and 
use FRT.  Low accuracy rates could lead to increased use of FRT in order to find 
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individuals or information about them, and increased use could reveal important 
information about an individual’s social group; this is particularly concerning for minors 
whose profiles can provide information about their friends and families and potentially 
lead to geographical tracking.  Regardless, using FRT on minors is a contentious issue for 
stakeholders and technology providers, all of whom understand the increased concerns, 
some even refuse to provide FRT to individuals wishing to apply it to minors.   
 Data accretion and linkage is a major concern for minors not only from social 
networking but also from school obligations.  Students are required to attend school and 
much state funding for schools is the result of student attendance rates (Kravets, 2013).  
Schools are increasingly turning to student IDs to prevent unauthorized access to students 
and to track their whereabouts.  Students have even been suspended for refusing to wear 
ID’s that contain Radio Frequency Identification chips (RFID).  RFID equipped student 
IDs contribute to data accretion because they contain a student’s photo, monitor his or her 
location and movement, and could contain other sensitive information, such as a 
healthcare contacts, healthcare information, and financial services used for school 
lunches or activities.  These developments confirm Chandler’s (2012) observation about 
the obligatory technologies necessary to participate in society.   
 Developments such as these highlight the concerns that Acquisti informed the 
group about such as offline to online linkages and online to offline linkages.  While 
student IDs increase school security and protect students, they are also creating unwanted 
linkages between a student’s real life and their online profiles and activities, causing 
additional safety concerns of their own.  Student IDs are just one example; college 
students and many employees are required to wear similar ID badges which create similar 
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privacy concerns.  With data accretion one must ask whether student IDs and similar 
photo based credentials are creating safer spaces or additional opportunities to exploit 
security and privacy as well as track individuals.   
 Student safety and secure schools are often reasons used to justify student IDs 
with similar reasons used to justify various forms of identification for employees and 
American citizens.  However, another issue, and an underlying theme from the meetings 
and presentations, concerns the profiling of individuals.  Much of the interest in and 
funding for FRT has been for security purposes, but these security interests can lead to 
the profiling and discrimination of individuals.  A problem inherent with many security 
systems and cameras is that they are run by individuals who have their own biases.  It is 
possible that racially biased individuals would choose to follow certain individuals 
around locations or apply the technology in differential ways to discriminate against 
others.  FRT has the ability to amplify an operator’s biases by providing additional 
information about an individual they otherwise would not have, such as credit score, 
political affiliation, sexual orientation, and other sensitive details. 
 The continued and varied uses of IDs for students, workers, and citizens should 
give us pause when we think about the likely increased use of FRT.  These credentials are 
often required, meaning users have less control over their identities and privacy than they 
may have originally thought.  The application of FRT to these credentials provides 
individuals with a feeling of safety and security but there is also the paradox of increased 





8.2. Stages of Facial Recognition 
 There are other facets of the technology that complicate the regulation of FRT 
beyond simply where it is deployed and the variety of individuals that can interact with it.  
This section contains technical aspects of the technology that have been extensively 
discussed by the stakeholders.  The technical definitions presented throughout this section 
can be found in Appendix C.  Appendix C is a consensus document of definitions agreed 
upon by the stakeholder groups; there are also different modalities of FR discussed, but 
please refer to chapter two for detailed discussion on their differences and capabilities.   
 The first task that any FR system must complete is called facial detection.  Facial 
detection was defined by the definitions group as, “A task where the Facial Recognition 
System distinguishes the presence of a human face and/or facial characteristics without 
necessarily creating or deriving a Facial Template.”  Face detection is seen as mostly 
innocuous by the group.  During this process no identifying data is stored or associated 
with a face, and demographic characteristics are not monitored or used.  Face detection is 
mostly used for counting purposes.  For example, retailers may use this modality to 
monitor foot traffic into their establishments.   Retailers may be interested in monitoring 
traffic at their stores or monitoring numbers in facilities to ensure they are not violating 
capacity restrictions.  The technology is capable of counting humans and providing 
simple and innocuous information to customers wishing to deploy FR systems for facial 
detection purposes.  However, FRT is capable of much more than simple facial detection.   
 Another capacity of the technology is age estimation.  Patrick Grother of NIST 
presented to the group at the November 6, 2014 meeting on the age estimation 
capabilities of FRT.  Like humans, the technology is imperfect in this area, “What you 
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get there's a data point and it says that 67% of estimates are within 5 years of correct” 
(Grother, 2014).  This is to be expected as “Some people look genuinely young for their 
age” (Grother, 2014).  The technology becomes less accurate when trying to estimate 
older individuals as Grother explained:   
Somebody can be in the 80's and you don't know if they are in their 90's or 
70's.  This distribution gets wider naturally but never the less the numbers 
are what they are.  Age estimation accuracy gets less as we get older.   
 While imperfect, age estimations by FRT can be expected to improve as the 
technology evolves.  Age estimation by FRT may be used in the future to allow or 
prohibit individuals from entering a bar or other locations that are age restricted.  Age 
estimation was seen as a mostly noncontroversial issue by the group unless its 
deployment was used to discriminate against an individual based on their age.   
 Another use of face detection may be identifying products the individual is 
interested in at a retail store.  Face detection may be coupled with eye tracking 
technology to identify how long a person has looked at a product while also attempting to 
determine the emotions on the face as they engage with the product.  Marketers are 
interested in these capabilities of FRT so that they can more effectively advertise 
products to consumers.  This effective and targeted advertising strategy is developed by 
intruding on the mind’s thought process.  I refer to this intrusion as interference with 
cognitive privacy, or the privacy we take for granted when we choose to conceal or reveal 
our thoughts to others.  This form of FRT is in its infancy but poses a significant threat to 
one of our most trusted conceptions of privacy cognitive privacy or privacy of the mind.   
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 Another popular use of FRT is facial authentication.  Facial authentication was 
defined by the group as: 
A task where the Facial Recognition System attempts to confirm an 
individual’s claimed identity by comparing the template generated from a 
submitted face image with a specific known template generated from a 
previously enrolled face image.  This process is also called one-to-one 
verification. 
Facial authentication is a mostly unobjectionable use of FRT because an individual has 
normally enrolled their image in a database so it can be authenticated.  Facial 
authentication is commonly used for security purposes and gaining access to privileges, 
like access to a database or an area of a building.  Facial authentication has been 
deployed in Canadian casinos to prevent gambling addicts from betting.  One interviewee 
explained how the technology was being deployed in detail (July 29, 2014).     
All the gambling in Ontario are state owned [casinos] but people of course 
lose money and it creates social problems.  This corporation tried to 
promote responsible gaming.  So they created a self-exclusion program.  
So some gamblers that feel they need help ask Ontario Lottery and 
Gaming Corp to put them on the self-exclusionary list.  So OLG would 
take their photograph and name and basically said they wouldn't let them 
enter the facility (Government).    
Previously, casinos had their security guards memorize photos of individuals that had 
self-selected to be excluded from the casino.  As expected, the guards had difficulty 
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remembering all the individuals on the list and some gamblers who relapsed into 
addiction sued the casinos for allowing them into the facility.   
So OLG decided to use FR.  So the photographs of the self-excluded 
people were used to generate templates and create watch list.  Anyone 
who enters the facility his or her facial image is taken and run against the 
database.  If there is a match this person will be approached by security 
guards and they check their ID and if it’s an excluded person they will be 
escorted out (Government).   
Facial authentication can be used for prosocial purposes and is frequently used for 
security purposes.  For these reasons, and because an individual has generally 
volunteered their image, facial authentication uses of FRT faced few objections from the 
group.   
 FRT used to identify an individual faced increased scrutiny from the group.  
Facial identification was defined by the group as “Searching a database for a reference 
matching a submitted Facial Template and returning a corresponding identity.”  Facial 
identification is controversial to the group because it can provide individuals with 
information that they would not otherwise have.  As will be discussed in detail later, an 
individual’s facial template can be linked with a wide variety of sensitive data including 
credit scores, criminal records, and sexual orientation.  Consider, for example, walking 
into a dealership to purchase a vehicle and the dealership has deployed FRT.  The 
dealership may be able to identify an individual based on their face, a feat they could not 
perform previously, and determine that the individual has a poor credit score.  Now, 
instead of the promotional financing rate that they would have previously offered, the 
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dealership has a finance offer with a higher interest rate.  Such instances could occur with 
facial identification.   
 The group has also discussed a hybrid version of facial identification which is 
face recognition without identification.  Recognition could include an individual’s image 
being captured on a security camera at a store and their template is stored; when they 
return to the store, the FR system recognizes that the individual has been in the store 
before but does not have additional information about the individual.  Steve DelBianco of 
NetChoice at the May 20, 2014 meeting expanded on this point.     
You mentioned two levels of definition, one called detection, that's a face, 
and then recognition.  Recognition doesn't necessarily associate that with 
a name [emphasis added].  Recognition could be that face has been in my 
store before.  Without ever associating with a name it just says I've seen 
that face before.  That's one form of recognition that doesn’t associate with 
identification at all. 
Recognition uses of FRT raise concerns about surveilling and monitoring an individual’s 
habits or routine.  This form of recognition is not the one initially thought of by most 
individuals and is probably being addressed so that there are two separate provisions in 
the code of conduct, one most likely providing less protection than the other, a business 
goal.  Recognizing that an individual has been at a certain location could be viewed as 
useful or even as an acceptable form of surveillance.  DelBianco continued the example 
with a useful application of the technology.   
So I walk into the apartment building in Manhattan.  The instant the 
camera sees my face it does a quick detection to see where my face is with 
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this guy at the door.  And then it makes a template.  In truth it compares 
the template with the known templates on the residents of the building and 
if there's a positive match to the threshold define the door will probably 
buzz and they will let them in.  If it doesn't the door won't buzz.  There's 
no requirement or expectation that that template will be enrolled or 
retained or shared in anyway.  
In this example presented to the group, facial recognition enables convenient access to 
the apartment building by tenants.  The use of this technology also increases the security 
of the building by preventing non-residents from gaining access to the building.     
8.3. Facial Recognition Technology Data 
 Through the use of FRT, biometric data are captured.  Biometric data are unique 
biological characteristics that are particular to each individual, in this case the face; other 
examples include fingerprints, the iris, and DNA (Biometrics Institute, 2015).  For further 
discussion on biometric data please refer to chapter two.  One of the initial arguments of 
the group concerns whether or not a face template, the information created from the face 
through FRT, constitutes personally identifiable information (PII).  According to the 
National Institute for Security and Technology (NIST)31,  
PII is ―any information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place 
                                                          
31 NIST is one of the nation's oldest physical science laboratories. Congress established the agency to 
remove a major handicap to U.S. industrial competitiveness at the time—a second-rate measurement 
infrastructure that lagged behind the capabilities of the United Kingdom, Germany, and other economic 
rivals. Today, NIST measurements support the smallest of technologies—nanoscale devices so tiny that 
tens of thousands can fit on the end of a single human hair—to the largest and most complex of human-
made creations, from earthquake-resistant skyscrapers to wide-body jetliners to global communication 
networks (National Institute for Standards and Technology, 2015).   
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of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other 
information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, 
educational, financial, and employment information (McCallister, Grance, 
& Scarfone, 2010, p. ES-1).   
 Despite biometric records being included in the definition of PII, according to 
NIST, there have been disagreements about whether data derived from FRT should be 
considered PII for the purposes of a code of conduct.  From the outset of the first meeting 
(February 6, 2014), FRT data being treated as PII has been discussed:  
…when we map the data that's used by face recognition systems into a 
framework of PII, then we are bringing in the type of protections we are 
elevating… in a way that a high resolution doctored photograph that’s 
frontal is as dangerous being kept online as your social security being 
publicly published online…in the next 5 to 10 years that image is going to 
be harvested [collected from the Internet] (Unknown Academic).   
 Certain participants are concerned about facial photographs being collected from 
the Internet and used for purposes other than their original intention.  The sensitivity of 
the data collected is undisputed amongst the stakeholders, and industry advocates 
understand the liabilities they carry when storing sensitive information.  The issue is 
whether an individual’s face, an inherently public personal feature and one we are not 
normally allowed to hide, should be considered PII.  The other complicating factor with 
the code is that companies must still comply with state, federal, and occasionally 
international law.  Therefore, stakeholders must be careful to not write provisions that 
contradict those laws as Alvaro Bedoya pointed out (December 15, 2014).     
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[I]f the state law covers it; it covers it, and if it doesn't you have to take 
certain action following breach and treat it as PII.  I think here the guiding 
principle should be not looking at what the states have done but looking at 
what companies do.  On biometrics…Apple, Samsung, Facebook, and 
Google protect the heck out of this data.  They certainly treat it as PII and 
as a result…I would say it should be treated as PII for purposes of breach.  
If you have a face template that's been developed using 25, 50, or 100s of 
photos, you can use that template quickly to figure out who that is using 
publicly available information.  So I think we need to protect it as PII 
without any connection to name or anything else.  It inherently connects to 
other things.  So we need to have some kind of breach standard.  I think 
anything less is totally unacceptable.   
Previous presentations by FRT providers helped stakeholders recognize several strong 
protections in industry self-regulation.  Following, but also mandating, some industry 
best practices have been helpful to move certain issues forward.   
 Stakeholders have also been mindful of government precedents that have been set 
with regard to PII.  Walter Hamilton of the IBIA explained to the group on June 3, 2014:   
When a [any] federal agency creates a system of records, they have to 
perform a privacy impact assessment on that system of records, identify 
any PII that's collected and come up with a policy and a set of rules by 
which that data is collected and retained and ultimately disposed of32.  
                                                          
32 The E-Government Act of 2002, Section 208, establishes the requirement for agencies to conduct  
privacy impact assessments (PIAs) for electronic information systems and collections (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2007, p.2).   
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That does not apply to commercial entities.  What it does is to show that 
what is PII, and by the way, I think a photograph is PII, a photograph is 
not a biometric.  A derived template from a photograph or fingerprint is a 
biometric and meets the definition of that term.   
In 2010 the Internet Policy Task force, an entity under the Department of Commerce, 
endorsed the use of Privacy Impact Assessments (Wolf, 2015, p. 211). A plethora of 
governmental agencies support the consideration of biometric data to be included as PII 
as Bedoya explained at the June 24, 2014 meeting.   
The government has repeatedly recognized it as PII.  The NIST and 
Commerce among others, Department of State, Homeland Security, OMB 
[Office of Management and Budget], all categorically recognize 
biometrics as PII.  Also, I had that the companies handling the data, and 
certainly in Senator Franken’s33 view, have afforded it the highest 
protection possible and have gone out of their way to protect that data.  I 
would argue even more so than they protect things like address [and] date 
of birth. 
While consumers have a reasonable expectation of strong data security, there are 
important First Amendment implications in the balance.  Photography is a First 
Amendment right that could pose a challenge to those who may want to use FRT.  One 
participant was quick to note the copyright protections afforded to photos: “From a 
copyright perspective it's clear.  I snapped a picture of you, it’s my picture.  I own the 
copyright, done.  [Its] settled law, absent some contractual agreement, you have no say 
                                                          
33 Sitting Senator for Minnesota.   
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over the matter” (Government).  The complications between the First Amendment and 
copyright law are discussed further in chapter five.  As Szabo pointed out in the June 24, 
2014 meeting photography also has positive uses:       
So the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] for example, encourages 
public photography but they are trying to strike a balance between public 
photography versus what happens to those photos once you start using 
them.  You hear a lot of horror stories about this being used to identify 
people at a marijuana rally.  But then you can flip it around and say well 
there's a strike going on and there are some guys going down there to 
crack skulls, will the ACLU use FR to identify those people and for whom 
they work.  You can make a more transparent notice of companies doing 
bad things. 
This example illustrates the threats and protections that FR can provide to First 
Amendment protected activities including political support and opposition.   
 Since FRT can be used retroactively on photos there is a legitimate question about 
the scope of a code of conduct.  One participant observed, “If we're talking about a jpeg34 
might later be used and put in a database, then we are writing a code for all photography, 
aren't we?” (Business).  The code of conduct cannot limit one’s First Amendment rights, 
and there is a clear distinction between photography and biometric data in that a 
photograph is not biometric data.   
 While a photograph is not considered biometric data, stakeholders began to 
wonder if the integers (whole numbers including 0) created as a result of applying FRT to 
                                                          
34 A computer file format for the compression and storage of usually high-quality photographic digital 
images (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2015).   
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a photo should be considered PII.  Predictably the business community resisted the 
integers being classified as PII as DelBianco stated in the February 25, 2014 meeting.   
The number that Mark generates from his algorithm is absolutely not PII.  
It’s a vector of integers that his algorithm generated for that photo… Mr. 
Atick said that unless you have it married with meta-data,…or married 
with data that identifies a person, it is in and of itself not PII.   
Stakeholders continue to struggle with which data inputs and outputs of FRT constitute 
PII. 
 As the previously mentioned big data report suggested, citizens and stakeholders 
should concern themselves with the use of data and not the collection of data.  This 
conclusion is naïve in an age of NSA and IRS scandal.  Citizens should be concerned 
about the collection of data because conclusions are reached from the processing of data 
and data cannot be processed unless it is collected.  Consumers should be mindful about 
the content they post online, especially their image.  As discussed previously it remains 
unclear if the integers created from an image being processed by FRT can be protected by 
copyright.  Furthermore, the EULAs of Facebook and other prominent social networking 
platforms make clear that images and content posted by consumers can and will be 
utilized by these companies for their own monetary gain.  Chandler (2007) noted the 
importance of courts assigning property rights in regulating technologies.  Images or face 
templates created via application of FRT, if assigned property rights to the individual, 
could have important regulatory consequences for FRT providers.   
 Two primary views are represented in this discussion of PII and the integers 
created as a result of FRT.  Business has a vested interest in keeping the status quo to 
 
196 
continue profiting from their consumer’s content.  Therefore, they are advocating for 
photos, and the integers created from photos via FRT, to not be protected under PII.  
NGOs, on the other hand, are advocating for the opposite: consumers should have 
property rights over their images and the integers, thus should be protected as PII.  Under 
the business paradigm, it remains unclear what property rights consumers will have over 
their images and the potential to access property and privileges based on their image.  
However, following the NGO paradigm could potentially limit photography rights as 
currently conceived under the First Amendment.  Also under the NGO paradigm, current 
business practices would have to be restructured as consumers would have a property 
right over their images and integers; it remains unclear how social networks and other 
businesses could monetize user content.  The decisions made here could set important 
legal precedent for establishing a consumer’s property right over their image, and, by 
extension, their identity.  Although laws exist to protect an individual’s name and 
likeness, this precedent would extend to commercial uses; in time, private use may also 
have equally important ramifications.   
8.3.1. Reverse Engineering Data 
 Most companies using FRT have their own or have licensed a specific algorithm 
to conduct FR.  Each algorithm processes the facial vectors differently, focusing on 
unique parts of the face that will allow the most accurate identification.  Algorithms that 
are highly accurate create a competitive advantage for a company.  Most algorithms are 
unique, unless a vendor has licensed their algorithm to multiple companies.  The question 
the group maintained was: what could be done with the integers created.  Could another 
company recreate the original photograph used by the FR software?  This topic was one 
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of contention for the group.  Some stakeholders felt that the image could absolutely not 
be reverse engineered.  Marc Vaillant explained this difficulty at the February 25, 2014 
meeting.     
What we do is extract from the image discriminating information and so it 
takes the image down to about 200 to 1000 numbers…and so that's a 
tremendous compression, you can think about the 6+ megapixel picture 
that it came from and now we are talking about 200-1000 numbers.  And 
the other important point about this is that it is opaque.  In other words, 
you can't go in the other direction, you can imagine because of this 
tremendous compression.  Also, it’s unknown how the data was generated.  
That’s sort of the secret sauce of the algorithm and so it’s only known to 
the algorithm…our biometric template is not the same biometric template 
that is used by Cognitec or NEC or NL1.   
According to this view, the data cannot be reverse engineered into the original photo or 
be utilized by a separate company’s algorithm.  Other stakeholders maintained that the 
data could be reverse engineered.  The implications of the argument involve data 
brokers35 selling the created information and placing individuals back into the original 
photograph which can contain more potentially sensitive information.  Vaillant went on 
to explain: 
                                                          
35 “[Data brokers] are collecting, analyzing and packaging some of our most sensitive personal information 
and selling it as a commodity...to each other, to advertisers, even the government, often without our direct 
knowledge.  ….[Compared to government snooping] a much greater and more immediate threat to your 
privacy is coming from thousands of companies [data brokers] you've probably never heard of, in the name 
of commerce”  (Kroft, 2014, par. 1).   
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[E]ven if you are not given information about the algorithm that generated 
the biometric template, you could work very hard to reverse engineer, the 
biometric template and… depending on how the biometric template was 
generated, and it’s certainly not the case for all biometric templates, and it 
depends on what the vendor did to generate that biometric template, you 
could infer information from that biometric template.   
Despite some technical limitations that may currently be present, small concessions were 
made by the business community at the February 25, 2014 meeting that found reverse 
engineering the data was possible, although admittedly very difficult.  However, some 
stakeholders took a strong position about the ability for the data to be reverse engineered.  
In an interview occurring July 29, 2014 it was explained that:   
Secondly, that the image cannot be reconstructed from the template, 
especially the template algorithm that is proprietary, that is also not true 
and we showed that.  Finally, there was a claim that two templates created 
from the same person by different algorithms cannot be linked together, in 
fact they can be linked together.  So we tried to address and debunk that 
mess and published a note and it's published on the NTIA website36.   
 Stakeholders felt that the best course of action was to proceed as if the data could 
be reconstructed as technological advances would likely make this process more accurate 
and easy to accomplish.  Some stakeholders dissented from this position, as explained in 
a September 5, 2014 interview:   
                                                          
36 The paper can be found here:   
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uniqueness_of_faceena_recognition_templates_-
_ipc_march-2014.pdf  (Chibba & Stoianov, 2014). 
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That's the Ontario Privacy commissioner and she is way off base.  I think 
they are taking an absolutist approach that everything can be re-identified 
and that's an ideological view rather than something that's borne out by the 
evidence, including a researcher from Ottawa in a day long debate on de-
identification in D.C. a couple of years ago.  We couldn’t do that. 
Proceeding as if the data could not be reverse engineered would have potential resale 
benefits for industry advocates, while the opposite approach benefits privacy advocates.  
In the end, it was conceded that the data could be reverse engineered.  Since stakeholders 
agreed that the data could be reverse engineered, the code will likely be worded with this 
agreement in mind.  Proceeding as if the data could not be reverse engineered would 
create a privacy blind spot where images could be reconstructed, companies would be 
further incentivized to sell data, and consumers would be given the false impression that 
their data was safe.  Contrarily, proceeding as if the data can be reconstructed to an image 
acknowledges the technological advances that are likely to occur, provides consumers 
with a realistic set of expectations about how their data can be used, and acknowledges 
the plethora of other potentially sensitive details that can be included in an image.  The 
stakeholders’ consensus on reverse engineered facial data provides consumers with an 
enhanced level of privacy protection.   
8.3.2. Data Security 
 Stakeholders were charged with assigning strong protection to the data given the 
sensitivity of biometric data and the fact that it can be reverse engineered.  Two primary 
areas of concern for stakeholders included when the data was in transit and when it was at 
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rest or in storage.  It was determined that encryption would act as the primary protection 
for biometric data. 
 Stakeholders formed strong consensus on the need for robust security protections 
for FRT data.  Encryption was determined to be an important component of the security 
regime.  Stakeholders, however, were unable to initially agree as to what constituted 
encryption.  Some stakeholders felt that the creation of a template constituted encryption 
because of the uniqueness of the algorithm used and the data it generated.  This assertion 
was contested at the meetings “What is the intended significance or take away from 
declaring or asserting that FR scans are a form of encryption?” (Government).  If the face 
template created was to be considered encryption it would eliminate a major technical 
requirement for companies that wanted to sign onto a voluntary code of conduct.  Not all 
stakeholders were receptive to that idea, nor did they think the creation of a face template 
constituted encryption.  “A faceprint is not an encryption of an image.  It isn't.  It's an 
abstraction of an image.  Can you take the abstraction that is [a] faceprint and get back to 
the original image?  No.  But it's not an encryption” (Business).  Stakeholders were also 
cognizant that, though a unique template did not constitute encryption, there was some 
utility to storing templates without identifying data as Walter Hamilton of the IBIA 
explained in the June 3, 2014 meeting.   
I do support the notion that a biometric algorithm that generates a template 
is not encryption.  That to say, it would be encryption would be security 
by obscurity and I don't think that's valid.  While it's less than useable in 
most forms if you don't know who the vendor was and their proprietary 
algorithm, you would have to have some knowledge about that.  It is not in 
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the form of a secret key as is defined generally from the term data 
encryption.   
Facial templates do not constitute encryption in and of themselves.  However, omitted 
information about the algorithm used on a template, makes it difficult to interpret the 
data, which is security by obscurity.  Eventually, the definitions drafting committee did 
some research and prepared a draft of what they considered encryption.  The group 
defined encryption as “The protection of data using reasonable means that have been 
generally accepted by experts in the field of information security, which renders such 
data unintelligible or unreadable.”  Stated another way: 
Encryption is a method of converting an original message of regular text 
into encoded text. The text is encrypted by means of an algorithm (type of 
formula). If information is encrypted, there would be a low probability 
that anyone other than the receiving party who has the key to the code or 
access to another confidential process would be able to decrypt (translate) 
the text and convert it into plain, comprehensible text (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Service, 2015).   
After stakeholders agreed that the creation of a face template did not constitute 
encryption, they still had to decipher what standard of encryption would be appropriate.  
A common format for encryption is 128 bit encryption.  A bit is an integer of either “1” 
or “0.”  Depending upon the encryption method there may be one key to unlock the series 
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of integers or multiple keys to encode and decode the information.37  As the bits of 
encryption increase, so does the security of the information.   
 Despite the desire of the group to strongly protect the data, there was 
disagreement about how to best address the standard of encryption required.  
Stakeholders are aware of the developing nature of FRT and encryption.  The problem 
the group needed to address was how to define 1) an appropriate level of data security via 
encryption and 2) how that standard would last given the evolution of technology.  Two 
separate proposals were offered in regard to the evolution of encryption standards.  Some 
stakeholders, notably Carl Szabo, preferred vague language to allow flexibility for the 
standard in the future:  
We looked at the security procedure for banking which should [by] all 
accounts have the highest degree of security.  Basically we say: Parties to 
this code should use commercially reasonable measures to secure facial 
template information.  Once again, the commercially reasonable, allows 
flexibility for evolution yet it requires businesses and parties to the code to 
maintain a certain degree of protection.   
This view puts the code of conduct more in line with industry self-regulation for 
“commercially reasonable” security practices.  Businesses certainly have an interest in 
maintaining the security of their information, otherwise consumers may choose their 
                                                          
37 If the key is 128 bits long, attempting to crack the code without the key would be 4.7 sextillion 
(4,700,000,000,000,000,000,000) times more difficult than cracking a 56-bit key (which itself has 72 
quadrillion possible combinations)! Given the current power of computers, experts consider that a 56-bit 
key could be cracked by using the brute-force method in 10 million hours of computer time (14,000 
computers used around the clock for 4 months)” (Kang, 2000).   
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competitors.  However, given the recent security breaches at Target, Home Depot, and 
Apple, one must question the efficacy of the commercially reasonable standard.   
 The second proposal for the evolving nature of data protection in the code was 
tied to a governmental standard, “What I detail is FIPPS validated cryptographic method 
that has been confirmed as a base security and cryptographic measure by NIST” (NGO).  
This alternative proposal was justified on the following grounds by Michelle De Mooy 
from Consumer Action at the December 15, 2014 meeting:  
I think it’s perfectly reasonable to expect a decent NIST approved level of 
security for such sensitive information as FR.  I think the other just sort of 
legal aspect of this language is it puts it basically into FTC jurisdiction.  
They have sort of exercised that recently with Wyndham and LabMD38.  
But the important point is that it would be in their jurisdiction but it is not 
prescribed by them.  It’s taken to a more generally accepted level by NIST 
and that's important, because we don't want it to be something that can be 
invalidated by a court, we want it to stand the test of time (NGO). 
It is important to note that the second method did not try to be overly prescriptive but did 
want to tie it to a specific standard.  NGOs felt the code language needed the standard for 
rigor, “So where we are coming from with option B is not a prescriptive, though it may 
seem detailed, that's not the same thing as being prescriptive” (NGO).  That standard was 
clarified to the group by the moderator, Verdi, who stated: 
                                                          
38 Companies that have challenged the FTC’s rulings against them for suffering data breaches (Privacy 
Association, 2013).   
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To give a little background without speaking for NIST, FIPS 140-239 that 
standard is not a standard that is baked and set in concrete.  That's 
something that has been around for a decade or better and gets updated 
and visited periodically. 
The debate continued during the December 15, 2014 meeting and is best summarized in 
the following exchange between stakeholders.  The business community would prefer the 
Uniform Commercial Code because it allows for the greatest flexibility while the NGO 
community would like to see the security standard tied to something concrete that 
provides strict assurance of protection.  Both groups want something that can evolve over 
time so as to not have to renegotiate periodically.  Szabo advocated for the Uniform 
Commercial Code stating:   
At the end of the last meeting we had this exact discussion and that's why I 
went with commercially reasonable.  For example, the NIST standard says 
a minimum of 120 bits of security.  Well if suddenly tomorrow 
commercially reasonable jumps to 256 that would actually engender a 
more strict and higher degree of security than the one we are attempting to 
prescribe here.  So the UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] is not something 
that should be dismissed off hand.   
Szabo goes on to note that the UCC is used by the banking industry which has strict data 
security protocols because of the sensitive information they handle and store.  He further 
                                                          
39 FIPS 140-2 was created after FIPS 140-1 entered a five year review period with a three month request for 
comments period.  The standard was finalized in December of 2000.  FIPS 140-2 dictates security 
standards in each of four security levels it outlines, allows for flexibility in choosing security features, 
ensures cryptographic modules contain proper security features, and assures that modules are in compliance 
with cryptography requirements (Snouffer, Lee, & Oldehoeft, 2001, p. 2).   
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notes that this standard has evolved over a period of over fifteen years, so it is reasonable 
to expect that it could continue to evolve.  However, the NGO community still felt that 
specific assurances were necessary for robust consumer protection. De Mooy of 
Consumer Action countered:  
That is in fact totally erroneous.  I'm going to look at something that NIST 
says.  120 bits affords a wide latitude for companies to choose between a 
whole bunch of cryptographic protections and methods.  It's not a hugely 
high standard in terms of it being difficult in terms of companies finding a 
way to do that.  The other thing, the security strength according to NIST is 
to last up [until] 2030 or 2031 according to NIST. 
The De Mooy, backed by most of the NGO participants, tried to provide businesses the 
flexibility they need while also holding them accountable to tangible standard.  This point 
was further argued against by the business community.  Szabo argued: 
So the point I was making was that commercially reasonable is not 
dependent on some national board determining what is or is not 
commercially reasonable.  It's whatever it basically becomes.  [This seems 
to evolve according to the needs of business with little oversight]  While 
NIST may have 128 bits today but the commercially reasonable standard 
may be something else much higher potentially.  [But not guaranteed]. 
The point of contention between the two proposals was finding a method of data 
protection that was flexible enough for a variety of different businesses to implement and 
explicit enough to ensure that companies were protecting FR data in a responsible 
manner.  As noted previously, the variety of companies that might sign onto the code of 
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conduct proved problematic.  As can be seen in the following exchange occurring during 
the same meeting Emily from Facebook said: 
I just want to comment in favor of option A [Commercially reasonable 
standard].  I think when we are looking at a lot of companies like 
Facebook, Google, and others that are multinational.  We have obligations 
in other jurisdictions and by saying a U.S. based standard, even if it does 
evolve, it could prove problematic if there might be different standards.  
[The UCC is also a U.S. standard].   
Having flexibility in implementing appropriate data security was an important issue for 
many stakeholders.  To allow for the international nature of some companies, the 
following proposal was put forward by Hamilton of the IBIA to secure FR data: 
Following up to Emily’s [Facebook] comment.  There is an international 
equivalent to FIPS 140-2.  Which I believe is ISOIEC-19790.  It defines 
security levels for cryptographic modules.  Its lowest level to the highest 
level depending on what you are protecting.  Administrative data, funds 
transfer, PII, or sensitive information used by governments in a variety of 
application environments.  That might be a better choice if we want to 
have a broad worldwide aspect to the code.   
It appeared that the international standard might by a compromise that both groups could 
agree to.  For the NGO community, they would have a tangible standard that provides 
specified security standards.  The business community would have a standard that applies 
internationally allowing multinational companies to continue to conduct business where 
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they please.  Hamilton, of the IBIA, also noted a problem with the NIST standard in that 
it may unintentionally pass testing costs onto commercial entities.   
NIST performs module validation on hardware or software modules for 
FIPS 140 compliance.  There is a substantial cost to the developer of those 
software or hardware modules in order to achieve a certification from 
NIST that their module has been judged to be compliant with the specifics 
of whatever level of the standard they are applying for….many of those 
modules hardware or software, have a cost to the implementer to integrate 
or incorporate them into a final system design.  This code could 
unintentionally require a subscriber to the code to actually go out and 
make a commercial purchase…which might carry a cost aspect to it that 
we might not want to impose on subscribers. 
The NGO community then became concerned with how much of a burden they might 
impose on commercial entities if they did in fact stick with their original NIST standard 
proposal.  NGO stakeholders were aware that imposing heavy costs on commercial 
retailers would limit the adoption of the code of conduct.  The group again looked to 
Hamilton of the IBIA to provide guidance on the potential costs.   
I don't think you’re talking major costs but it could be a component of like 
a mobile telephone for example that has cryptographic security features in 
it.  The developer of the phone may have purchased from a third party a 
crypto module that has been certified and approved by NIST 140-240 and 
that module may cost .... I don’t know it could cost any amount of money.  
                                                          
40 FIPS 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html  (McCallister, Grance, & Scarfone, 2010, p. 4-7).   
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It’s hard to say.  The cost to actually go through the process for the 
developer of that thing could be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Setting forth an option that could cost companies thousands of dollars to implement was 
not deemed as feasible by the group.  The group is currently in the midst of striking a 
compromise between the proposals.   
I was going to offer a compromise option.  I was going to say, Carl's point 
that commercially reasonable may be more rigorous than NIST.  At the 
same time, clients would like to have some sort of safe harbor.  Could we 
take option A and add to it at a minimum “Parties should comply with 
FIPPS 140-2 as modified from time to time” (Business).   
Ultimately, Verdi offered the resources of the NTIA to determine the way in which NIST, 
ISO, and commercially reasonable standards overlapped.   
8.3.3. Data Access 
 Broad consensus was reached by the stakeholders regarding the need for strong 
data security in the form of encryption, but data encryption is just one aspect of data 
security.  Another concern that needed to be addressed by the group was how the data 
would be stored and who would have access to it.  These issues have been tangentially 
and less explicitly discussed by the group than the encryption issue.   
 Storage of de-identified data versus identified data41 became the next contentious 
and problematic issue for the group as there is no uniform definition of PII nor is there a 
standard for what constitutes de-identified data (Wolf, 2015, p. 207). Facial recognition 
                                                          
41 De-identified data is data that has the identity of an individual or individual identifiers removed from it.  
Identified data is data about an individual where their identity, such as name or social security number, is 
still attached.   
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works when applied to photos, but photos are not considered biometric data and are not 
protected as PII.  However, without photos, FR cannot be conducted, so they are 
important, yet unprotected, PII pieces of data that stakeholders could legitimately argue 
for less protection in storage.  Storage of an image is also a very important starting point 
in the process of FR.  Storage of an image may constitute enrollment into a FR system, 
because it’s the image that comparisons are made from.  Does this then mean that all 
images recorded on surveillance systems constitute enrollment into an FR system?  The 
definitions group defined enrollment into a FR system as, “The process of storing and 
maintaining Facial Recognition Data.”   The question of enrollment was addressed in the 
June 3, 2014 meeting by Bill Long of Business Performance Research Associates where 
the difference between an image and a template were discussed:   
Walter and I tried to distinguish in our definitions group between an image 
and a template.  An image is a picture, anybody can take anywhere with 
any device, hidden or open as the cameras in this room are.  That's just an 
image.  That's not biometric data.  That’s an image.  It’s not a template.  
Anyone who wants to can create a template and store it in a database; then 
we are talking about stuff in this room [enrollment].  But just the image 
and storing it for 10 years, that's not part of the discussion (Business).   
As discussed earlier in chapter five, photography is a First Amendment protected activity 
when completed in the right circumstances.  The people who take photos may also have a 
copyright interest in them.  These competing legal interests have yet to be clarified by the 
courts in regards to FRT.  Photos and the images in them are not biometric data and are 
not considered PII.  An image processed by FRT and used to create a template of an 
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individual constitutes biometric information and is considered PII.  The definitions 
committee defined a facial template as, “A digital representation of distinct 
characteristics of a Subject’s face, representing information extracted from a photograph 
using a facial recognition algorithm.”   
 With the group defining differences between photos and face templates, specific 
conversations could be had about the storage of templates, which are now defined as 
biometric data.  Walter Hamilton of the International Biometrics and Identification 
Association shared the following best practices of biometric data companies with the 
group at the November 6, 2014 meeting:   
We also support the concept, to the extent practical, depending on the 
application, disassociating biometric data from other personally 
identifiable information; to provide another level of abstraction, if you 
will, to minimize the effects of data breach.  We also support the notion of 
having databases with restricted access, meaning that there should be 
some form of strong authentication to the users and administrators of that 
data such that the data is protected by a means other than simple username 
and password if possible.   
Several important points are made in this comment.  In addition to having the data 
encrypted while in storage, face templates should be stored in a separate database without 
identifying metadata.  The implications of this are clear, potential hackers would need to 
not only break into the database where the face templates are stored, but also break into a 
separate database to gather the identifying metadata to associate with the template.  A 
facial template without its identifying information is not terribly useful.  Consider this 
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illustrative example: as humans, we leave fingerprints on all types of surfaces every day 
and pay little consideration to it because our names and other relevant information are not 
accompanying them.  Walter also thought these databases should have limited access, not 
everyone at the company should be able to view the information, protected by strong 
authorization methods.  Walter specifically identified a username and password as being 
a weak form of authentication.  He goes on to explain some components of strong 
authentication during the same meeting: 
I would like to include in that some form of strong authentication rather 
than simple user name and password.  That doesn't mean passwords can't 
be used but strong passwords at a minimum but preferably two factor 
authentication for access to sensitive data whether PII or biometric 
information should be limited.  I don't want to suggest a requirement for 
biometric authentication for logical access control, that would be a form of 
strong authentication but a token or a pin plus token there’s a number of 
different approaches to that…we just need to make sure that access to the 
data is restricted only to individuals that have an appropriate access 
privilege.   
The group in drafting language has been careful to describe robust practices that it deems 
to be acceptable without being so granular that businesses lack the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate their particular needs.  With regard to appropriate access to data, the group 
is also considering an auditing mechanism to ensure adherence to access requirements.  
Existing industry practices were also presented by Alvaro Bedoya, of Senator Al 
Franken’s office, at the same meeting to inform the group on secure storage methods: 
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On security I do want to point out that the big players in the space have 
very robust security practices.  It's not just secure storage, it's also 
encryption according to Facebook, Apple, and Samsung.  Facebook said in 
a letter to Congress42 that all of their facial templates are encrypted and 
stored in a monitored and access restricted database.  Apple has said with 
respect to touch ID that the data is encrypted and securely stored in a 
secure enclave.  Samsung with their fingerprint scanner, it confirmed to 
me that it's encrypted and they say also in this letter that the fingerprint 
data is stored in a secure part of the smartphone.  For security it's not just 
encryption but also secure storage.   
This was the first time that the notion of a monitored database was introduced to the 
group.  This monitored database seems similar to the group’s auditing mechanism idea.  
There was no indication if the database referenced was monitored in real time or if there 
was an audit system in place.   
 The location or accessibility of a storage vessel was also a topic of concern for the 
group.  Data may be stored on servers that have no connection to the Internet; companies 
may also store information in the “cloud” to utilize cheaper storage spaces.  NIST defined 
cloud computing as: 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that 
                                                          
42 Facebook announced the encryption standards after receiving scrutiny from privacy advocates and 
members of Congress when it was discovered that user identifying information was sent to third parties, the 
response came in October of 2010 (Bentley, 2010).   
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can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction (Brown, 2011, par. 2).     
Concerns about offline and online storage are centered on issues of a data breach.  Verdi 
attempted to clarify the issue for the group stating at the November 6, 2014 meeting:   
The cloud issue wasn't really raised but I think some of the examples that 
were given were…think about a digital sign that performs full blown FR 
trying to identify folks or trying to authenticate folks, but does not have a 
network connection it stores the data locally.  At some time is updated 
either over a network or physically.  So then you have questions about 
transmittal and you have FR biometrics that are transmitted back and forth 
whether that’s pursuant to sharing or a function of the system, that's an 
open question.  Then you have a question which is a system that does 
both, both stores biometric data locally and is sort of having a constant or 
periodic transmittal relationship in which biometric information is 
exchanged and it is talking or calling back to a home server for updates or 
to perform other functions.   
Issues of cloud storage raise questions of data transmission.  It was determined by the 
group that data storage and data transmission both deserved robust encryption protection.  
Hamilton of the IBIA at the same meeting noted that data would be unprotected for a 
brief time:  
The NIST standards previously referenced apply to both data at rest and in 
transit.  When data is in transmission it needs to be over a secure channel 
or protected in some way for some cryptographic means.  However, when 
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the matching function occurs, the data necessarily will be decrypted both 
the match candidate and the target enrollment record for that match to take 
place.  So there is an instant of time if you will where the data is in the 
clear.  I don't know that that represents a significant or even measureable 
business or social risk to these discussions.  Personally, I think we should 
be satisfied by having a broad agreement [consensus] on the data 
protection in transit and in rest using accepted cryptographic means.   
 As has been discussed, none of the outcomes from the NTIA MSH process 
happen in a vacuum; many states have data breach laws that the code must comply with 
in order for companies to be able to implement it.  Stakeholders have acknowledged that 
they cannot re-write laws; thus creating standards that follow existing legal requirements 
is a productive way to proceed.  Hamilton was reluctant to redefine PII stating at the 
same November meeting:   
I think there are already some statutes on that breach of PII and if the 
definition of PII includes biometrics it would apply there as well.  So I 
don't know that this code should attempt to redefine or visit those existing 
statutes…  
The NGO community agreed and consensus started to form around the futility of trying 
to redefine PII, Michelle De Mooy stated, “I agree. I think the states have handled data 
breach notification very well in that realm.”  In concert with those comments Bill Long, 
victim of a recent data breach, spoke up about the notice that commercial entities 
provided to him. 
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Having recently been the victim of a data breach called Home Depot, the 
rules and regulations about how to notify victims and enable large well 
represented companies to not disclose very much.  Home Depot never got 
in touch with me individually.  [I]f we are going to deal with breaches, 
maybe we have done enough to require users of this technology to have 
more secure authentication of users but hacking happens.  When hacking 
happens, is it ok to rely on the state of Maryland or Virginia or Utah to 
ensure that if it's a Home Depot or a Target or a whoever shopping mall, 
I'm not sure we can write language that will do any better. 
Clear consensus could not be reached on data breach notification during the November 6, 
2014 meeting.  Groups came back to the table at the December 15, 2014 meeting with 
two ways to proceed regarding data breach policy, addressing the issue or leaving it to 
existing laws.  Issues of templates and PII once again cropped up in an exchange between 
stakeholders during the December 15, 2014 meeting.  Szabo explained to the group: 
There are two approaches here.  First is option A.  Which is that we should 
not necessarily address data breach notification as there are already 47 
different state laws that cover unauthorized acquisition of PII and 
regardless whether an entity adopts the guidelines or not these state laws 
apply.  Finally when the federal government passes a national data breach 
standard, if ever, this section can create confusing or conflicting 
obligations for parties to the guidelines.   
The business community must comply with state laws and the majority of states already 
drafted laws for data breaches.  Szabo felt that creating additional standards would create 
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conflicts for businesses attempting to comply with the code of conduct if the standards 
were different from the state laws that the businesses already have to comply with.  It is 
not unusual for business to avoid regulation (Kolk et al., 1999); however, it also seems 
unlikely that Congress will act to create the legislation referenced.  An interesting appeal 
to the possible passage of a federal data breach law was used to argue for reduced 
regulation.  As De Mooy argued during the same meeting, most existing state laws did 
not address biometric data in their data breach laws.   
So for 47 state laws but only about 10 of them cover biometric data.  So 
what we did was combine language that we thought would be 
straightforward and that's from the state of Wisconsin and it’s what we 
think is fair for now, definition of biometric data.   
Szabo countered noting, “There are only 4 states in the country that even mention 
biometric in data breach law, none of which consider biometric anything that's facial 
fingerprints, and iris as a form of PII.”  The argument between the two participants 
centers on what should be considered PII.  As discussed previously, PII lacks a consistent 
definition as, states define PII differently.  For the purposes of data breach, group tried to 
determine if un-identified biometric data should be considered PII or if only biometric 
data with identifying information attached to it should be considered PII.  Szabo 
continued during the December 15, 2014 meeting noting:   
In Wisconsin in order for it to be PII must be biometric data which is 
combined with last name and a first initial.  So that is the definition of 
what is PII in the state of Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, and North Carolina.  
I think that further hits home the idea that we have all been talking about a 
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lot today and over the past couple of months of whether a face alone 
constitutes PII.  If we're going to rely on the state laws then the answer is 
no.  So if we want to change option B to be in parody with the Wisconsin 
statute which would have biometric data including fingerprint, voice print, 
retina or iris image, we must include at the preface last name plus first 
initial or first full name would be my suggestion. 
NGO participants similarly made appeals for code provisions by looking to the future and 
noting the likelihood of increased accuracy and additional capabilities of FRT to argue 
for increased protections.  NGO participants are particularly concerned with the 
sensitivity of biometric data collected by FRT, whether attached to a name or not; as 
Acquisti had previously shown, it is likely that un-identified data can be identified with 
relative ease.  The NGO community strongly supported this assertion at the same 
December 15, 2014 meeting: 
Bedoya- Look, I think the idea that a faceprint is not PII is outside of the 
mainstream.  I'm happy to be corrected on that.  I think the reason we are 
all spending countless hours on this is because it is so extraordinarily 
sensitive.   
De Mooy- I think it would be really disingenuous of the process not to 
address this.  I think in fact it would be a huge opening for criticism of the 
entire code to not address biometrics in this section and to sort of blankly 
discuss state laws which we are very aware of the fact that they don't 
cover biometrics.  I think that would be not working with integrity in this 
process and we would strongly object to that. 
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NGOs continued to argue for strong protection in the code for data breach provisions, 
suggesting the entire process would be criticized if they were not included.  Business 
participants felt that if the code was to address data breach of PII then it should include 
the entire language in state law that protects PII rather than using partial language from 
the laws.  It was noted that using partial language could create conflicts for businesses 
needing to comply with both state law and the provisions in a code of conduct as stated 
by Szabo during the same meeting.   
I’m not arguing that we would be disingenuous or operate without 
integrity.  I'm just suggesting that if we are going to take part of the state 
law that we take all of it.  …[W]e say look: if you are a business you must 
follow the state laws because you already have to today. 
Stakeholders then discussed the evolving nature of state and federal data breach laws.  
The data breach discussion involved a comparison between state law and best business 
practices.  The purpose was for the code to cover any gaps in state law as noted by 
Bedoya in the same meeting: 
I just want to say that, there has to be some kind of breach protection for 
this.  A modified option B is if the state law covers it covers it and if it 
doesn't you have to take certain action following breach and treat it as PII.   
A new appeal was made to the group supporting the inclusion of a provision that 
addresses a data breach of PII.  Instead of looking to existing state laws, it was suggested 
that the code should follow existing best practices set by the business community 
interestingly this was suggested by Bedoya, an NGO stakeholder, in the December 15, 
2014 meeting:   
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I think here the guiding principle should be not looking at what the states 
have done but looking at what companies do.  I'll just… that Apple, 
Samsung, Facebook, and Google protect the heck out of this data.  They 
certainly treat it as PII and as a result of that I would say it should be 
treated as PII for purposes of breach.  If you have a face template that's 
been developed using 25, 50, or 100s of photos, you can use that template 
quickly to figure out who that is using publicly available information.  So I 
think we need to protect it as PII without any connection to name or 
anything else.  It inherently connects to other things.  So we need to have 
some kind of breach standard.  I think anything less is totally 
unacceptable. 
Business participants continued to push back on a provision in the code of conduct 
addressing the data breach of PII, arguing that such provisions would open up those 
companies who complied with the code to greater legal liability.  It was also noted that 
additional complexity to the code could create an unworkable document similar to the 
one created in the MATP, which led to limited adoption by the business community.  
Stakeholders continued to negotiate a fine line between providing robust consumer 
protections while leaving enough discretion for companies to actually implement the 
potential code of conduct.  The paradox of this negotiation is that adding consumer 
privacy protection opens businesses up to increased liability.  Ultimately, it was 
determined that there was an important missing stakeholder, CDT, and the discussion was 
tabled to the next meeting; currently, as of this writing, that meeting has not transpired.   
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8.3.4. Data Retention 
 Data retention was an important topic addressed in conjunction with data storage, 
primarily how long and why businesses store sensitive consumer data which was 
determined to fall within the scope of the code of conduct.  The data retention issue was 
broached as the group tried to decide what would happen to the consumer’s data if the 
consumer withdrew from a service.  Other entities already defined best practices 
regarding data retention, which were then presented to the group by Bedoya at the 
November 6, 2014 meeting:   
On retention, FCC and CDT have both issued best practices on retention.  
FTC said that companies should implement a specified retention period 
and dispose of stored images once they are no longer necessary for the 
purpose for which they were collected.  If a customer deletes his or her 
account on the website the stored images are no longer necessary and 
should be disposed of even if the stated retention period has not passed.  
CDT echoed this, they said when a company does retain consumer 
information, the retention should last no longer than the purpose for which 
it was collected.   
Providing consumers with choice about what happens to their data subsequent to a 
withdrawal request was important to several participants, thus data retention was a best 
practice identified in the FTC workshop preceding this process.  Amanda Koulousias of 
the FTC presented this to the group in the March 25, 2014 meeting: 
And then the third recommendation for privacy by design was limited data 
retention.  So for example in the scenario that we laid out the company 
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was not storing the images which we think is a best practice in this 
instance because they don't need to store the images for their purpose.  
And we would recommend that just generally, companies limit their data 
retention to what is necessary.   
At a superficial level, data retention seemed to be a practical principle for the code to 
address, but a number of issues complicated the topic.  One of the caveats to the data 
retention principle was a consideration for minors.  As noted previously, and discussed 
by the group, minors have comparatively limited cognitive ability to grasp long term 
rewards and consequences.  Amanda Koulousias of the FTC expressed the following 
recommendations after a workshop concerning the limited mental capacity of minors to 
the group at the same meeting:   
So, for example, those case studies did not deal with use on children or 
teens.  I recommend for more general guidance on those things the 
commission’s 2012 privacy report43 does deal with some of those issues 
and provides general guidance…companies might want to consider extra 
protections for teens.  Some of the things that were suggested might be 
things like shorter data retention periods, privacy protective default 
settings, and in terms of children’s data you know that was one of the 
categories that was laid out in the privacy report as sensitive data.  Where 
                                                          
43 https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf  The report acknowledges 
comments received, including privacy harms, the global nature of many businesses, and legislation to 
complement self-regulatory initiatives.  The report outlines a privacy framework with the following main 
components: 1) Scope: to include online and offline companies dealing with sensitive data; 2) Privacy by 
Design: implemented in all phases of business practices and addressing data accuracy, retention, and 
security among other concepts; 3) Simplified Consumer Choice: consumers need choices for practices 
inconsistent with context of business relationship; and 4) Transparency: notice, access, and education.   
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it was recommended that affirmative express consent be obtained before 
collecting that data.   
Presumably, special consideration for minors seems appropriate given their use of social 
media, as Common Sense Media presented to the group in the April 29, 2014 meeting:  
And then you think what if: the images are used and then matched with 
social media profiles or other data bases so you could identify the shopper.  
Especially when it comes to teens, they are heavy users of social media, 
91% of teens have posted a picture of themselves online, 92% use their 
real names, 53% post their real email address, and 20% post their 
cellphone number, according to Pew.   
Special consideration for minors on data retention periods were not the only data 
retention issues discussed.  While this is a code of conduct designed to protect 
consumers, legitimate business considerations must also be acknowledged.  Many brick 
and mortar retailers employ security cameras for loss prevention.  Therefore, stakeholders 
have discussed scenarios where businesses may have legitimate reasons to retain facial 
templates despite an individual’s request that their data be deleted.  Walter Hamilton of 
the IBIA explained this view to the group (December 15, 2014): 
[T]here was quite a bit of discussion about the need for potentially a 
general exclusion or statement that the code does not apply to security or 
loss prevention uses such as looking for known shoplifters in a retail 
setting or access control into a secure area limited only to authorized 
people where FR is being used.  That those types of uses should not 
provide a facility for that individual to easily request and promptly receive 
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removal of their FR data from a database if it is used for those kinds of 
purposes.  There need[s] to be… some kind of preamble to this code that 
talks about the security or loss prevention exclusion. 
Stakeholders have recognized that businesses also want to harness the potential benefits 
of FRT.  There is legal precedent suggesting that criminals have limited rights after 
committing certain crimes.  For example, sex offenders have to register with the police 
for the communities in which they live.  The immediate problem is that sex offenders 
have been processed through the judicial system and convicted of a crime, protecting 
their constitutional right to due process.  If retailers kept shoplifters face template without 
their consent before being convicted of theft he or she would be denied due process by 
the retailer.   
 While retail theft is a legitimate concern faced by the business community, these 
crimes do not occur without potential selection bias.  Williams made a presentation to 
stakeholders (July 24, 2014) regarding racial profiling in the retail setting.     
Retailers are deploying FRT to identify customers as a retention 
technique.  What will happen when a situation where there is 
discrimination against consumers.  People refer to it as shop and frisk.  
Essentially you identify people and you pay more attention to them in the 
store and also when they leave the store and using FRT to zero in on only 
certain groups and perpetuate this behavior in the marketplace (Williams, 
2014). 
Use of FRT to address retail loss prevention brings up additional questions of profiling, 
including profiling convicts who have paid their debt to society.  However, FRT may still 
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be used by retailers to protect their property, “There are uses and Alvaro has mentioned a 
retailer might be using FR for looking at known or convicted shoplifters or people who 
have tried to commit crimes in the store before” (Business).  Profiling known criminals is 
not the only concern for “facial profiling.”  Stakeholders were also concerned about 
disparate opportunities presented to individuals based on demographic characteristics or 
other linked data.  This notion was explained to the group by Bedoya in the February 25, 
2014 meeting: 
While inaccurate outcomes are of concern, accurate outcomes when they 
are produced by non-consensual analysis can be equally problematic.  So 
for example if I walk into a car dealership and an identity service provider 
can tell the owner of the dealership, “Hey someone just walked in… and 
that person uh works at X place, earns Y and just got a promotion.  I think 
that's something that a lot of people would be uncomfortable with even if 
it is an accurate outcome.   
Facial profiling is a contentious issue amongst the group.  Some stakeholders worry about 
profiling based on demographic information, while others do not want to market 
unwanted products to uninterested individuals.  Businesses do not want to waste effort on 
ads that are ineffective, “Whether its behavioral targeted advertising and they are taking 
my data, they are tracking certain kinds of data to make sure the ads you see are ones you 
are vaguely interested in as opposed to completely wasting your time” (Business).  This 
exchange highlights the fact that consumers do not want their time wasted with irrelevant 
products and marketers do not want to waste valuable resources advertising products to 
consumers who have no interest in them.  Profiling is a contentious issue amongst 
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stakeholders; some uses may discriminate while others are beneficial.  Consequently, 
stakeholders continue to grapple with the delineations between productive and harmful 
uses of profiling.   
8.4. Notice 
 Given the sensitivity of the data collected and generated by FRT, as well as its 
multiplicity of uses, the group determined that notice of the operation of FRT was a key 
component in helping to safeguard consumer privacy.  One of the initial ideas for notice 
came in the form of a sign.  Unfortunately, the suggestion came from someone in the 
room who did not identify themselves and their identity remains unknown: 
And then the question becomes, yes, we can put a notice we can put a sign 
saying CCTV with facial recognition in action in this area if you choose 
not to enter, you can leave, you can do something… you can give me a 
choice.  We can create a sign maybe signage that would be iconic and 
maybe part of the discussion.   
Notice is a key concept in the code of conduct.  Consumers need to be aware of FR usage 
so that they can avoid the area if they choose, or take other measures to protect their 
image, including wearing a hat, sunglasses, scarf, or other protective measures.   
 Most stakeholders felt that consumers should be notified before coming in contact 
with FRT.  If adequate notice could not be given, one stakeholder felt it should not be 
deployed, “Just like my casino example, I wonder whether there is any effective way of 
giving notice in that case.  If there is not, then it strikes me that the best practice would be 
just to not do it” (NGO).  Contrarily, there may be legitimate uses of FR where notice 
would not be beneficial for consumers.  For example, airports that employ FRT to 
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identify terrorists or wanted criminals would likely not notify patrons of its usage in an 
effort to keep passengers safe.  There may be a few exceptions to the idea of notice, but 
for most applications of FRT notice is the expectation.   
 It is expected that notice of FRT will be provided to users before they interact 
with the technology.  Some stakeholders wondered what would happen if notice were 
given after an interaction with FRT.  Specifically, stakeholders wondered if notice after 
interacting with FRT would be considered an unfair or deceptive practice that the FTC 
could enforce under its Section 5 authority.  Koulousias of the FTC had explained to the 
group at the March 25, 2014 meeting that:   
And so then your other question was if consent was obtained at some later 
point would that be deceptive or unfair.  In terms of deception or 
unfairness, those are things that we in terms of determining Section 5 
violations we look at all those cases on a case by case basis.  Consider the 
specific facts in a particular scenario.  So it's not something that I can 
hypothesize right now but I can tell you it's something that we would look 
at on a fact specific basis.   
Notice provided after interacting with the technology is counter to previously determined 
best practices; however, there may be legitimate circumstances where it is necessary or 
acceptable, especially when considering security interests in public places.  The discourse 
surrounding notice is important as it has been extensively discussed by the group and the 
government recognized it as a previous best practice.  Given this context it is likely to be 
a principal decision in this code of conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  
However, no matter when it is provided, notice is still a controversial topic for NGO 
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stakeholders.  Additionally, the FTC would determine unfair or deceptive notices if 
provided after the fact and would be decided on a case by case basis. 
 The type of FRT being employed is very important to stakeholders with regard to 
notice.  Stakeholders have begun to coalesce around the concept of multiple notices 
depending on the use of FRT.  Vocal business participant Szabo seemed amenable to the 
proposal stating at the April 29, 2014 meeting:   
[I]f I as a consumer opt-into the system, unless it's disclosed to me at the 
outset you want to respect the information that is provided at the outset, 
like we would on any website.  If there is material change in the privacy 
policy, typically most people would agree you need opt-in consent.  If how 
I opt-in to the system is by agreeing to a privacy policy with the federal 
government that says they will only use this photograph for purposes of 
authentication.  If they changed to identification then perhaps they might 
need a second round of authorization to do so.   
If a FRT provider changes how they use the technology, stakeholders feel that consumers 
should be provided a second notice, and an opportunity to consent to the use of FR data.   
 While most stakeholders recognize notice as an important rule to include in a 
code of conduct, others were not convinced that notice would be taken seriously by 
consumers or that it provided necessary protection to consumers.   
I don’t think notice and concern mechanisms are enough.  And let me be 
clear I don't think notice and consent are bad per se, transparency controls 
are important but…were part of a broader package of principles which 
included different principles.  If we only focus on those two without 
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considering the others, it’s as if we try to build a house without strong 
foundations.  (Acquisti, 2014).   
The worry that consumers might not take seriously the notice of FRT’s use was echoed 
by another participant in an interview (September 22, 2014).   
The reality is consumers have been trained to be like Pavlov’s dogs, they 
want the app so they click yes yes yes.  It’s also not been in the app 
developer’s interest to say hey are you really sure you want to give me all 
your personal contact information that I can use to market other products.  
It needs to be more of a notice, but no one ever looks at [it] (NGO).   
This comment was substantiated in the academic literature regarding end user license 
agreements (EULAs).  It appears that many end users do not read the EULA before 
consenting to its terms.  According to Earp, Anton, Aiman-Smith, and Stufflebeam 
(2005) an overwhelming majority of Internet users expect to see privacy policies on 
websites, yet only 60% of users admit to reading them.  It is important to note that this 
covers all websites, including those carrying sensitive medical information.  Legal 
scholars have observed a similar trend, but note that the agreement is nonetheless legally 
binding: “Despite the reality that consumers tend not to read these agreements, courts 
have consistently upheld online standard form contracts, finding sufficient assent” 
(Preston & McCann, 2011, p. 18).  Creating a code of conduct that truly protects 
consumer privacy will require other principles besides a simple notification of FRT use.   
8.5. Transparency 
 Providing consumers notice of FRT deployment is the first step to providing 
consumers meaningful control over their biometric data.  The literature also proves, as 
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well as the NTIA meetings, that providing notice of FRT use to consumers is insufficient 
to ensure their privacy is adequately protected.  Stakeholders see notice as an important 
first step to protecting consumer privacy, but businesses also need to be transparent about 
what they do with consumers’ data.  Will the business retain FR data?  What are their 
retention policies?  Will the company share a consumer’s data?  Data use questions are 
very important, and yet stakeholders remain divided concerning what transparency 
safeguards should be required of companies.  One important principle of transparency is 
that it should be easy for consumers to understand.  Legalese was a concern espoused by 
Susan Grant, of Consumer Federation of America, at the May 20, 2014 meeting: 
I think where the more meaty transparency comes into play, the 
explanation of how it's going to be used and government access and so on 
is in fact when somebody is being enrolled in an FR system.  While it 
should be in plain language and not legalese, I don't think we need to 
worry how that would fit on the building because that's not what we are 
talking about.   
Stakeholders are mindful that many consumers, including minors, will not understand the 
legal jargon contained in privacy policies.  Transparency requires lay language.   
 The goal of the group is to give the consumer control over their data through 
notices and company transparency.  As mentioned previously with data retention policies, 
consumers should have the ability to delete their data regardless of how they entered into 
a service.  Chris Calabrese of the ACLU cited the practices of Google and Facebook 
during the June 24, 2014 meeting.     
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Google has said that you can opt-in and they will only collect your 
faceprint when you opt-in.  I think that's a powerful first principle.  I think 
it contrasts sharply with some things that are in the IBIA framework.  Both 
Google and Facebook allow you to withdraw your consent in the form of 
deleting faceprints whenever you want, certainly a powerful way to keep 
the technology under your control.  Google and Facebook give a certain 
level of access to prints; you can know when it's being used and control 
how it's being used.  Certainly it's not the robust audit control that we 
would argue for, but it's an understanding that this is the consumer’s 
information.  It needs to be handled and the consumer needs to be 
consulted on it.   
The goal of providing a consumer with notice and transparency is to enable consumer 
data control.  Control has been a popular conception of privacy amongst the stakeholders.  
When many stakeholders were asked about how they conceived of privacy, many of them 
used the word control to sum up their view.  Control is a popular conception of privacy 
because it is one that can be “operationalized.”  As noted, privacy is a complicated, 
multifaceted, and subjective subject, whereas control is seen as something tangible that 
can be given to consumers in detailed ways.   
8.6. Conclusion 
 The complexity of the technology, the sensitive data it collects, the protection of 
that data, and providing consumers with meaningful controls has the group grappling 
with those issues.  Security of the data generated by FRT has been the “low hanging 
fruit” that the group has decided to address first.  As shown, even though stakeholders 
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agreed that strong security protections were warranted they are having difficulty agreeing 
on the details of those protections.  At the last meeting, which occurred December 15, 
2014, the group was unable to achieve consensus on this issue.  At this time, no other 
meetings have been scheduled, so it remains unclear as to how these issues will be 
resolved.  The group still has many issues to decide, including how the technology will 








HOW DOES FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE 
CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY? 
 
 Facial recognition technology is an emerging technology that will likely force 
academics to reconsider how they conceive of privacy.  As explained previously, privacy 
is a subjective and contentious concept.  There are no agreed upon definitions of privacy 
in the academic community.  As such, many scholars have chosen to focus on specific 
aspects of privacy rather than deal with the entire concept which consists of, but is not 
limited to, physical privacy, data privacy, cognitive privacy, and information privacy.  
The power of FRT links these varying conceptions together and challenges the merits of 
splitting privacy into such narrow conceptions.  This chapter will explore stakeholder 
understandings of privacy as their understanding will influence how privacy is conceived 
by a code of conduct.  Also addressed, are the various academic conceptions of privacy 
and how the technology has the ability to link the current fragmented conceptions of 
privacy. 
9.1. Understanding Stakeholders’ Conceptions of Privacy 
 Understanding how stakeholders conceive of privacy is an important precursor to 
understanding how a code of conduct for FRT protects consumer privacy (Scollon & de 
Saint-Georges, 2012).  Stakeholders have varied conceptions of privacy, thanks to what 
their organizations and constituencies value.  Some constituencies are inherently privacy 
protective while others are privacy intrusive.  Stakeholder opinions of privacy were 
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collected to determine what has been called “anticipatory discourse” or the sense that our 
actions begin as “preparation for action” (de Saint-Georges, 2004, p. 73).  One can best 
understand an action after examining the sequence of motivations that led to its 
accomplishment.  Understanding stakeholder privacy opinions represents an important 
step in understanding how a code of conduct will address the issue in regards to FRT.   
 When several interviewees were asked for their definition of privacy, they gave 
uniform answers that could be summed up in a single word: control.  An interview 
conducted with a government official elicited this response: “Control.  It [privacy] could 
be other things to other people and that's fine, we can have good conversations about that.  
But it’s about control, it’s not secrecy.  It’s about control” (Government).  A similarly 
concise answer was given when another interviewee was asked about his/her definition of 
privacy, which was “Control of the information” (Business).  During another interview 
the control theme was again espoused when asked about how he/she conceived of 
privacy, the responder indicated that “Privacy is about information control… the 
individual has the ability to know what is known about him or her, and control it.  But 
certainly I mean that's mine.  Mine is much more about information control” (NGO).   
 In the literature informational privacy is a popular conception of privacy amongst 
many others (Nissenbaum, 2009; Smith et al., 2011; White House, 2012).  The uniformity 
of this discourse suggests that data and information control will be an important topic of 
discussion for stakeholders.  Indeed, the first substantive issue addressed by the group in 
the drafting process was data security.  Part of having control over one’s information 
includes assurances that the information is adequately protected and there is limited 
access to it.  Given the many understandings of privacy found in academic literature, the 
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uniform understanding of privacy as control by stakeholders is counterintuitive.  One 
would expect a diversity of conceptualizations of privacy amongst stakeholders, but 
perhaps since the purpose of the process is to develop a code of conduct, operationalizing 
privacy as control does make sense.   
 Control appears to be a popular concept amongst stakeholders drafting a code of 
conduct for FRT because “control” can be operationalized.  The popular 
conceptualization of control was substantiated later in actions by the group. The 
stakeholders first drafted language about the high security protections and limited access 
to this data the code should provide as an example of anticipatory discourse (de Saint-
Georges, 2004).   
 It is virtually impossible to account for the subjective nature and the varied 
conceptions of privacy in a single code of conduct and achieve a satisfactory outcome; 
however, it is possible to provide users with tools of notice, transparency, and assurances 
of security that provide consumers with some level of “control” over their information.  
For instance, if a FRT commercial entity makes a material change in how it uses a 
consumer’s FR data then it may have to receive affirmative consent from the consumer, 
thereby providing the consumer a measure of control over how their data will be used.  It 
should be noted that control provides stakeholders the practicality of operationalization 
through language in a code of conduct.  However, despite its conveniences, the concept 
of control does have some limitations despite its conveniences.   
 Equally clear during the first few interviews is the woeful inadequacy of the 
concept of control as a conception of privacy.  Data breaches have occurred recently at 
Target, Home Depot, and Apple making it apparent that even though the consumer has 
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entered into agreements with each commercial entity, they ultimately had no control over 
how their data was accessed and used.  With these events occurring during this MSH 
process, it is of little surprise that the group placed a premium importance on data 
security (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  Scandals at the IRS and NSA have also 
illustrated that government entities can use a consumer’s or citizen’s data outside of his 
or her control.  Data breaches do not eliminate the usefulness of the concept of control 
but point to a potential limit of its viability in practice.  This code of conduct cannot 
adequately address the limitation of data control, Internet service providers, the 
architecture of the Internet, and users’ access to their data are all important points 
affecting the control of data.  One might simply suggest storing data on servers without 
Internet access, but this would place limits on business practices and still would not deter 
rogue employees with nefarious intentions.  Even if users had perfect control over their 
information they would still lack privacy because many individuals willingly divulge 
personal information for various reasons, including monetary gain or increased celebrity 
(Allen, 1999, p.867).   
 With these understandings in mind, the researcher continued conducting 
interviews asking interviewees for their definitions of privacy and discussing how useful 
the conceptualization of privacy as control actually is.  A different conception of privacy 
was voiced by an NGO interviewee (August 6, 2014),  
I think that privacy is a right to be left alone, to be free from intrusion by 
companies and by the government.  There's a limited space where one can 
be without being monitored or assessed and preserving the ability of an 
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individual to have that space to feel unencumbered, uninhibited, without 
fear of reprisal, assessment, or judgement (NGO). 
The right to be let alone is another conception of privacy found frequently in the 
academic literature (Rosen, 2000; Mill, 1988; Terilli & Splichal, 2011; Smith et al., 
2011); one that we typically think of in regard to physical privacy but can also include 
our information being let alone as well.  FRT can certainly intrude on one’s physical 
privacy and informational privacy.  One interviewee placed control as tangentially related 
to privacy rather than central to privacy: 
I think control is an aspect of what I think about it.  Having control over 
the space is part of it but the reason we have privacy is individuals really 
feel the need to have part of their lives that they don't have to worry about 
someone else seeing them or assessing them and using that against them 
(NGO).   
Control is thought of by this interviewee as an important component of privacy, but not 
all encompassing.  Another conception was articulated as, “data retention, awareness, 
giving people consent.  If I had to encapsulate it, it's about personal control” (NGO).  In 
this definition there are components that have been explicitly discussed in the meetings, 
including notice, transparency, choice, and data retention, which may have been absorbed 
by the interviewee from the meetings (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  However, the 
concept of control once again materialized, in an interview occurring July 23, 2014, this 
time with a very different understanding:  
I think the point that people are making when they say that [control], or at 
least the point that I am making, is sort of highlighting the fact that that 
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has been lost.  Because we are talking about privacy in the sort of general 
way, that needs to be returned to people (NGO). 
This same interviewee perceived of privacy control as something that has largely been 
lost.  This participant felt that there has been a steady erosion of consumer control of 
privacy, which is what NGOs are advocating against.   
But what that does [advocating for big data] is make people feel like it's 
too late, this is just what's happening, or it makes them say things like 
"well I have nothing to hide"  but that's never true, there are always things 
to hide.  So when you say privacy in the context of this conversation it 
means having that control back, taking some of that back or having the 
ability to take some of that back.  So it can be transparency which the 
companies would show you, this is what we are doing; this is what we are 
taking from you without you knowing or having any possibility.  So that's 
the thing that advocates are trying to get to happen so we do have some 
control over it (NGO).   
Control, notice, and transparency seem to be important components of privacy that many 
stakeholders can agree on; these conceptions have arisen from prior experiences of 
stakeholders, conversations had during this process, and compliance with existing laws.  
Stakeholders seem to agree on control as an important part of privacy.  In an interview 
with a business participant (September 22, 2014), he felt that might be a point of 
consensus:   
I've spent time with others in the room but it's hard to judge what their 
perspective is.  Again, I think like you said everyone does agree on 
 
238 
transparency, on a level of control, again [it] depends on context, what’s 
appropriate, and what’s sufficient (Business). 
Two interviewees failed to provide an answer as to how they conceived of privacy.44 
 There are two broad understandings of privacy in the meetings: one is 
representative of the business stakeholder group and the other from the NGOs.  For 
example, one academic said, “Industry has a very legalistic understanding of privacy for 
pretty obvious reasons.  Privacy groups have a much broader understanding of what it is 
and what it should be.”  Industry (Business) has a more legal understanding of privacy 
because of their concern to reduce legal liability.  Businesses want to minimize their 
exposure to potential lawsuits that can arise from an invasion of privacy or the 
mishandling of consumers’ data.  NGOs likely have a broad understanding of privacy due 
to their varied citizen’s privacy interests.  Several NGOs have reported working on 
numerous MSH processes involving a number issues surrounding privacy. Despite there 
being some agreement amongst stakeholders about important aspects of privacy, it is 
important to understand how stakeholders view FRT in terms of being inherently privacy 
enhancing or privacy exploitive.    
9.1.1. Big Data and Privacy  
 The increase of large data sets that include consumer information has been 
concerning for some participants.  More important is the distinction between collection 
and use.  Carl Szabo of NetChoice stated at this (June 24, 2014):   
If you go back to the White House big data report, the PCAST45 report in 
particular, which is the technology arm of the White House, they said with 
                                                          
44 1) Don't have one. 2) I'd be happy to follow up with you on that. 
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respect to big data don't worry about collection, worry about use.  When it 
comes to FR the use is really a sharing, the sharing of information with 
somebody who otherwise wouldn't have that information.  So we believe 
that users should have the opportunity to control the sharing of personal 
information with someone who otherwise wouldn't have that information.  
It's control of sharing.  That personal information in this instance is 
derived from FR.  That is control personal information, collected from FR 
software.   
The start of privacy intrusion begins with the collection of big data.  Steven Aftergood 
(2015) noted the glaring flaw in the statement “don’t worry about collection, worry about 
use” when he stated,“[The problem with] secret collection of…records… is the … public 
was denied any opportunity to grant or to withhold consent to this practice” (p. 20).  
Citizens must be worried about the collection of their data as the government and big 
business continues to prove that they are both  incapable of protecting consumer data and 
often abuse the data; the NSA and Facebook being the more recent and publicized 
examples.  As Bruce Schneier (2015) noted, “…Government surveillance piggybacks on 
existing corporate capabilities” (p. 202).  He goes on to explain that corporations equally 
rely on the government to keep their own surveillance practices legal and unregulated.  
The government and corporations “use each other’s laws to protect their own data 
collection and get around rules that limit their actions” (Shneier, 2015, p. 202).   Business 
entities also contend that they need to collect personal data to provide consumers with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
45 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), the report referenced can be 




better services. The “Big Data” report has been tangentially discussed by the group, 
mostly because FR creates new biometric data that adds to existing data about an 
individual.   
9.1.2. Technology and Privacy 
 There has been some discussion by stakeholders about whether FRT is a privacy 
enhancing, privacy invading, or a privacy neutral technology.  How stakeholders view the 
technology in regards to privacy is important to understand what protections the code of 
conduct may provide consumers.  These discussions are likely to impact the final code of 
conduct (Scollon & de Saint-Georges, 2012).  Regulation can change how the technology 
is viewed in terms of privacy.  As one business representative said: “As a matter of fact, 
many technologies are privacy protective.  Or technologies can be crafted in such a way 
to be much more or much less privacy protective.”  This sentiment was reaffirmed by 
another interviewee (June 23, 2014):  
I think in many ways technology facilitates privacy and in many ways 
technology threatens privacy.  I am largely of the camp that technology is 
neutral.  The means to which we put it as human beings and the ways in 
which we use it determine whether or not it is privacy enhancing or 
whether it is privacy reducing (Government).  
The degree to which FRT is inherently privacy protective or privacy exploitative might 
be considered extreme positions, “But those are edge cases.  I think that the big fat 
middle is folks get to pick in terms of how they implement them [privacy protective or 
privacy intrusive]” (government).  This middle ground where users get to choose how the 
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technology is used seems to be a position with broad agreement amongst the group.  
Walter Hamilton of the IBIA took this position at the June 24, 2014 meeting:  
First any technology is inherently privacy neutral.  It is only the 
application or use of a technology that determines whether it is a protector 
of privacy, or a privacy enhancing technology, or whether it's a threat to 
personal privacy.  It's very difficult for us to say that a technology is good 
or bad or characterize it as something dangerous.  It is privacy neutral. 
Stakeholders understand that whether or not the technology enhances or degrades privacy 
is largely dependent on the safeguards that they create in a code of conduct.  For 
example, broad authentication uses may increase the security with which an individual 
accesses his or her bank accounts and other sensitive records; however, its uses may lead 
to what has been called the democratization of surveillance, or when citizens play an 
active role in surveilling their peers (Dupont, 2008).  Equally important are the 
underlying values attached to the technology and largely ignored by participants.  FRT 
has historically been funded by the government to be utilized for national defense.  The 
military’s defensive influence on the technology should not be dismissed by the 
stakeholder participants who immediately state that the technology is neutral.   
9.1.3. Privacy and Control 
 Since privacy has often been conceptualized as control by stakeholders, it is 
important to understand this concept in greater depth.  A business interviewee stated: “I 
think [control] is an important concept.  Control without [an] adequate understanding 
about what the implications [privacy risks] are and what your other options [transparency 
and notice] are can be kind of pointless.”  These comments demonstrate stakeholder 
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awareness of the limits of privacy as control.  Consumers are unable to enact meaningful 
control over their person or information in the absence of proper notification and 
transparency provided by businesses.  If businesses are not forthcoming about their 
practices and the rights of consumers then will be unable to enact the protections 
provided.  However, as shown in the previous chapter on the regulation of technology, 
providing consumers with too much notification can lead to a Pavlovian effect (please 
refer to interviewee comments on p. 225) where consumers simply click “accept” without 
reading through the terms of the agreement.  Conversely, there is disagreement about the 
level of notice provided to consumers, which leads to consumer control of their privacy.  
One interviewee articulated some of the shortcomings of notice stating (September 17, 
2014): 
I don't think we have meaningful notice either.  No one will read these 
super long privacy policies.  It's certainly a take it or leave it proposition in 
some cases.  When I was talking about when companies will enter data 
along the lines of privacy it would be nice if these companies wanted to 
give people more privacy and giving people choice and control.  I don't 
think that you have right now I don't feel like there are a lot of choices and 
particularly when we are talking about facial [recognition] and where you 
are walking down the street.  It's kind of meaningless (NGO). 
NGO participants have mostly expressed a lack of meaningful controls provided to the 
consumer.  However, industry participants disagree: “…[C]onsumers have in the end a 
lot of control.  But you have to give up certain amounts of control to receive various 
things in return” (Business).  Industry participants appear to consider the surrender of 
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privacy as normal and possibly required to receive a particular product or service.  
Nonetheless, even business participants are undecided on the level of control that should 
be provided to a consumer as one interviewee stated September 9, 2014:  
Trying to determine how much should a consumer consider giving up 
control of X and privacy of Y in order to get product or service Z.  
Whether it’s behavioral targeted advertising and they are taking my data, 
they are tracking certain kinds of data to make sure the ads you see are 
ones you are vaguely interested in as opposed to completely wasting your 
time.  Is that something you care about and giving someone choice makes 
sense.  I prefer to see the ads I care about rather than ads that disgust me or 
don't interest me (Business).   
Despite a lack of certainty concerning the needs of consumer control, business seems to 
view intrusion on consumer privacy as a way to provide benefits or beneficial services to 
the consumer.  No discussion transpired concerning businesses harming consumer 
privacy, nor was this issue even readily acknowledged by business participants.  Notice 
and transparency are precursors of control, and represent the ability for consumers to 
keep their information private.  However, providing too much notice can lead to the 
erosion of privacy, as shown earlier.  A deeper understanding about the “appropriate” 
level of notice, transparency, and control is needed to protect consumer privacy and who 
provides those levels.   
9.1.4. Privacy and Business 
 The business community has a somewhat conflicted position with privacy.  
Businesses must provide enough privacy protection assurances to consumers to gain 
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consumer trust so they will use the service or product, yet they also have a vested interest 
in exploiting consumer privacy to make money by offering relevant ads or better 
customer service.  However, where this balance lies remains unclear as one interviewee 
articulated to me (September 25, 2014):   
Companies can prove through the security context and data breach or the 
impact it has on the bottom line or some sort of change in privacy policy 
that really upsets consumers, so there is a real economic incentive tied to 
having appropriate privacy protections and companies made of people 
who hold that same fundamental belief.  But doing that in a way that 
doesn’t really jeopardize future growth can be difficult as we have seen 
(Business). 
The business community seems cognizant of the fact that if they do not have responsible 
privacy policies, consumers may choose other services. As one business interviewee 
stated (June 24, 2014):  
One of the important things to note is that when industry creates self-
regulation we do it because we think it’s good business.  By that I mean 
we want to instill confidence in the market and also instill confidence in 
our users, especially in a post-Snowden era.  That we will use their 
information responsibly and not outside the guise of what we say we want 
to do (Business). 
Of course this recognition only works in business areas of competition.  Where 
competition is scarce or where monopolies exist, companies have less incentive to 
prioritize consumer privacy.  For example, Facebook is not very concerned about their 
 
245 
users leaving the service for Myspace.  As noted previously, businesses generally try to 
avoid regulation, and, in order to do so, they must provide reasonable levels of privacy 
protection.  “I think the companies understand the need for privacy protections.  I think 
they don't want to be thought of as companies bad at privacy, which can be bad PR and 
create lots of regulatory oversight” (NGO).  From a business perspective, being, or 
appearing to be, a business that protects consumer privacy can enhance the business’s 
reputation, as well as its bottom line as Szabo pointed out at the May 20, 2014 meeting.   
I think there are groups who will not be bound, who do not perform FR, 
but are bound by reputational assets and reputational interests.  So, I don't 
want to pick Consumer Federation out, but if Consumer Federation's 
decade long reputation as a defender of consumer rights is on the line, I 
feel like that in fact is an important sign on to a code.  Equally important, I 
think if a company were to say we will be bound by the code as well 
would to my mind be their buy in.   
However, the business community was quick to push back on the notion that signing up 
for the NTIA code would enhance its reputation and business interests.  Hamilton of the 
IBIA stated at the June 24, 2014 meeting:   
We support privacy, we believe in privacy, we want biometrics to be seen 
as a tool to enhance privacy.  But we also want to recognize the 
complexity of so many myriad of applications that there may be instances 
where an organization shouldn't be shunned or branded as an outlier, if 
they don't sign up to a code of conduct that professes to apply a biometric 
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set of principles for privacy when in fact it just doesn't make sense for the 
way in which the organization has applied them for its use.   
It is true that any code of conduct will have a hard time responsibly covering all 
legitimate business practices.  Companies whose practices fall outside of the code should 
not be punished by consumers because they were unable to sign on.  To this end 
corporate responsibility literature is informative.  Corporate responsibility refers to 
responsible business practices, something that is particularly important giving the 
sensitivity of FR data.  Simon Zadek (2007) noted that most companies learn corporate 
responsibility in the following five stages:   
1. It’s not our job to fix that 
2. We’ll do just as much as we have to 
3. It’s the business, stupid 
4. It gives us a competitive advantage 
5. We need to make sure everyone does it (p. 2). 
With regard to privacy, many companies seem to be in the latter stages of the corporate 
learning process.  After publicized commercial data breaches, businesses have realized 
that “It’s the business, stupid”; therefore, they need to adopt data protection and privacy 
enhancing practices or face losing consumers.  Early adopters of these methods may find  
it provides a competitive advantage in the form of increased user trust and thus increased 
consumer use.  Finally, with regard to the code of conduct, the group is attempting to 
standardize best practices that create fair competitive spaces for businesses to engage in.   
 Businesses may find it difficult to abide by the code of conduct which is to 
address commercial uses of FRT.  As David Lyon (2007) noted: 
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[N]ot only have corporations outstripped the capacity of state 
administration to undertake mass surveillance in the twenty-first century, 
the surveillance activities of many corporations themselves have not 
become part of a large ensemble of governance alongside and intertwined 
with government administration (p. 163).   
Companies may not be able to sign on to a code of conduct or abide by its privacy rules 
due to entanglement with government entities.  A code of conduct that is limited to 
consumer uses of FR may not provide consumers with much protection because of 
government involvement.   
9.1.5. Privacy and Anonymity 
 As explained earlier, anonymity is not privacy nor is privacy anonymity.  Instead, 
“Anonymity allows the individual to have a voice without having a name” (Weicher, 
2006, p.1) another interpretation states,  “Anonymity is the ability to conceal a person’s 
identity…” (Smith et al., 2011, p. 996).   However, anonymity is often an important part 
of privacy.  Often the reason citizens feel safe to exercise their First Amendment rights is 
that they feel that privacy will be protected through the relative anonymity that crowds 
provide.  Certain participants, and one interviewee (July 29, 2014), fear the surveillance 
and identification powers of FRT, particularly the power it has to transform a world of 
relative anonymity to a world where all persons are known at all times.   
Even if a person is anonymous in some databases or has a pseudonym, he 
can change a pseudonym but not their biometrics.  That's what makes 
surveillance, profiling, and discrimination possible and easier basically.  
That's basically the problem with biometrics.  Those problems occur 
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without biometrics as the IBIA [International Biometrics Industry 
Association] they submitted that biometrics isn't the biggest threat but big 
data is.  I agree that that is true. But biometrics facilitates using big data 
because it can link all the databases without knowing the person’s name.  
(Government).   
Another potential threat to an individual’s privacy is that FRT does not have to occur in 
real time.  FRT can be applied to photos that were taken in the past if the photo is of 
sufficient quality.  These implications are threatening.  If an individual attended a 
political rally twenty years ago and now wants to run for political office, there could be 
devastating consequences, as that photo may no longer represent how that person wishes 
to be viewed.  Previously, the photo may have looked ridiculous to others, but they would 
not have had the ability to identify the individual in that photo.   FRT threatens an 
individual’s ability to conceal their identity or to have a voice without a name.   
 A position paper released regarding anonymity by the IBIA during the meetings46 
was particularly troubling. The position paper states that to participate in society an 
individual must forfeit their anonymity (p. 5).  The IBIA faced severe criticism from 
other participants for having such a strong position on anonymity during the June 24, 
2014 meeting.  Calabrese of the ACLU stated:   
“Anonymity and privacy are not synonymous terms.  The former is 
forfeited if one chooses to live in society” [p.5].  Those are very very 
strong words.  I'm surprised by them but I assume you meant them since 
                                                          
46 The position paper can be found here: 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ibia_statement_to_ntia__best_practice_recommendations_6




you used them throughout the document.  Can you talk about them?  
Anonymity is a pretty fundamental value in American Society. 
Hamilton of the IBIA responded stating: 
We wanted to distinguish between privacy and anonymity.  One of the 
examples is that: I value my privacy, privacy meaning I don't want to be 
intruded on or contacted by an organization…. the organization may know 
who I am, they may have a telephone book, they may have my address, 
they may have some of my demographics from other public data they have 
aggregated and analyzed but that doesn't give them the right to invade my 
privacy by disturbing or pushing unwanted things.  We wanted to 
distinguish between anonymity because there is very little anonymity in 
our society if we are going to be productive members.  What we are 
saying is that you are constantly going to be required to identify yourself 
or have your identity verified in order to receive services, privileges, drive 
a car, open a bank account, do just about anything to live in our society.  
 The IBIA drew criticism for having such an extreme position on anonymity, saying that 
to participate in society anonymity is forfeited.  Individuals expect generalized anonymity 
but also recognize that they may be identified at unexpected times by participating in a 
public space.  To state that being in public is to be identified is a violation of current 
social norms as pointed out in the same meeting by Travis Hall of New York University:   
It seems like the point is that anonymity should be or can be maintained 
contextually.  It's not that to function in society you have to give up your 
identity at all times but in certain situations and circumstances you have to 
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produce your identity.  Contextually you should have the ability to protect 
your identity.   
Biometric data alone do not possess a substantial threat to anonymity.  For example, 
individuals leave fingerprints on many surfaces during the course of the day without the 
expectation of those prints being used to identify that person.  However, biometrics do 
present a threat to anonymity because of their ability to link identified data.  Hall 
continued:   
Biometric data the template by itself is also kind of useless.  Biometric 
data is useful in as much as it is linked and has access to other 
information.  It seems that the important crux here is the linkage of 
information, of biometric data to other pieces of information, to things that 
need to be protected…with FRT we have to make sure they can't be 
identified or it’s not attached to biographic data, because for the most part 
those things are typically linked because biometric data not attached to 
other things is not terribly useful. 
This exchange highlights the value that some stakeholders attach to anonymity and its 
ability to help protect consumer privacy.  It is also true that there are certain situations in 
which we must be, or at least want to be, identified.  The group has been tasked with 
deciding in which contexts it is appropriate for FRT to identify someone.  The IBIA 
returned to the forum at the next meeting, July 24, 2014, and stated that privacy was not 
anonymity, clarifying that they were there to discuss privacy; however, that was where 
the conversation ended.   
 
251 
We've offered some clarifying remarks which are posted to the 
website…the comment I did want to make is that we would like to focus 
the discussion around best practice recommendations that IBIA has 
entered… rather than on our findings and perspectives of the state of the 
world.  We would rather close the debate on anonymity as it pertains to 
this forum but we are happy to discuss it offline.  Now we want to focus 
on privacy matters that are germane to the scope of this work.   
One participant had some clarifying remarks during an interview.  The interviewee 
offered the following behind the scenes email exchange with the IBIA.   
The second part of their [IBIA]argument was, privacy is degraded but not 
our fault.  Anonymity, which is something you could argue biometrics 
gets rid of…you don't actually have the right to that anymore.  There's no 
way that you can actually think that you have anonymity period.  …they 
were conflating the idea of anonymity at all times and in all places with 
anonymity as people understand it.  So they were trying to deny that you 
have a right to anonymity but they were using the most extreme 
understanding of what anonymity means to deny that desire for 
generalized anonymity or anonymity period. They also were being 
willfully ignorant of the role that biometrics can potentially play within 
the broader context of privacy degrading technologies (Academic).   
  It is fair to say that participants, including the IBIA, have recognized the value of 
anonymity in society while also recognizing the ability FRT has to impose on an 
individual’s anonymity.  Stakeholders are still discussing principles for a potential code 
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of conduct, but it appears they will be mindful of protecting anonymity and the value it 
provides to society.   
9.2. Anonymity and Free Speech 
 It has been established that anonymity is not privacy, but that anonymity can help 
maintain privacy; anonymity can also encourage free speech. 
A frequently cited 1995 Supreme Court ruling in McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission reads: Protections for anonymous speech are vital 
to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees 
them to express critical minority views . . . Anonymity is a shield from the 
tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill 
of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular 
individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society. 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015, par. 4)   
If we lose anonymity because of FRT we may severely damage free speech in our 
democracy.  Using FRT for identification purposes is something that will have to be 
seriously discussed by the group and possibly curtailed to ensure the free flow of ideas 
and communication, especially unpopular ones.  For now, the group recognizes the 
heightened stakes of using FRT for identification, but has yet to decide on its application 
or implementation.   
9.3. Facial Recognition Technology as a Threat to Privacy 
 It has been proposed in this research that privacy needs to be reconceptualized 
because of the proliferation of FRT.  FRT challenges the current conceptions of privacy 
in many ways, as will be explained in detail now.  The first privacy challenge FRT poses 
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is its ability to mimic a skill in which humans are very accurate, which is detecting, 
remembering, and associating information with faces.  FRT simulates a human skill.  In 
other words, why should a technology be regulated in restrictive ways for a task that can 
be completed by humans and not subject to the same prohibitive restrictions? 
9.3.1. Facial Recognition Technology Simulating Human Capabilities 
 During the course of the meetings, business entities have been quick to point out 
that FRT merely mimics a skill that humans readily perform.  Business stakeholders have 
used this observation to advance their interests and argue for reduced regulation because 
they could simply employ humans and avoid the FRT regulations as Szabo pointed out to 
the group in the May 20, 2014 meeting.   
Today a reporter can take a snapshot of a yearbook and at a pot rally and 
identify people there.  This can be done through Bing's image matching 
search.  Casino card cheat program as you walk in the “eye in the sky” 
captures your image and right now it's somewhat manually done but it can 
also be automated to identify card cheats and ask them to leave. 
In short, businesses could simply employ 500 interns to start looking through high school 
yearbooks to identify individuals of interest.  Furthermore, there are legitimate public 
interest exceptions that must be recognized, such as newspapers covering “newsworthy” 
stories.  NGO stakeholders have recognized these situations but are concerned about the 
limit of such exceptions as Bedoya countered at the same meeting.   
I totally understand where this…public interest, public information 
exception [is coming from].  My concern is that this [public interest 
exception] encompasses a few of the exact situations people are most 
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concerned by.  For example, if there is a political protest, or a political 
rally, that is definitely public interest, that involves politics, public affairs, 
certainly newsworthy.  Should there be an exception that allows a news 
organization to photograph that rally a news organization a company that 
has decided to voluntarily comply with the code of conduct, should there 
be something that allows them to identify by name the individuals in that 
crowd because it is newsworthy. 
The press has had an important role in promoting American democracy but there are also 
legitimate fears that this technology will have a chilling effect on First Amendment 
rights.  Citizens expect a certain amount of anonymity, and that anonymity protects their 
privacy and encourages them to express their views.  Nonetheless, business participants 
once again pushed back. 
This isn't about companies identifying anonymous people.  This is in 
general, if it’s a matter of public interest, news, affairs, etcetera.  I think 
realistically if I took a picture of 30 people or 3,000 rallying on the steps 
of the capital and I want to know what kind of people I could easily send 
out 500 interns to compare images based on the groups that I have.  This 
can all be done by human eye.  I mean we are talking about a difference 
between an automated technology and what can be done without 
automated technology (Business). 
However, there is a very important difference in scale of what a human can perform and 
what FRT is capable of, “Right but you would need 500 interns and probably 20 years.  
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FR could do that in a matter of minutes.  That's what's different and that's why we are 
here” (NGO).  To give an idea concerning the difference in scale, Bedoya had this to say: 
Basically the human mind according to most studies can remember 10,000 
people at a maximum.  As of 2012 the fastest FR algorithm was from 
Hitachi that could process 36 million people in a second.  Now the 
technology exists that would allow the identification of every single 
person at the rally.  That tension of privacy and public is what makes this 
interesting.  People do have an expectation of privacy in public and FRT at 
its extreme threatens to undermine that. 
The potential capability of the technology versus the capability of humans is radically 
different, especially when including both the time and money involved for similar 
identification outcomes.  Furthermore, the decisions that FRT may be involved in making 
would be automated, which is potentially problematic as Chris Calabrese of the ACLU 
articulated in the April 29, 2014 meeting.   
So Pam Dickson and Bob Gellman47 did a great report on scoring and the 
idea that we can use big data to score people.  As we gather this kind of 
information does it go into a score?  Is this something my employability is 
questioned because I was in a pot rally, we know that, and again the power 
of this is that it's automated.  No one has to go through and make these 
judgments; they happen automatically. 
                                                          
47 Pam Dickson is the founder of the World Privacy Forum.  Robert (Bob) Gellman is a privacy policy 
consultant.  The report referenced is titled Data Brokers and the Federal Government: A New Front in the 
Battle for Privacy Opens (World Privacy Forum, 2014).   
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There are legitimate concerns for the types of decisions FRT may make; therefore, a 
compromise may need to be drawn that includes news agencies covering only public 
events and public figures, but crowds would not be subject to identification via FRT.  
Akin to FR, scientists are asking computers to report what they see in images, this is very 
primitive currently.  We need to ask what judgements FRT will make in the future and 
what values or motives operators will attach to those judgements.  Additionally, FRT has 
incredible potential to link data that is already known about an individual, something that 
currently takes considerably more effort.  Ultimately, because the technology replicates a 
skill that humans perform, it is difficult to regulate its actions.  Of course the cost of 
employing humans for such a task would be prohibitive.  It is hard to create strict 
regulations for a technology when the same task could be completed without the 
technology and no regulations would apply.  However, the speed, accuracy, and scale of 
projects that can be completed via FRT ultimately warrant regulatory safeguards.  The 
distinction between technology and humans task completion will present the most 
important impact on the creation of privacy safeguards. 
9.3.2. Data 
 The data created by FRT is biometric.  Biometric data poses specific threats to 
privacy that other information such as usernames and passwords, do not.  Biometric data 
is permanent in nature and intimately linked with one’s identity.  Even when considering 
plastic surgery, the costs are usually prohibitive and the surgery is unlikely to change the 
orbital socket which is an identifying feature that most FR systems utilize for 
identification purposes.  If biometric data was compromised in a data breach or other 
theft, an individual will be unable to use it for authentication purposes.  More 
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importantly, as humans we are generally not allowed to hide our faces, imagine 
conducting one’s banking business with a ski mask on.  Since FRT utilizes our face for 
the creation of biometric data we are limited in the ways that we can protect our face 
from the technology.   
You can change your name….[but it is] very hard to change your face.  
And in fact even using facial hair, or funny haircuts, or glasses to fool 
facial recognition is working now is probably not going to work 5-10 
years out because researchers keep getting better and better at algorithms 
which account for facial hair and so forth (Acquisti, 2014).   
Not only is it very hard for an individual to meaningfully protect his/her face from the 
technology, but the technology is commonly used to authenticate known identities which 
contain a host of related biographic data as was shown at the March 25, 2014 meeting by 
Mathew Young of Sotero Defense Solutions: “So at the time that you collect you’re the 
picture right there of the ID and you capture your live face, are there other details that are 
being collected such as a time stamp of when that actually happened?”  King responded: 
“Absolutely we do.”  FRT scans and digital pictures contain a multitude of information, 
some necessary for FR and some that is simply inherent to the picture.  Photos reveal a 
great deal of information about individuals, including race, age, gender, weight, height, 
hair color, eye color, disability, and location, all of which can be guessed with relative 
accuracy.  As made clear in the previous exchange digital photos also contain a host of 
information, including a time stamp, document origination, date of birth, and possibly 
security clearances or other privileges.  Many digital cameras capture what is called 
Extended File Information (EXIF).  EXIF data contains information about the camera 
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that took the photo, such as file name, size, date, camera make, camera model, resolution, 
whether the flash was used, focal length, and Jpeg process (Alvarez, 2004, p. 2).  Apple’s 
iPhone is also capable of embedding precise geo-coordinates with photos and videos 
taken with the device (Friedland & Sommer, 2010, p. 1).  Furthermore FR can be enacted 
retroactively.  Photos from years in the past, if of sufficient quality, can be utilized for 
FR.  More worrisome still, are the value judgements that either computers or humans can 
add to the picture and the people in it.  Put succinctly, the data that photos reveal about an 
individual are much more detailed than when taken at face value, coupled with FR an 
individual and their privacy can be completely violated.   
9.3.3. Data Linkage 
 Businesses have been eager to utilize FRT for a variety of purposes.  Much has 
been made, during the course of the meetings, of the proprietary nature of the algorithms.  
It was thought initially that different algorithms would produce different results and that 
those results could not be compared due to their proprietary nature.  However, one 
government participant from the Privacy Commissioner’s Office in Canada, a 
technologist by trade, explained to the group that:  
There was a claim that two templates created from the same person by 
different algorithms cannot be linked together; in fact they can be linked 
together.  So we tried to address and debunk that mess and published a 
note and it's published on the NTIA website (Government).48   
                                                          
48 The full report, “Uniqueness of Face Recognition Templates” can be found at: 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uniqueness_of_face_recognition_templates_-_ipc_march-
2014.pdf (Chibba & Stoianov, 2014).   
 
259 
One can imagine the complications that could arise from being able to link algorithms 
conducted by two separate companies that were subscribed to by a consumer.  For 
instance, if one can link a Facebook profile, potentially containing personal information, 
and a Match.com profile, where anonymity is valued, consumers could be put in a 
precarious or compromised position.  One interviewee explained the ability to link data as 
follows (July 23, 2014).     
I don't know how many consumers are aware of this.  There is never just 
one piece of data about you.  There is a huge collection of data about you 
brought together from different sources to create profiles.  And these 
profiles are secret, they are difficult for you to correct, amend, or find.  
And of course people have no idea that this is happening so they aren't 
able to give their consent.  I personally think that is creepy and 
unacceptable (NGO). 
Other participants have been frustrated with looking at FRT in isolation.  FRT does 
require a camera of some sort, presumably on a phone, and needs to be coupled with 
some sort of application to process the photo, and then finally compared to a database of 
photos, more than likely social networks as they possess the most readily accessible 
photo archive.  “You really can't look at any of these technologies anymore in isolation, 
that was has happened is an integrated offline and online 24/7 real-time advertising data 
collection system” (NGO).  The ability FRT has to link one’s existing data to make 
predictions about an individual is quite powerful as Acquisti has shown.   
 Acquisti’s proof of concept experiment highlighted the technology’s power to link 
data about an individual.  Acquisti called the technology “first amongst peers” in terms of 
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its ability to link information about an individual.  Databases have been called, 
“instruments of selection, separation and exclusion” (Bauman, 2000, p. 51).  The ability 
to link various databases that individuals may find themselves in greatly increases the 
power of selection, separation, and exclusion.  Similarly, the ability to link databases may 
identify personal patterns or habits of the subjects.  Taken to an extreme, it has been 
suggested that this will lead to what is being called Personally Predictive Information 
(PPI) instead of just PII.  The ability to anticipate an individual’s routine could pose a 
significant threat to an individual’s safety.   Although many of the data linkages could be 
made without the technology, the process would be more arduous and sluggish without 
FRT.  Olga Raskin of IBG presented to the group at the March 25, 2014 meeting: 
Facebook is probably the largest consumer usage of biometrics.  The one 
thing about Facebook I would say that we considered relatively 
threatening is that once you tag photos they now have the graph search 
function which allows you to search photos more easily.  So if there's 
more tagged photos there's more photos indexed and those searches can be 
conducted more easily… that can't be possible unless tagging is facilitated 
through facial recognition technology, or it will work much more slowly 
and the searches won't be as effective. 
Speed, or immediacy, is not the real threat with the technology; rather it is the scale of 
projects, searches, and linkages that can be made because of its speed.  We have good 
reasons to keep our data in separate piles; for example, there are things that we want to 
share on Facebook that are inappropriate for LinkedIn.  Linkage of data poses a threat to 
privacy and some of those threats are yet unknown.     
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9.3.4. Cognitive Intrusion 
 Many, but not all participants, consider the mind a private sanctuary free from 
intrusion.  We can choose to reveal our thoughts or keep them to ourselves.  FRT is about 
to change that.  Kairos, a company that presented at the meetings, made this recent 
announcement in an email press release:   
Today was an important day for Kairos. We’ve expanded our offering 
beyond facial recognition to include facial expression detection and 
emotion analysis. We did that by acquiring a company that we admire and 
who shares our values and vision of the future: IMRSV.  With this 
acquisition, Kairos becomes the only facial biometrics company in the 
world offering both facial recognition and emotion analysis tools for 
developers (Business).   
FRT being used for emotional analysis has broad implications.  As shown earlier, the 
technology has already been employed to help facilitate deception detection.  Marketers 
will undoubtedly use the technology to gauge emotional affect and make educated 
guesses concerning consumer opinion about products or services.  Infrared FRT can tell if 
an individual is intoxicated or under stress based on body temperature and blood travel.  
When consumer data are linked (think about the products Amazon suggests based on 
browser and past purchase history information) with the emotional analysis component of 
FRT, the technology can make more accurate guesses about what the individual is likely 
thinking.  The technology, particularly the emotional analysis capability, is in its infancy; 
however, the technology will continue to improve and make increasingly accurate 
guesses concerning an individual’s thought process, thus violating cognitive processes.    
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 In many ways, cognitive intrusion by the technology stands as the biggest threat 
to not only privacy, but also to the democratic way of life.  Cognition is the precursor to 
expression.  If the technology continues to improve in its ability to intrude on human 
cognition, the chilling effect could be profound on our First Amendment rights.   
9.4. Reconceptualizing Privacy 
 So far privacy has been discussed from a variety of perspectives, including legal, 
societal, and as a right.  H. Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev, and Heng Xu (2011) discussed 
informational privacy by providing an extensive discussion on the many conceptions of 
privacy.  Should we consider privacy as a value or human right?  Is privacy a commodity 
that consumers can trade for benefits?  Are we speaking of informational privacy or 
physical privacy, the right to be left alone?  Should privacy be seen as cognitive with 
access to our thoughts?  Can we come to a satisfactory definition of privacy through 
negation of the terms that get conflated with it: surveillance, secrecy, and anonymity?  Is 
privacy simply the ability to control our information?   
 My aim is not to describe the many definitions of privacy.  Previously, scholars 
tried to distinguish between physical and informational privacy, privacy as a value or a 
right, societal versus individual privacy, and many other conceptions.  Unfortunately, 
FRT makes these distinctions unworkable.   
 Physical privacy, the ability to be let alone, is challenged by FRT.  Images that 
have applied FRT reveal a great deal about the location of a person, including when he or 
she was there and possibly even why.  FRT can then be used to identify the individual in 
the picture, revealing his or her physical information, such as age range, race, ethnicity, 
time of day and potentially other aspects given the context of the inquiry.  FRT 
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challenges notions of physical privacy for these precise reasons.  The photos that FRT is 
applied to also allow individuals to speculate about an individual and his or her motives.  
Oftentimes, information associated with an individual can be more damaging than 
accurate information about an individual.   
 According to Smith et al., informational privacy is the ability to control personally 
identifiable information (p. 990).  FRT collects biometric data which are unique to each 
individual.  By definition this is personally identifiable information.  Given the ability for 
facial data to be collected secretly and the ubiquity of cameras, FRT challenges the 
notions of informational privacy, as well as individual control over personal information.  
Additionally, the compilation of an individual’s data has been called an individual’s 
“data-double” (Lyon, 2007, p. 125).  The data-double creates a virtual person that 
replicates the physical person, especially with the collection of biometric data.  The data-
double further blurs the distinction between physical and informational privacy and raises 
concerns about where a data-double physically travels to and where it is stored at, which 
could be multiple locations.  These travel and storage concerns can impact a physical 
person’s freedom or access to privileges.    
 As humans, we lie on almost a daily basis, sometimes for altruistic reasons.  One 
must ask, if physical privacy and informational privacy are pitted against one another, 
which is more important?  Information can be associated with an individual for a variety 
of reasons but when an individual is physically located in space, time, and identity, that 
information is much more difficult to explain away.  As stated by Mark Andrejevic 
(2002), “If, in other words, what people say is potentially inaccurate, uninterpretable, or 
illusory, the body is offered as a guarantee of some surplus beyond the manipulations of 
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discourse” (p. 481).  FRT may show that we have manipulated or omitted information 
and it will do so by confirming our physical location or attributes as proof.     
 Even cognitive conceptions of privacy, the solitude of our minds to hold opinions 
and thoughts, are quickly becoming outdated and ineffective.  We like to believe that we 
have “control” over when to reveal our thoughts and opinions to others.  FRT has the 
ability to track eye movement, gauge an individual’s temperature, via infrared FRT, and 
monitor emotional affect based on pupil dilation, and other physical facial markers such 
as smiling or frowning.  As the technology continues to improve, it will be deployed in 
more locations, and has more images to compare an individual’s affect; soon the human 
face may betray emotions, providing insight into human cognition.   
 Privacy has also been thought of as a commodity (Papacharissi, 2010).  Private 
information can be given to retailers and other organizations in order to obtain some 
perceived benefit like targeted advertisements or possible discounts.  The problem with 
this view of privacy, although it arguably allows for the most individual autonomy, is that 
there are public interest exceptions.  Pictures are taken by the press, as photography is a 
First Amendment protected activity, and individuals are all but required to have state 
issued photo ID’s, all of which can detract from an individual’s ability to capitalize on 
commodifying one’s privacy.   
 Since FRT links or challenges individual conceptions of privacy, the academic 
community should stop making these distinctions.  Privacy must once again be thought of 
in its entirety.  How scholarship can wrestle this complex topic is less certain.  I believe 
that scholars should start to conceive of privacy in relation to interference of privacy.  
Interference is another subjective and context dependent term that is hard to pin down.  
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However, interference allows important research about privacy to continue.  Researchers 
can start by polling data to identify privacy interference as defined by individuals; they 
can then try to understand why individuals feel this way and work on pragmatic solutions 
to address the interference.  Since privacy must be addressed in its entirety, and because 
it remains a subjective and context dependent term, scholarship will need interference to 
address privacy considering it also accounts for the subjective and context dependent 
nature of privacy.  Another benefit of thinking about privacy in terms of interference is 
that no new definitions of privacy are created or added to the numerous definitions 
already in circulation.   
 FRT at the time of this writing had yet to seriously impact the general public’s 
views on privacy.  It is anticipated that as the technology becomes more prevalent in use, 
more accurate in its capabilities of both authentication and identification, as well as 
increasingly adopted by the public (democratization of surveillance), those individuals 
interested in protecting their privacy, will be forced to adopt some methods of FRT 









 This research has presented several findings that merit further exploration and 
comment.  The primary research interest in this data was the developing regulatory 
regime for facial recognition technology and how it impacts consumer privacy.  
However, a rarity occurred during this process in that, numerous stakeholders present in a 
previous process regarding consumer privacy were also involved in the process for facial 
recognition technology.  The multistakeholder literature noted this paucity, stating “Little 
information is available with regard to how processes build on or learn from previous 
experiences” (Hemmati, 2002, p. 119).  The academic community is offered an 
opportunity to inquire into this area as the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration is now charged with holding another MSH process on drone privacy 
(Mershon, 2014).   
 It is important to note that the same criticisms leveled against the MSH process 
for FRT are already being made against the NTIA MSH process for drones.  Individuals 
are still concerned that these processes do not involve government or law enforcement 
use of the technology, which is seen as a major obstacle for public acceptance of the 
regulation.  Similarly, the code of conduct to be created is voluntary, which opens the 
process up to further criticism.  Finally, the convener has once again been questioned as 
to his or her expertise in the area with some holding the opinion that the Federal Aviation 
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Administration would be a more appropriate convener.  Despite perceived or real 
shortcomings this new set of meetings provide an exciting opportunity for academics in 
the MSH field to interrogate how these processes can build on one another.   
 Regarding the process for FRT, this process has been limited in scope to strictly 
commercial uses of the technology.  With citizens being all but required to have 
identification credentials with their face on them, such as a driver’s license or state issued 
identification card, government uses of the technology should concern all citizens and not 
just consumers.  Scandals at the Internal Revenue Service and National Security Agency, 
as well as successful hacking attempts on federal government databases and the White 
House, call into question the trust citizens have with the government.  The government 
stores sensitive face data in their databases and have shown that they are not capable of 
adequately protecting it or providing the necessary oversight so that the data is not 
misused.  Government and law enforcement uses not being covered in a code of conduct 
for FRT is an important limitation of this process.   
 FRT presents a threat not only to consumers but also to citizens.  As has been 
shown FRT presents serious threats to how we currently view and interpret the First and 
Fourth Amendments.  FRT will likely present challenges to the First Amendment in the 
form of photography and free speech.  Who owns images and how those images are 
subsequently used, even for public interest exceptions, may require new interpretations of 
the First Amendment.  Depending on how the technology is regulated, FRT has the 
potential to stifle free speech.  Citizens may be less willing to exercise their First 
Amendment right, especially for controversial speech, if they feel that they will be 
identified by the technology.  As has been previously discussed, facial images can be 
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collected surreptitiously.  When these images are collected by the state, Fourth 
Amendment protections may be implicated.  Since facial images can be collected without 
the awareness of the target, the Fourth Amendment may need clarification from the 
United States Supreme Court as to what constitutes a burdensome search.   
 During this MSH process for FRT business interests have been prominently on 
display.  Consumers have a right to be skeptical about the privacy protections provided 
by a voluntary code of conduct.  The code of conduct is further called into question by 
the fact that the NTIA is housed in the Department of Commerce, an entity with a 
mandate to promote U.S. business.  As shown previously, the mission statement of the 
Department of Commerce does not contain a single mention of the word privacy, calling 
into question the value they place on such an important human right.  It is also ironic the 
amount of privacy that the business stakeholder group has requested during this process.  
The IBIA and other business entities prefer to discuss sensitive parts of a voluntary code 
of conduct offline (protecting their privacy) while simultaneously working to limit the 
many of the privacy protections proposed for consumers in the code of conduct such as 
notice of the technology’s use.  Despite these limitations the data collected may provide 
insight into other research questions.     
 Further exploration of this data may reveal important findings about the learning 
process in the MSH format and may hold important data for those seeking to interrogate 
how MSH processes can build on one another.  Stakeholders are generally either new to 
the MSH format or new to the topic of the MSH process.  Carryover stakeholders in this 
process were familiar with both the topic of the process, consumer privacy, and also the 
MSH format.  Many of the stakeholders interviewed in the first process admitted it was 
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complicated, frustrating, and disappointing.  It is worth noting that despite large amounts 
of animosity in the first process, that many of the carryover stakeholders found 
productive and respectful ways of communicating with each other during the subsequent 
process.  This suggests that stakeholders are able to start new beginnings for new 
processes despite aggravating results from previous processes.  In isolation, this case 
study suggests that there are positive benefits to be obtained during subsequent processes 
from negative experiences in previous processes.  This case suggests that stakeholders are 
willing to avoid similar negative experiences and find productive and respectful ways to 
interact.   
 The social constructivist paradigm has been adopted for this project.  The MSH 
meetings for FRT have been tasked with creating a voluntary code of conduct which will 
dictate appropriate uses of the technology and the privacy protections that must be 
observed.  This group will dictate how the technology is used.  Humans are not subject to 
determinism by technology, instead we are involved in the daily creation and production 
of our world.  As noted previously, cultural choices shape the use of technology, not the 
other way around (Nye, 2006).   
 This dissertation has asked three distinct research questions which merit further 
discussion.  The first research question is: “How is the regulatory regime of FRT 
emerging in the U.S.?”  The regulatory regime of FRT is emerging in the U.S. via the 
multistakeholder process.  As of now only a set of best practice recommendations from 
the FTC exist for common commercial uses of FRT.  The creation of a voluntary code of 
conduct for FRT has been under development at the NTIA for a year and a half with no 
tangible language yet in existence.  Stakeholders have expressed frustration with the 
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length of the process, lack of input from important business participants, the limited 
scope of the process, and the proposed regulations in the code itself.  It is unclear if this 
process will conclude with the creation of a voluntary code of conduct.  It is apparent to 
this researcher that voluntary codes of conduct that apply strictly for consumer uses of 
FRT provide inadequate privacy protection to both consumers and citizens at large.  It is 
hoped by this researcher that this process will conclude successfully with the creation of a 
code of conduct.  Meaningful legislation can then be passed that will provide robust 
privacy protection to both consumers and citizens that reflect the nuanced language 
achieved through this process to allow for responsible innovation and use of the 
technology.   
 The second research question asked was: “What are the roles of the various 
stakeholders in shaping the commercial regulation of FRT?”  There have been four 
primary stakeholder groups identified during this process: academics, government, 
business, and non-governmental organizations.  It is important to note that none of these 
groups are homogenous in their interests or values.  Academics have played an important 
role in providing information to the group on topics ranging from how the technology 
works to how the technology can be misused.  Both business and NGO stakeholder 
groups have had academics present information that reflects their values.  During this 
process, business entities have often been reluctant to discuss how they currently use the 
technology or what their plans for future use are.  Business participants have argued for 
minimal regulation to allow for continued innovation of the technology.  NGO 
participants have argued for increased privacy safeguards.  NGO interests range from 
supporting Congressional legislation, providing special safeguards for minors, to concern 
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about the potential for discrimination.  While these positions have been advocated for it 
remains to be seen how they will be accounted for in any potential code of conduct.  
Finally, government participants have had an important role in the process.  The NTIA 
has convened the meetings and have had a hands off approach facilitating the process.  
The NTIA has exercised influence over the process by encouraging stakeholders to not 
consider government and law enforcement uses of the technology.  The only other 
identified government participant has been the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s 
office of Ontario Canada.  This participant has largely observed the process but has also 
influenced the process by explaining that reverse engineering of FRT data is possible, 
increasing the privacy protections of the potential code of conduct. 
 The third research question asked was: “How does FRT challenge our current 
conceptions of privacy?”  Depending on whether or not an individual has a property right 
interest in images, facial templates, and the integers created by the application of FRT, 
liberal notions of privacy may change.  As previously discussed academics have 
discussed privacy in the narrowed conceptions of informational, physical, and cognitive 
privacy.  FRT conflates all of these conceptions rendering them less useful than in the 
past.  It has been argued that privacy should be thought of in terms of interference to 
account for these conceptions and the subjective and contextual nature of privacy itself.  
Should courts decide that an individual has a property right in the their image, facial 
template, or the integers created as a result of the application of FRT, consumers and 
citizens may have stronger legal recourse in protecting their privacy interests.  Much 
remains to be seen for the future of privacy in the context of FRT depending on the 
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potential creation of a code of conduct, legal rulings, and possible congressional 
legislation.    
 This research contributes to the academic literature in the following ways. 
 FRT conflates previous distinctions of privacy made by scholars 
(informational, physical, and cognitive); these distinctions are no longer 
pragmatic ways of viewing privacy and its violation. 
 Since FRT conflates privacy distinctions, academics need to re-conceptualize 
privacy as interference to allow for the subjective and contextual nature of 
privacy. 
 The emerging regulatory regime for FRT is being created via a voluntary code 
of conduct.  The MSH process represents a novel way to regulate 
communication technology. 
 Voluntary codes of conduct, while flexible enough to allow innovation for the 
technology, provide insufficient privacy protection due to their voluntary 
nature. 
 The series of NTIA MSH meetings regarding consumer privacy protection 
offers researchers a unique opportunity to understand how MSH processes and 
its participants build upon one another in both positive and negative ways, 
which currently stands as an under researched academic area. 
 Academic literature does not use the term “Regulation of Technology” yet 
such a field does exist. 
 Further exploration is needed to substantiate what amount to my musings on a 
tangentially related findings from this research.  It remains unclear if the negative 
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experiences from the first process led to more productive interactions or if simple 
experience are responsible for the increased camaraderie and productivity.  Since no new 
code of conduct has been created, it remains to be seen if the added experience will lead 
to higher rates of adoption or a code that has more intended benefits.  These aspects of 
the MSH process warrant further exploration.   
 Secondly, this project has proposed and shown some of the merits of re-
conceptualizing privacy as interference.   This conception is untested and merits further 
consideration or study from privacy scholars.  I contend that conceptualizing privacy as 
interference will lead the study of privacy in a more pragmatic direction, encouraging 
scholars to detect and solve privacy grievances rather than create definitions of privacy 
ad infinitum or merely point out the limits or problems of current conceptions of privacy.  
While I believe in the merits of interference I have not personally tested this conception 
nor have I received challenges on this conception, therefore, I cautiously suggest this 
alternative way to study privacy.   
 Finally, this research promised to track the developing regulatory regime for FRT 
via a voluntary code of conduct to protect consumer privacy.  This process has been 
lengthy, in excess of a year and a half, and with no clear ending or tangible code of 
conduct in sight.  The next meeting is scheduled for June 11, 2015.  The regulatory 
regime for FRT is hampered by the voluntary nature of any code of conduct created, if 
there is one at all.  The voluntary nature of the code of conduct is ultimately the biggest 
limitation of this process.  If companies do not wish to, or cannot, comply they simply 
will not ascribe to the code.  This provides the consumer with potentially very little 
protection even if a code of conduct is created.  Consumers are also well within their 
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right to be skeptical of this process as it has been facilitated by the Department of 
Commerce, a department with no history of privacy protection and whose sole charge is 
to promote American business interests.  Codes of conduct are simply no replacement for 
legislation and research has shown that the American public vastly prefers legislation to 
alternative proposals: 
A February 2002 Harris Poll showed that 63% of respondents thought 
current law inadequate to protect privacy. A June 2001 Gallup poll 
indicated that two-thirds of respondents favored new federal legislation to 
protect privacy online. A July 2001 Markle Foundation study concluded 
that 64% favored rules to protect consumers on the Internet, and 58% 
reported that self-regulation wasn't enough to ensure adequate 
accountability. A March 2000 BusinessWeek/Harris Poll found that 57% 
of respondents favored laws that would regulate how personal information 
is used. In that same poll, only 15% supported self-regulation (Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, 2015a).   
Ultimately, if the current administration wants to be taken seriously by the American 
public with regard to privacy protection, stronger protections will need to be enacted.   
 I would be remiss to dismiss the benefits that a voluntary code of conduct presents 
to the business community, as well as the technology.  If a voluntary code of conduct is 
created, its voluntary nature will promote innovation of the technology in potentially 
productive and imaginative ways, most of which will benefit the business community 
financially.  Legislation is often strict in scope and purpose and would most likely 
eliminate certain uses of the technology, even those that are beneficial to society.  Given 
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the nascent nature of the technology, caution should be exercised before advocating for 
comprehensive legislation regarding FRT.          
Appendix A 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Privacy Principles 
 
 
Principle Definition Context of Use 
Legality Government’s legal authority 
to invade an individual’s 
privacy as well as the legal 
restrictions involved in doing 
so.   
Search warrants used to 
search communications must 
specify what information is 
being sought 
Legitimate Aim Only certain communications 
can be surveilled by specified 
state actors for legitimate 
reasons 
Not all state actors have 
surveillance powers and those 
should only be used pursuant 
to a search warrant 
Necessity Gathering only the 
information necessary to build 
the government’s case 
Only communications 
detailing illegal or sought 
after activity should be 
collected 
Adequacy Appropriate levels of 
surveillance are to be used 
The minimum amount of 
surveillance necessary to 
achieve goals should be used.  
Searching individuals not 
associated with a crime is 
prohibited.  i.e. friends and 
family 
Proportionality Recognition that the 
government has 
disproportionate power to 
invade a citizen’s privacy 
rather than vice versa.   
Citizens do not possess mass 
surveillance capabilities as the 
government does.  
Government must limit scope 
of their inquiries 
Competent Judicial Authority Impartial judicial authority 
must be obtained prior to 
surveilling communications 
Appropriate and unbiased 
judicial authority must be 
sought for legitimate invasion 
of privacy 
Due Process Ensures a fair, impartial, and 
public hearing for any human 
right infringement 
 
User Notification Users must be notified their 
communications are being 
surveilled unless there are 
exigent circumstances 
Search warrants must specify 
what is being sought from the 
individual.   
Transparency Citizens should be provided Details of the surveillance 
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notice about when, the extent 
to which, and the tools used 
to invade privacy 
must be provided for the 
individual to appropriately 
defend themselves in court 
Public Oversight Ensures legitimacy and 
transparency of the 
government 
e.g. The EU has public 
oversight offices to protect 
against government 
corruption or zealotry  
Integrity of Communication 
Systems 
The government cannot 
compel software/hardware 
providers to build in 
surveillance capabilities 
Private firms cannot be 
compelled to aid in 
government surveillance 
Safeguards for International 
Cooperation 
Where state and national laws 
overlap, the ones with the 
higher individual protections 
should be used 
The highest privacy 
protections for citizens should 
be used to balance the 




Legislation ensuring against 
illegal government or private 
communication surveillance 
e.g. Bill of Rights, or 
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Definitions for NTIA Privacy Multistakeholder Facial Recognition  
 
Draft – July 21 - 2014 
Algorithm:  A limited sequence of instructions or steps that directs a computer system 
how to solve a particular problem or perform a function.49   
Custodian:  The entity or individual that holds Facial Recognition Data 
Database:  The facial recognition system’s database or set of known subjects.  May 
include Facial Templates. 
Delete:  To make unreadable Facial Recognition Data so that after deletion it cannot be 
used by reasonable means.50 
OR  
To remove (something, such as words, pictures, or computer files) from a document, 
recording, computer, etc.51 
Encryption:  The protection of data using reasonable means that have been generally 
accepted by experts in the field of information security, which renders such data 
unintelligible or unreadable. 
Enroll:  The process of storing and maintaining Facial Recognition Data.  
Entity using Facial Recognition:  An entity that uses Facial Recognition Systems to 
Collect and/or Use Facial Recognition Data about Subjects. 
Existing Privacy Laws and Regulations: Any state or federal law or regulation that 
governs the collection or use of personal data from a Subject, where Facial Recognition 
Data could be considered one type of such data.  These laws and regulations may include, 
but are not limited to, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, the Children's Online Privacy Protection, the California Online 
Privacy Protection Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, and state UDAP (“Unfair or Deceptive Acts or 
Practices”) laws. 
                                                          
49 National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary definition 
of “Algorithm”: “A limited sequence of instructions or steps that tells a computer system how to solve a 
particular problem. A biometric system will have multiple algorithms, for example: image processing, 
template generation, comparisons, etc.”  
50 Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary 
definition of “Identification:” “A task where the biometric system searches a database for a reference 
matching a submitted biometric sample, and if found, returns a corresponding identity. A biometric is 
collected and compared to all the references in a database. Identification is “closed-set” if the person is 
known to exist in the database. In “open-set” identification, sometimes referred to as a “watchlist,” the 
person is not guaranteed to exist in the database. The system must determine whether the person is in the 
database, then return the identity.” 
51 Merrian Webster definition of “delete”: “to remove (something, such as words, pictures, or computer 
files) from a document, recording, computer, etc.” 
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Facial Authentication:  A task where the Facial Recognition System attempts to confirm 
an individual’s claimed identity by comparing the template generated from a submitted 
face image with a specific known template generated from a previously enrolled face 
image.  This process is also called one-to-one verification.52 
Facial Detection:  A task where the Facial Recognition System distinguishes the 
presence of a human face and/or facial characteristics without necessarily creating or 
deriving a Facial Template.53 
Facial Detection Software:  Software used to detect the presence of a human face.54 
Facial Identification:  Searching a database for a reference matching a submitted Facial 
Template and returning a corresponding identity.55 
Facial Recognition Data:  Data derived from the application of Facial Recognition 
Software, including Facial Template and associated metadata. 
Facial Recognition Software:  Software used to compare the visible physical structure 
of an individual’s face with a stored Facial Template.56 
Facial Recognition System: A system that uses Facial Recognition Software. 
Facial Template: A digital representation of distinct characteristics of a Subject’s face, 
representing information extracted from a photograph using a facial recognition 
algorithm.57  
Facial Image:  A photograph or video frame or other image that shows the visible 
physical structure of an individual’s face 
Operation of Facial Detection Software:  Facial Detection Software is considered “in 
operation” when the process of Facial Detection is occurring. 
Secure Storage of Information:  Using commercially reasonable measures to secure 
information.58 
                                                          
52 Definition based on comments from Walter Hamilton and John Dowden. 
53 Change based on definition of Facial Profiling created and submitted by Ariel Johnson and the FTC’s 
report refers in the Case Study section to “the detection or recognition of demographic characteristics” (p. 
13) 
54 Definition based on comments from stakeholders during May 20, 2014 meeting. 
55 Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary 
definition of “Identification” and “Detection Rate”: “The rate at which individuals, who are in a database, 
are properly identified in an open-set identification (watchlist) application. See also open-set identification, 
watchlist.” 
 
57 Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary 
definition of “Template”: “a digital representation of an individual’s distinct characteristics, representing 
information extracted from a biometric sample. Templates are used during biometric authentication as the 
basis for comparison. See also extraction, feature, model.”  
57 Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary 
definition of “Template”: “a digital representation of an individual’s distinct characteristics, representing 
information extracted from a biometric sample. Templates are used during biometric authentication as the 
basis for comparison. See also extraction, feature, model.”  
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Share Information:  The disclosure of information to an entity other than the Entity 
using Facial Recognition or Subject. 
Subject: The individual represented in a Facial Recognition System and/or a facial 
recognition database.59 
Threshold: A user setting for Facial Recognition Systems for authentication, verification 
or identification.  The acceptance or rejection of a Facial Template match is dependent on 
the match score falling above or below the threshold.  The threshold is adjustable within 
the Facial Recognition System.60 
                                                                                                                                                                             
58 Based, in part, Article 4A-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) requirements for bank 
transfers: “If a bank and its customer have agreed that the authenticity of payment orders . . . will be 
verified pursuant to a security procedure, a payment order . . . is effective as the order of the customer . . .if: 
(a) The security procedure is a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized 
payment orders;” 
59 Based on the National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics 
Glossary definition of “User”: “A person, such as an administrator, who interacts with or controls end 
users’ interactions with a biometric system. See also cooperative user, end user, indifferent user, non-
cooperative user, uncooperative user”  However, separated out to clarify the subject and the user are 
different. 
60 Based on National Science & Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics - Biometrics Glossary 
definition of “Threshold”: “A user setting for biometric systems operating in the verification or open-set 
identification (watchlist) tasks. The acceptance or rejection of biometric data is dependent on the match 
score falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable so that the biometric system can be 
more or less strict, depending on the requirements of any given biometric application. See also comparison, 




Mission Statement of the Department of Commerce 
 
Mission Statement 
The mission of the Department is to create the conditions for economic growth and 
opportunity. 
As part of the Obama administration’s economic team, the Secretary of Commerce serves 
as the voice of U.S. business within the President’s Cabinet. The Department works with 
businesses, universities, communities, and the Nation’s workers to promote job creation, 
economic growth, sustainable development, and improved standards of living for 
Americans. Through its 12 bureaus and nearly 47,000 employees located in all 50 states 
and territories and more than 86 countries worldwide, the Department administers critical 
programs that touch the lives of every American. The Department’s workforce is as 
diverse as its mission. It is made of up economists, Nobel winning scientists, foreign 
service officers, patent attorneys, law enforcement officers, and specialists in everything 
from international trade to aerospace engineering. 
The Department is comprised of 12 bureaus that work together to drive progress in four 
business facing key goal areas: 




The underlying strength of the Department is the ability for its bureaus to work together 





List of Acronyms Used 
 
ACA   Affordable Care Act 
ACLU  American Civil Liberties Union 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
CDT  Center for Democracy and Technology 
CPBR  Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
DA  Discourse Analysis 
DNS  Domain Name System 
EU  European Union 
EXIF  Extended File Information 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FIPPS  Fair Information Practice Principles 
FR  Facial Recognition 
FRT  Facial Recognition Technology 
FTC  Federal Trade Commission 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act  
IBIA  International Biometrics Industry Association 
ICANN International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
IGF  Internet Governance Forum 
IRS  Internal Revenue Service 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
MATP  Mobile Application Transparency Process 
MDA  Mediated Discourse Analysis 
MSH  Multistakeholder 
NGO  Non-government Organization 
NIST  National Institute for Standards and Technology 
NSA  National Security Agency 
NTIA  National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLG  Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation  
PII  Personally Identifiable Information 
PPI  Personally Predictive Information 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification Chip 
SSN  Social Security Number 
TQM  Total Quality Management 
UCC  Uniform Commercial Code 
USSC  United States Supreme Court 




Provisions of the NTIA 
 
Provisions of the Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data61 
• Accurate, up to date, relevant, and not excessive data 
• Used only for legitimate purposes for which it was originally collected 
• Stored in a form that does not permit identification for longer than the original 
 purpose for which it was collected 
• Data can be processed only with the consent of the individual, when legally 
 required, or to protect the public interest or legitimate private interests 
• Processing of sensitive data such as race, political opinion, religious beliefs and 
 others are severely limited and generally require written consent from the 
 individual 
• Disclosure must be provided to the individual about the purposes for processing 
personal data, if any response is needed, the right to access and correct data, as well as 
provide notice when information has been collected without his/her consent 
• The right to obtain data without excessive constraint, expense, or delay data 
relating to the individual 
• The right to correct or delete information that is incomplete or inaccurate 
• The right to data security against accidental or unlawful destruction, alteration, 
access, and disclosure.  
                                                          
61 (Cate, 1994) 
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• Each state will establish an independent public authority to monitor data 
protection  
• Data processors must also notify relevant national authorities before data 
processing 
• The right not to be subject to legal decisions made about him/her from 
automated processing 
• Laws must be established to provide for civil liabilities against data 
controllers for unlawful processing 
• Establish laws prohibiting the transfer of data to non-member states that fail 










Research Question Interview Question Follow Up Question 
How is the regulatory 
regime of FRT emerging in 
the U.S.? 
How did you get involved in 
this process? 
It is claimed the MSH process is 
a novelty in public policy 
creation.  What is your view on 
MSH? 
 Have you been involved in 
similar MSH processes?  
If yes.  How can you compare 
experiences in this process as 
compared with others?  
(Internet governance, Internet 
neutrality) 
 During the meetings, some 
civil society stakeholders have 
criticized the validity of the 
MSH process.  Do you agree or 
disagree with this view? 
If yes.  What are your 
objections?   
 In your opinion, is there any 
consensus emerging about the 
following issues: regulatory 
safeguards, privacy 
safeguards, regulation of 
innovative technologies.   
Which groups have been most 
influential in forming 
consensus? 
  How were process mechanisms 
managed for consensus 
building? 
 
 Which are the areas of 
discussion where you learned 
the most? 
Can you specify topics that 
you’ve learned the most about? 
 In your opinion, what are the 
benefits or deficits of 
innovating a code of conduct 
via the MSH process versus a 
professional association or a 
private company? 
 
What are the roles of the 
various stakeholders in 
shaping the commercial 
regulation of FRT? 
Describe your role in the FRT 
MSH process. 
Were there some stakeholders 
who were more helpful or more 
of a hindrance to the process.   
 Were there stakeholders who 
were more vocal at the 
meetings than others? 
Were there any behind the 
scenes meetings? 
 Other than increased 
participation, were there 
What other factors impacted 
the influence that stakeholders 
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other reasons why 
stakeholders may have had 
more or less influence on the 
meetings? 
had on the meeting? 
 Has the size of stakeholder 
organizations or their 
reputation influenced the 
MSH process? 
Was there an impact on the 
process? 
 What has been the role of the 
civil society in this process? 
Have they been successful in 
voicing concerns of users? If yes.  
Who and on what points? 
 
 Do you think the convener of 
the NTIA MSH meetings had a 
particular influence on the 
process and outcomes? 
If yes.  Which processes or 
outcomes were impacted? 
  How were these processes or 
outcomes impacted? 
How does FRT challenge 
current conceptions of 
privacy? 
Privacy is defined differently 
by different people.  Does FRT 
challenge our conceptions of 
data privacy, personal privacy, 
or in other ways? 
In your view, how should we 
think about this issue 
differently? 






Are privacy concerns more 
heightened because of this 
technology or is this an old 





If yes.  What facets of FRT are 
presenting challenges and why? 
 From you observation, would 
it be accurate to say that all 
stakeholders understand 
privacy in similar terms? If 
not, what are the distinct 
interpretations of privacy? 
 
 If we define privacy 
differently, are there new 
safeguards we must consider? 
Why are these safeguards 
important? 
 What are the most important 
considerations we must now 
think through for a new 




 "Security vs. Privacy" is the 
usual argument when issues 
of surveillance by the 
government are discussed. 
Are there any alternative 
arguments proposed during 
the NTIA multistakeholder 
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